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NGOs have come to occupy center stage in emergency relief and development 
work in the past twenty years. This study looks at the efforts made by international 
actors–both official donors and international NGOs– in developing the capacities of local 
organizations in Burundi during the decade of civil strife since 1993. While the needs of 
democratization set the agenda for most peace building programs, the priorities of 
donors in conflict afflicted countries may not always lead to financial commitments, nor 
match the needs of emerging civil society organizations.  Using field interviews and 
document analysis, this study analyzes the development and the challenges of civil 
organizations in Burundi, which are marked by the political developments distinctive to 
the country.  Donor programs, including work in critical peacebuilding sectors of media, 
human rights, gender and basic education are examined in detail, and aid donors are 
shown to have had particular difficulty encouraging the organizational autonomy that is 
required for Burundian civil society organizations to become effective civic and political 
actors.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION  
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Capacity development (CD) is a concept that emerged in the 1980s and reflects 
many ideas and lessons learned from international development practices, particularly 
in the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  It has now become a central 
issue in technical cooperation and is often assimilated with capacity building or 
institutional development, all indicating the strengthening of existing capacities in a 
given context.   
 
As donors increase their funding in emergency and post-war reconstruction 
programs, scholars and practitioners largely agree that civil society organizations 
(CSOs) should be at the center stage, either in conventional development or in conflict 
situations. The idea of participation of civil society organizations in policy-making as well 
as in service delivery is in itself commendable. However, in a fragile state where ethnic 
cleavage has undermined private and public institutions, can local organizations 
contribute positively to the efforts of peacebuilding? Where civil society is deeply 
affected by political divisions, the work of local organizations, the coordination among 
them and their impact on their ground can be questioned.  Moreover, donors are not 
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always comfortable working with traditional local organizations, which differ from 
western organizational models in many aspects. This research analyses the donors‘ 
practices in supporting Burundian CSOs which have grown significantly after a civil war 
that erupted in 1993 and lasted more than a decade. The growth of the CSOs has 
paralleled with a strong presence of donors particularly International Non-Government 
Organizations (INGOS), which have influenced and shaped CSOs‘ participation in the 
peace process. The purpose of the analysis is to assess the trends of the donors‘ 
influence to the development and actions of the CSOs in peacebuilding programs from 
1993 to 2005, when elections to implement peace negotiations occurred.  
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN 
BURUNDI 
Successive periods of ethnic-based political conflicts have characterized Burundi since 
its independence in 1962. The latest wave of violence followed the assassination of the 
first elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye on October 21, 2003. Within days of his 
assassination, mass killings perpetrated by the Hutu occurred, retaliated later by the 
Tutsi army on the Hutu population. An estimated 300 to 400 hundred thousand civilians 
were killed and about 1.3 million (16% of the population) became internally displaced 
and refugees1. Although Burundians traditionally did not mobilize politically around their 
ethnic identity prior to the colonial period, the last forty years have been marked by 
                                                 
1 “Conflict-sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi”. The World Bank‟s Social Development Papers. Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction. Paper No. 27 /June 2005 
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cycles of violence that increased ethnic divisions which many foreign observers, as well 
as Burundians perceive as an elite-driven manipulation of power. Ethnicity is only one 
aspect of the cleavages. History has shown that alliances across clan and regional 
identities have been even stronger contributors to the differences in power sharing 
between the two ethnic groups. 
  
After the violence in 1993, several attempts to reach compromises were 
undertaken to bring together Hutu and Tutsi political leaders; first under the leadership 
of Julius Nyerere, and after his death in 1999, headed by Nelson Mandela. The goal of 
the international community in the support for negotiations was 1) to establish a 
transitional government where both ethnic groups would share power; and 2) to 
restructure the army in a way that Tutsi and Hutu would be represented in equal 
proportions. The main challenge was to focus on talks between the Burundi army and 
the rebel groups operating from Tanzania and the democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
to keep an armistice. A first partial peace and reconciliation agreement was signed in 
Arusha, Tanzania in August 2000. An important part of this Agreement was 
implemented as the new Transitional Government was installed in 2002. However the 
fighting between the National Army and the divided armed opposition groups continued. 
It was only in 2003 that a comprehensive peace agreement between the transitional 
government and the political branch of the major rebel group, the CNDD-FDD (National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy) was put in place. Although the other belligerent 
group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL) was not part of this peace agreement, the 
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international community in Burundi considered the signing of the Agreement as a major 
milestone.   
 
The peace agreements of 2002 and 2003 explain the present political landscape, 
marked by two transitional governments from 2001 to 2005. Democratic elections were 
held in 2005 resulting into a 5 year mandate for the current president, Pierre Nkurunziza 
of the political party CNDD-FDD. Under the Arusha Agreement, the Army and the 
Senate are to be constituted of 50 percent Hutu, 50 percent Tutsi; the government is 
made-up of 60 percent Hutu, 40 percent Tutsi; the National Assembly has the same 
ratio. Although the Arusha Agreement did not represent a consensus among all political 
parties, the major players in the armed conflict took part in the negotiations. In the eyes 
of donors, the fact that members of the former armed opposition groups have joined the 
Transitional Government as well as and the integration of former rebel fighters into the 
National Army was an encouraging sign of progress in peace efforts. 
1.3 EMPHASIS ON CIVIL ACTORS  
 During the period of civil war, the presence of international actors in Burundi 
increased sharply in response to the crisis. On the development front, foreign 
assistance gradually diminished and shifted from poverty reduction programs to peace 
building and relief assistance due to the political developments.   As observed in many 
other countries affected by civil war, responses to emergencies outweigh assistance for 
economic recovery but provide opportunities for CSOs to flourish and engage in service 
   5 
delivery. Moreover, the discussion of capacity building in development theory indicates 
that there is a growing focus on community-driven development and peacebuilding 
strategies, most importantly in post-conflict settings. Similarly, the need to reach 
vulnerable populations affected by the war in Burundi has prompted donors to rely on 
local partnerships with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as well as 
local civil society organizations in responding to the crisis. The situation has resulted in 
a remarkable surge of local civil society organizations (CSOs). AFRICARE, an 
American NGO working in Burundi, reported in 2000 that 49% of the more than 600 
NGOs registered emerged after 1992.  Eighty percent of these 600 NGOs were created 
after 19802. The latest research on local civil society organizations by Sebundandi & 
Nduwayo (2002) indicates the existence of more than 1,400 CSOs in Burundi in 2002. 
The same authors report a growth rate of 80 local organizations officially approved 
every year in addition to unreported community associations.  
 
The growth of CSOs and the presence of INGOS paralleled with an increasing 
role of these organizations in peacebuilding efforts with the support of donors. This 
research analyses this support as well as the dynamics of relationships that 
characterized aid donors and Burundi CSOs during the period of civil strife. 
                                                 
2 R.P. Herisse, former AFRICARE country Director in Burundi in his reflection paper „Democracy, Governance and 
conflicts in Burundi‟2000. 
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1.4 THESIS OF THE RESEARCH 
Donors have enormous impact on INGOs and civil society organizations‘ 
priorities everywhere. This is even more strongly the case where the civil society is 
fragile and recovering from conflict, and where donors are focused on human relief, as 
in Burundi. Although the new aid paradigm emphasizes civil society actors, the findings 
of the research show that while many resources are spent on the public sector where 
the relationship donor-state and capacity building activities are well defined, the same 
cannot be said for civil society organizations. The minimal financial support and the 
typical short-term project approach to CSOs‘ programs leads neither to the sustainable 
results sought by donors, nor the autonomy of civil society organizations that is 
necessary to fulfill their expected role towards state actors. Where there are acute 
humanitarian needs and pressing political priorities, donors find it difficult to follow their 
own best practices in the support given to CSOs. Moreover, the effects of war and 
social divisions exacerbated by poverty show that local NGOs are not equipped well 
enough to carry out sustainable programs of development and peacebuilding. The 
dependence on external aid indicates that the success of the few CSOs could be short-
lived, and that the preponderance of CSOs activities could simply be oriented towards 
democratization themes promoted by donors, allowing access to funds and hence, 
survival. How dependent are NGOs and CSOs upon donors and what type of local 
capacity building are donors involved in? How are Burundian CSOs prepared to carry 
out peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts and how do they counter-balance the 
actions of the government? These are some of the questions that the research 
explores. The type of activities promoted and methods used by donors to deliver 
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assistance will be analyzed as evidence to test CD common principles and practices. 
The goal of the analysis focuses on:  
 
a. Discovering the extent to which the key players within the donor 
community are engaged in local capacity development and assessing their 
collaboration, partnerships or linkages in delivering assistance;  
 
b. Analyzing how the dynamics of the conflict have affected the strategies of 
capacity development of Burundian NGOs; and  
 
c. Identifying the type of CD activities and the tools that are used by donors 
to evaluate their programs‘ progress and effectiveness.  
 
 In assessing and evaluating CD strategic practices, the research will be guided 
by general theoretical approaches to capacity development including organizational 
strengthening (Horton, 2003), institutional development (North, 1990; Uphoff, 1986) and 
by the commonly used approaches to peacebuilding. The prevalence of international 
non-government organizations (INGOs) in conflict-affected African countries and 
elsewhere means that there exist considerable field-based reports from aid-practitioners 
and donors‘ strategic reports on similar cases such as Burundi. These resources will 
serve as references to identify the common practices of donors in other emergency or 
post-emergency situations.  
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The main findings of the analysis are organized in four chapters. The first part of 
the findings provides a historical background on traditional civil society organizations. 
The purpose of this analysis is to have a perspective of non-government organizations 
that are generally found in Africa with respect to the expected roles and functions of civil 
society actors in Western models. 
 
 The second part of the findings presents an overview of donors‘ policies; the 
new trends of development assistance to Burundi with a particular look at the features 
that pertain to CSOs capacity building. 
 
The third part of the findings addresses the specific activities that donors have 
undertaken to develop the capacities of CSOs. The part identifies the themes around 
which programs and projects promoted by donors are designed and how the themes 
relate to the development of CSOs. 
 
Concluding remarks to the findings are provided in the last chapter. There is a 
constant interest in capacity development among international development scholars 
and practitioners, and the results of this research with contribute to the existing body of 
literature on local CSOs and their capacity building in Africa. Mostly, it is hoped that the 
study will inspire policy making for local institutional building in Burundi.  
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1.5 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.5.1    Framing capacity development 
The concept of capacity development is not new and it is a widely used term in the 
international development field. In the UN literature, capacity is described as a way in 
which development occurs and it is an essential part of the operational activities of the 
UN.3 Capacity development as used in this research will refer to:  
 
‗The process by which individuals, groups, organizations and societies 
increase their abilities to perform functions, solve problems and achieve 
objectives; to understand and deal with their development need in a broader 
context and in a sustainable manner‘4.  
 
Commonly associated with capacity building, institutional development or 
organizational development, capacity development can be seen as an umbrella concept 
(Morgan, 1998) and has become the new ‗way‘ of development.  As an ‗umbrella‘ 
concept, it builds on ideas found in development theories of the last fifty years. The 
emerging consensus among development practitioners is that all development activities 
involve some sort of capacity development. These activities are conducted over the long 
term, contributing to sustainable social and economic development that is demand 
                                                 
3  UN General Assembly Resolution –UN, A/RES/50/120 Art.22 
4   UNDP, 1997.“Capacity Development.” New York:  Management development and governance division. UNDP 
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driven5. Understood as such, capacity development encompasses other approaches to 
development that foster ownership and a reduced dominant role of donor-led projects. 
For instance, the new institutionalism theory or the development by the people 
approach that emerged in the last two decades calls for recognition of indigenous 
capacities and a consideration of other factors such as the enabling environment, a 
culture which includes existing networks among institutions and organizations that favor 
sustainability and ownership.  
   
The earlier institutional approach suggested building institutions from scratch 
using universal models imported from industrial countries. Capacity development, as a 
new perspective to development, responds to the structural and functional disconnect 
between the indigenous and formal institutions mostly transplanted from the West (Dia, 
1996). Capacity development seeks to remedy the neoclassical development 
approaches of the 1970s which did not pay enough attention to human resource 
development. Newer development theories want to bring in the element of social 
aspects of development, and define development as a process of enlarging people‘s 
choices in a much broader sense than proposed by mainstream economists. Capacity 
development in general includes various strategies and methodologies that reflect this 
need to move away from the alien models of the industrialized world that characterized 
earlier development economic concepts; and to focus more attention on how to instill 
autonomous and sustainable local capacities. 
                                                 
5
   
“Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation” in Universalia
 
occasional  papers No 
35, September 1999 
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The various aspects of capacity development suggest that there are different 
dimensions of capacity (e.g., individual, organizational, societal), each requiring a level 
of analysis and an entry level for a capacity intervention. Some see capacity 
development as (1) a development objective or target, such as targeting the 
development of individuals or organizational capacity.  The target could also be a 
sector, such as agricultural or health. In both of these instances, development indicates 
what core capacities to develop. Others describe capacity development as (2) a 
process, as for example, when suggesting an approach to reducing poverty, outlining 
the how and the principles that characterize it6.  Alan Fowler (1997) provides a typology 
of capacity development and distinguishes capacity development as both a process and 
purpose (in other words, a means to an end) as shown in table 1.  
                                                 
6   CIDA Occasional Paper, Vol.1 No1, May 2000 
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Table 1: Concepts of Capacity Building 
  Means Process Ends 
Building the 
capacity of an 
organization: 
organizational 
development 
Strengthens the 
organization's ability 
to perform specific 
functions, such as 
refugee-camp 
management 
Builds coherence within 
internal operations; 
develops the possibility 
of continued learning 
and adaptation 
Improves the 
organization's viability, 
sustainability, and 
impact in relation to its 
mission 
Building the 
capacity of an 
institutional sub- 
sector (e.g., 
health, credit, 
emergency 
assistance): 
sectoral 
development 
Strengthens the 
ability of the sector or 
sub sector to 
improve its overall 
impact 
Develops mutually 
supporting relations and 
understanding within the 
sector or sub sector 
Achieves confident 
and meaningful 
interaction with other 
sectors and social 
actors based on 
shared strategies and 
learning  
Adapted from Alan Fowler, “Striking the Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NGOs in 
International Development” (1997) 
 
The typology summarized above suggests that building capacity requires serious 
attention to target and purpose, as well as to the process. The concepts of capacity 
development, whether perceived as either objective, purpose or process, underline 
most importantly the recognition of the values of the peoples involved, giving them an 
opportunity to have a say in setting their priorities.  
 
In general, the literature of capacity development indicates practices, methods, 
tools, activities, and principles that should characterize capacity development 
interventions as summarized below:  
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 Local participation and locally driven agenda: local people set their priorities 
 Building on local capacities: exploring local resources 
 Ownership and respect of local values: indigenous models and local culture are 
emphasized 
 Long-term vision: ensuring continuity of projects and maximize impact 
 Targeting sustainable results: improving the organization‘s viability 
  
From the donor‘s perspective, these principles have implications in policy design 
and in the delivery of assistance. The focus of this research is to examine how these 
implications are applied to the case of Burundian civil society organizations. 
1.5.2 Working definitions 
NGOs 
The term non-governmental organization (NGO) actually carries with it a specific 
meaning, generally noting an organization that is run by private citizens outside of the 
government sector. NGOs are considered actors within the private sector. In the relief 
and development sector, the term is used to describe civil organizations that require 
funding from external sources to design, implement and manage their programming in 
providing specialized services to government agencies, victims of emergencies and 
regions in need of relief and development7.  
                                                 
7 CDHAM resource “A Guide to NGOs: A primer about private, voluntary non-governmental organizations.” 
Available at ReliefWeb policy &issues resources: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/ 
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NGOs are also referred to as ‗non-profit organizations‘ or ‗non-profit‘ and obtain 
funding to support their varied humanitarian activities from numerous sources including 
government agencies, private organizations, foundation grants and individual 
contributions. NGOs that operate in humanitarian emergencies may vary in their 
mission, objectives, specialty, expertise or funding requirements but despite these 
differences, they also have similarities. A major similarity is the needy population or 
target group they serve. In the last thirty years, the capacity to mitigate, manage and 
respond to humanitarian emergencies has grown considerably. In the countries in which 
NGOs operate, they constitute crucial partners with government bodies, the military, 
national staff and the community or local organizations with whom they collaborate to 
carry out their work. 
 
The term local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society 
organizations (CSOs) will be used interchangeably and will refer to Burundi non-
governmental organizations. Local NGOs will encompass ‗grassroots‘ organizations, 
voluntary organizations, ‗non-profits‘ or charities.  In the development discourse, local 
NGOs or international NGOs can both be referred to as voluntary organizations to 
denote the public service and community orientation that NGOs generally have. In this 
study, local organizations will mean Burundi civil society organizations; and international 
NGOs that operate in Burundi will be referred to as INGOs.   
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Institutions 
The term ―Institution‖ as understood in the development theory, are the "rules of 
the game", consisting of both the formal practices and the informal social norms that 
govern individual behavior and structure social interactions. The environments in which 
institutions operate influence their development. By contrast, organizations are social 
arrangements which pursue collective goals, control their own performance, and have 
boundaries separating them from their environment. Donors‘ initiatives in capacity 
development usually target institutions of the public sector (formal organizations) as well 
as the private sector.  In the study, traditional systems in the Burundi context will be 
referred to as institutions whereas actors supported by donors in the private sector are 
referred to as organizations.    
 
Donors 
This study will refer to donors as the group of bilateral and multilateral 
organizations that provide development or humanitarian assistance. Given the context 
of political instability characterizing the timeframe studied, development activities were 
limited. The emphasis will be to follow the channeled assistance to build local capacities 
in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding.  INGOs have been the most visible 
major actors in Burundi, and have been the common intermediary between donors and 
local actors. Consequently their activities are reported extensively in this research due 
to the special role they have played in the development of Burundi civil society 
organizations.  
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2.0  THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
There are theoretical approaches that constitute the framework within which the 
concept of CD was developed and is understood. The theories and concepts described 
in this first section explore the discourse on civil society of the last two decades, and the 
more recent concepts which highlight social institutions in development practices today. 
The last section of this chapter looks at the role that organizations in a civil society 
(INGOs particularly) play in peacebuilding initiatives. 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The concept of a ―civil society‖ is complex, and different schools of thought have 
influenced the theoretical debates and empirical research of the concept over time. The 
discourse on civil society is discussed in two ways: (1) an analysis of the different actors 
who form the organizations and associations, and (2) an analysis of the roles and 
functions they have performed or that have been assigned to them. Generally 
understood, civil society refers to a wide array of non-government and not-for-profit 
organizations that represent the different interests, values and purposes of private 
citizens. In social capital theory, the term goes beyond the category of development-
   17 
oriented NGOs that are common in the development literature and depicts instead a 
broader range of organizations that include  community organizations, women‘s 
associations, youth associations, professional associations, indigenous groups, 
charitable organizations, think tanks and, to a larger extent, all informal systems of 
organizations that participate in civic life8. Civil society in this study will be used to refer 
to the different non-government actors considered by donors and INGOs when targeting 
local participation in development and peacebuilding projects. Although international 
non-government organizations are also described within the concept of a ―civil society‖, 
the focus of this study is on Burundi, and the use of ―civil society organizations‖ or ―local 
non-government organizations‖ will be referring to Burundi local organizations. 
2.1.1 Civil society in the literature 
The literature on civil society stems from different roots and contexts and many 
political philosophers have shaped its definitions and discourse.  The concept of a civil 
society has come to the center stage of development and practices in the last two 
decades; and is viewed as a strong agent of change by development practitioners. 
Increased participation of civil society organizations, as many authors have argued, was 
considered an alternative approach to orthodox ideas of development administration. In 
the 1980‘s and 1990‘s, scholars such as Amartya Sen (1988), David Korten (1990), and 
John Friedmann (1992) advocated an emphasis on the capacity of local people to make 
and implement decisions regarding their own development. For scholars of civil society, 
                                                 
8
 World bank web site on participation: http://worldbank.org/participation 
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participation of individual citizens in the development process is crucial. Due to their 
social networks, the norms of trust and reciprocity generated by civil organizations and 
other grassroots groups are believed to have a positive impact on the political as well as 
the economic performance in developing countries by bringing accountability, and by 
playing the role of a democratic check on the state (Putnam, 2002).  
2.1.2 The idea of a global civil society 
The concept of civil society gained more momentum at the beginning of the 
1990s and was sometimes reduced to international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) due to the increasing role they have taken in service delivery (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001). As the Cold War came to an end, there was an opportunity to establish 
good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law as priority objectives in 
development. INGOs gained recognition among development academics, bilateral and 
multilateral agencies and emerged as a ‗global civil society‘ on the international scene 
(Cardoso, 2003), dealing with global issues to restore and assert a new moral order in 
establishing values of individual autonomy and freedom.  
 
It is also of note in donors‘ literature that civil society is sometimes mixed with the 
third sector in donors‘ approaches9 in reference to the same broad range of institutions 
and organizations they comprise (non-profit, voluntary) and interconnection of their 
functions (advocacy work, delivery of services). However, civil society organizations 
                                                 
9
 Social Development Paper No. 36 / October 2006: Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peace building. 
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have a different focus and objectives than the third sector. CSOs are concerned more 
with the social and political implications of democratization whereas the third sector is 
viewed as an economic force. 
 
In the 1990‘s, the effects of globalization on poverty, inequality and political 
insecurities in Southern countries called for a greater political role on the part of 
northern NGOs to adjust to the emerging systems of global governance, debates and 
decision-making (Edwards, 2004a).  Moreover, the various emergencies in the south 
influenced the ‗scale-up‘ of INGOs, favored by an environment in which they were seen 
as important vehicles to deliver the political and economic objectives of the ‗New Policy 
Agenda‘, adopted by official donor agencies with a focus on grassroots participation and 
the rules and standards of accountability.  In addition to an increased involvement in 
donors‘ decision-making, international NGOs have mobilized and created more 
equitable relationships with civil society in the south. By establishing stronger and more 
accountable mechanisms at the grassroots levels, INGOs have conducted large and 
well organized campaigns on development issues and have presented alternative 
viewpoints to those in official governments and development agencies. Their 
involvement in the United Nations (UN) system has been acknowledged and 
recommendations made for their future relations and interactions with the UN10.  
                                                 
10
 World Bank Report # 36445-GLB: Civil society and Peace building. December 2006. 
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2.1.3 The relevance of context 
It is argued that the concepts of civil society are not transferable to non-Western 
countries or other societies with different histories, levels of democracy and economic 
structures (Lewis, 2002). If we take the example of Africa, most authors agree that the 
conditions of Western-type civil society (e.g., a self-confident citizenship that has 
already gained some autonomy from state structures) are mostly missing in Africa. They 
also see the influence of civil society on political processes as limited due to the lack of 
political space and weak links with rural or urban CSOs. In such cases, the concept of 
civil society could also take into account the role of traditional institutions that have 
traditionally played the role of state-controller, albeit in a rudimentary fashion. 
2.2 BACKGROUND ON CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPTS 
The new aid paradigm that focuses on civil society is rooted in other theoretical 
concepts that were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Within the civil society theory of 
the 1980s, the development-by-the-people approach saw popular participation in 
development activities both as a goal in itself as well as the process through which other 
development goals should be designed. Theorists of this approach such as David 
Korten (1980; 1990) and Robert Chambers (1983) emphasized ―bottom-up‖ 
development, arguing that the state is part of the problem faced by the less 
economically-developed countries. The earlier approach to development assistance in 
the 1960s and 1970s was basically ―top-down,‖ with donor countries defining the 
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strategies of development with little participation from the beneficiaries in making these 
policies. Empowerment of the poor, devolution of power from the national level to the 
local and community organizations, and the participation of poor people in decision-
making are factors emphasized by the people-centered development. Empowerment is 
understood as consciousness-raising or awareness creation and self-organization 
(Gran, 1983). Scholars within the people-centered development movement strongly 
disassociate themselves from any form of centralized control over the development 
process. 
 
 A major criticism raised by these authors is that aid organizations are often too 
bureaucratic and too concerned with their objectives, and that they know little about 
local conditions in developing countries. Gran‘s proposed solution is to reduce 
significantly all types of official cooperation and emphasize instead the non-state 
organizations. However, Friedmann (1992) points out the difficulties of establishing non-
state organizations: civil society is not conflict-free and does not have homogenous 
human communities; furthermore, it is difficult to establish organizations across class 
distinctions, gender or perceived ethnic affiliations. Friedmann proposed a strategy of 
an ―inclusive democracy‖ that empowers poor people and at the same time renders the 
majority of citizens accountable of their actions.  
  
Although this notion of development by the people did not gain wide approval in 
international debates in the 1980s, it was further developed by Mahbub Ul Haq‘s 
reflections on human development (1995). United Nations Development Programs 
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UNDP) also set the tone in its Human Development Report of 1993, incorporating the 
core features of the human development strategy by inviting developing countries to do 
everything in their power to promote the participation of citizens, and to consider this 
participation as an important aspect of human development. The concept of human 
development has its roots in literature on inequality and poverty. It also derived from the 
concern that income cannot be the sole criterion of development. Prominent economists 
such as Amartya Sen (1988) and Paul Streeten (1981; 1994) argued that income should 
be regarded as a means to improve human welfare, not as an end in itself. To them, 
human welfare was the overall objective, the essence of development. This idea started 
as a goal of development by the people, but gradually became a new framework of 
research as well as development cooperation, known in the last years as sustainable 
human development. The human development approach seeks to put people back at 
the center of development and has the following features11: 
 
o Development is understood in terms of people. Each activity is analyzed to 
see how many people participate in it or benefit from it. 
o Human development encourages people to use their acquired capabilities. 
o People are regarded as the end, but means are not forgotten. The human 
development paradigm embraces all of society, not just the economy. 
 
Today, most development organizations have a component of local participation 
in their programs, and human development is a common theme. While the perspective 
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 United Nation Human Development Report, 1995 
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of the human development principle focuses on the ―people‖; the extension of this 
paradigm is found in the ideas of the economic theorists of the New Institutional School.   
 
Representatives of new institutional economics wanted to study the economic 
phenomena within a wider societal context. Like the proponents of the civil society and 
the ―development by the people‖ theorists, these economists not only bring into 
perspective not only economic institutions, they  also emphasize the social and political 
institutions in this development paradigm. 
  
Building institutions, either in the form of training or research, has always been a 
major purpose of technical assistance in developing countries since the 1960s12. But the 
new institutional economics school differs greatly from modern neoclassical economics, 
which was based on narrow assumptions about rationality and knowledge. Theorists 
within the new institutional economics school corrected some conceptions of previous 
theories in the way economic behavior is understood (Martinussen, 1995).  Their ideas 
suggest that the market is not the only institution that shapes economic behavior, but 
merely one among several aspects of the total incentive structure in a society. The 
networking systems that exist within an organization and the way in which the state 
institutions are organized in a country are all important features that should be 
considered in studying economic behavior. 
 
                                                 
12
  Examples of institutional capacity building in Africa can be found in the work of Louis A. Picard (1993, 1994, 
and 1996). 
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Another new feature brought by the new institutionalism suggested that the focus 
on institutions should be broadened to include the private sector and NGOs, and to 
consider external factors that influence the development of institutions (North, 1990; 
Ostrom, 1990; 1993). In the 1990s, building institutions was understood as more than 
knowledge transfer and supply-driven technology (hardware). The dynamics of 
organizations—the social, cultural and political environments (software)--are studied in 
development strategies, requiring a broader systematic perspective in economic 
interventions. To study institutions, it is not only the question of ‗what works‘ in less 
developed countries but also ‗what lasts‘ (Morgan, 1994).  The question of sustainability 
has become a central issue in the design of programs. To achieve sustainability, a 
coherent strategy for a capacity building approach should have a long-term perspective. 
It should also bring together different stakeholders—institutions, groups, organizations 
and individuals—who should work in collaboration to find solutions. 
 
An important contribution of the economists of the new institutional school in the 
development field is their attention to the element of social capital. The social capital of 
a country is its social institutions, its people, and their cultural values. Social capital is a 
fundamental value in a society in that it enables communities to prosper; it can also 
explain why some economic models work in one country but not another. Social 
institutions in a particular society can be an ‗institutional capital‘ because their societal 
values help constitute a production factor (Kasper & Streit, 1998).  
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2.3 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NEW AID PARADIGM  
The development and functions of civil society continue to be shaped by donors‘ 
policy reforms in the 2000‘s to the extent that civil society organizations continue to be 
critical in the framework of good governance and democratization. The 2000‘s 
framework of aid is molded by the agreements of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) for poverty reduction and reinforced by the Paris declaration on aid 
effectiveness ratified by donors in 2005. Both frameworks give a central role to the civil 
society to participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) as imposed by donors. They also advocate 
continuing coordination with key institutions such as international financial institutions 
and the UN system that determine the economic fate of the developing world. The 
interaction between donors and civil society has increased greatly in the 2000‘s, 
although the two entities perform roles and activities at different levels. For instance, the 
platform of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has supported civil society 
groups to establish national coalitions in both the developed and developing world to 
rally for action. Unlike the criticism directed at the organizations for their ineffectiveness 
that was noted by earlier authors who advocated for less involvement with large 
bureaucracies, civil society organizations, both national and international, have started 
to work closely with them. Many civil society organizations have linked their existing 
campaigns on health, education, HIV/AIDS, and peace to the MDGs13. 
 
                                                 
13 Development, Volume 48, #1, March 2005. p.29 
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The increasing participation of civil society in national poverty reduction plans 
comes with high expectations. Although donors put civil society at center stage, experts 
in the development discourse agree that the donors‘ strategies for local participation 
remain largely vague. The INGOs Action Aid and Care observe in their research paper 
that: 
While the space for civil society to engage in national policy processes appears 
to be opening to some degree, the research findings highlight that there is still 
insufficient space available for NGOs to effectively engage in discussions 
concerning the disbursement and allocation of aid. To date, civil society 
participation in national poverty reductions strategies has tended to be rather 
superficial poverty diagnostic consultations with perhaps some discussion about 
which sectors should be priorities.
 14 
 
Further, the increasing numbers of functions that CSOs are called upon to play 
have raised important issues related to their accountability and legitimacy. These issues 
are at the heart of what should characterize civil society organizations with regard to 
their objectives and their relationship to both the state and the public they represent.  
 
The issue of accountability: The essence of civil society organizations is that they 
represent the people who form them, their values, and the objectives they have set to 
defend. The biggest challenge that non-government organizations face is that external 
funding tends to impose some degree of constraint in the contractual arrangements for 
giving aid, such as the choice of methods of reporting, the durations of projects, and the 
participation of aid agencies in the form of technical assistance. Such constraints have 
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an impact on the successful implementation of projects and on the structure of these 
civil organizations as well. External funding is thus necessary for the survival of civil 
society organizations, although it leads to financial dependency. The consequence is 
that in justifying their actions, these organizations become accountable first to their 
funders, as opposed to the people they represent.  
 
The issue of legitimacy: Also related to the issue of accountability is the issue of 
legitimacy, which raises the question of ownership. The previous sections discussed the 
―conceptualization‖ of civil society and the need to apply and attribute its roles and the 
functions of civic actors in consideration of the different environments and regional 
contexts. Civil society has played an important role in eastern European countries as in 
Latin America in the 1960s and 1980s, but civil society organizations in African 
countries represent another type of function. NGOs are few and usually run by the 
urban elite with a very weak representation of the rural population.  Those few visible 
NGOs are often non-profit, are externally funded, and act like consulting firms. Some 
critics (Pouligny 2005) fear that this commercialization of civil society, and especially 
advocacy or public policy work discourages other ‗true‘ or more legitimate local actors 
that are not receiving funds from participating or becoming active. 
 
The issues of accountability and legitimacy related to the concept of civil society 
form the basis for the questions posed by this study. The challenges facing  civil society 
organizations in Burundi and their  relationship with donors is not different from other 
developing countries, but have unique factors given the country‘s  historical 
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environment and civil war context.  Before this context is discussed further in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six, it is important to look at other development theories that are related 
to the concept of civil society.  
2.4 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON  
PEACEBUILDING 
The peacebuilding discourse has focused on the potential role of civil society 
since the 1990s with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Through the 
emergence of UN system-wide humanitarian interventions and new patterns of aid 
subcontracting, non-state and private associations have grown to embrace 
humanitarian or governance responsibilities. They are learning to work with newer 
partners such as the military, or form new patterns of relationships with INGOs.  
2.4.1 Civil society and peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding in development cooperation emerged in the early 1990s. This 
issue gained momentum in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide bringing attention to 
the negative effects that aid can have on conflict dynamics (Uvin, 1998; Anderson, 
1999). Since the Rwandan genocide, the debates have developed around the issues of 
peace and development and their links to armed conflicts.  Scholars have explored this 
relationship extensively and have developed analytical frameworks that determine 
potential effects of aid projects on conflict and peace. The concept of ‗do no harm‘ 
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(Anderson, 1999) or the methodology of ‗Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment‘ 
(PCIA) by Kenneth Bush (1998) are such examples. The development community‘s 
involvement in the peacebuilding discourse has had several implications in the 
development field15. First, many peacebuilding approaches and tools, such as conflict 
analysis frameworks (Paffenholz, 2005b), were imported into the development field. 
Second, development actors started to fund or implement interventions directly aimed at 
peacebuilding, contributing to the involvement of new actors and INGOs in conflict 
countries. 
 
But unlike the traditional role of international relief organizations, NGOs that we 
find today go beyond caring about the victims of war; their work has extended to include 
prevention of conflicts and mediation, the strengthening of institutions, the promotion of 
human rights and more. The increasing participation and popularity of NGOs on the 
international development scene can partly be explained by the earlier criticisms 
directed towards aid organizations for their cumbersome bureaucracy and inadequacy 
to reach the poor in a timely manner16. The belief that NGOs are closer to the 
population who receive aid is justified.  In fact, NGOs are generally smaller-scale 
organizations, flexible in structure and more responsive and efficient in service delivery 
than state organizations (Putman, 2002). 
 
                                                 
15 Social development Papers #34, October 2006 „Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peace building ‟. p. 19 
16 Proponents of civil-society and people-managed development theories of the 1980‟s who criticized the 
bureaucracy characterizing institutions such as the World Bank. 
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 The partnership evolving between humanitarian organizations, together with 
donor governments has also gained new forms of economic, social and political 
influence in relation to the internal affairs of countries in conflict. Mark Duffield (2002) 
argues that, the idea of ‗gaining influence‘ is not associated with forms of territorial 
control or with colonialism. The influence is networked and non-territorial, it tends to be 
selective, unevenly distributed and of varying impact17.  The influence also attests to the 
growing relationship between the development NGOs and major financial institutions, 
and the question of dependency of development NGOs vis-à-vis donors that is often put 
forward in development literature. 
2.4.2 Peacekeeping from below 
Until the mid 1990‘s, peacebuilding research debate focused on the ability of 
external actors (INGOs) to support internal, national actors in conflict- affected countries 
to enhance their peacebuilding capacities. In the last decade, the peacebuilding 
discourse and practices have been influenced by Lederach (1997), who shifted the 
attention to the role of actors from within the conflict country. Lederach brought into the 
literature the concept of ―peacekeeping from below‖. He argued for multi-track and 
multi-dimensional diplomacy—i.e., including all levels of society in approaches to  
peace -building—as well as the need to understand the cultural, structural, personal and 
relational dimensions and changes within war-torn societies. This discourse served as a 
conceptual umbrella for a range of activities, particularly among international NGOs. 
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 Mark Duffield:  „Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a relation of global 
governance‟. Published in Development and Change 2002, 33 (5): 10049-71 
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A new body of academic literature has developed with the same ideas, focusing 
on the need for community-driven development strategies, particularly in post-conflict 
environments where the government‘s capacity is limited and where the platform for 
engaging NGOs has broadened.  Many approaches and initiatives such as peace funds, 
dialogue projects, peacebuilding training, and capacity building programs for local 
actors have been tested during the last decade. Additionally, democratization has 
become one of the high priorities of the international community‘s approach to 
peacebuilding. Thus, as part of the democratic agenda, we see today an array of non-
state actors such as NGOs, associations, religious entities, business and grassroots 
organizations and communities who are involved in different peacebuilding activities. 
2.4.3 Local approaches to peacebuilding  
As many multilateral agencies and bilateral donors have adjusted their policy 
frameworks and increased the participation of civil society organizations in development 
projects, they have also opened a space to support indigenous approaches to 
peacebuilding processes.  
 
Giving consideration to indigenous and informal traditional justice instruments in 
the context of peacemaking and justice in post-conflict countries is innovative. In 
response to the crimes of civil war and genocide, the international community referred 
to a legal framework focused on accountability, crafted after World War II. It is only after 
the 1980s that a major shift towards other intermediate mechanisms was observed as a 
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result of the global growth of human rights awareness. The United Nations, the Inter-
American Human Rights courts and other human rights NGOs have cooperated in 
putting together new approaches and norms for prosecuting crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes. This cooperation has resulted in the establishment of ad hoc 
tribunals of The Hague and International courts (for the former Yugoslavia) and Arusha 
(for Rwanda), of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the spread of the principle 
of universal retribution. Moreover, the choice of retributive justice as a strategy has 
been written into internationally brokered peace agreements, as in Guatemala, Sierra 
Leone and Burundi. 
 
However, the uniqueness of each post-conflict society and the various political, 
social, economic and cultural contingencies in countries where the crimes were 
committed has made prosecutions difficult to file and to  obtain convictions for (Rwanda 
is an example). Doubts about the use of trials led to a search for alternative or 
complementary mechanisms to avoid the dangers of both too much and too little 
criminal justice. The result that we witness today is a move from a de facto dichotomy 
(impunity or trials) to multiple conceptions of justice and reconciliation, state and non-
state instruments, and legal, semi-judicial and non-judicial techniques. Kofi Annan, 
former UN secretary-general, officially acknowledged this evolution18:  
 
―Due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering 
justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in 
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 Koffi Anan‟s report on: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. August 
2004 
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conformity with both international standards and local tradition‖ (United Nations 
 2004: 12). 
 
As part of this important development, some post-conflict societies have now 
turned their attention to their legacy of indigenous practices of dispute settlement and 
reconciliation. The argument is that traditional and informal systems of justice may be 
adopted or adapted to develop an appropriate response to a history of civil war and 
oppression in a country. 
 
In Burundi, where societal ties have been broken by ethnic divide, the 
international community efforts that were undertaken resorted to traditional mechanisms 
of conflict management, either in response to the institutional crisis after the 
assassination of Ndadaye in October 1993, or in the different phases of peace 
negotiations. The traditional institution of Bashingantahe discussed in chapter Four, 
played a role in the initial phase of the peace process. Due to power clashes between 
elected officials and traditional authority, the Bashingantahe play a background role on 
a national level. Today, the institution is consulted widely for the resolution of land 
disputes. In neighbouring Rwanda, where the culture and the nature of the conflict are 
similar, the Agacaca traditional tribunal was and is still used. Other examples include 
the processes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as seen in South Africa or other 
countries. 
 
The use of traditional mechanisms in peacebuilding projects shows the 
importance given to grassroots and civil society participation in bottom-up approaches 
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to development, along with the need to understand the crucial element of cultural 
dynamics stressed by the new institutional school theorists. In reference to Lederach‘s 
model of ―peacebuilding from below,‖ an illustration of the approach is given to see 
where traditional actors intervene. Lederach‘s illustration reflects the multi-track 
diplomacy model that aims to improve communications and inter-group relations. It 
capitalizes on the synergies between approaches to conflict resolution (Diamond & 
McDonald, 1996), and distinguishes the different peacebuilding actors and processes 
according to tracks. Participation of grassroots groups such as the Bashingantahe in 
Burundi in peacebuilding occurs usually at level 3 of Lederach‘s peacebuilding pyramid 
shown in figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Lederach’s Peacebuilding Levels 
 
 
Level 3: ―Grassroots Leadership‖ is where civil society tends to be most active and 
where the majority of the population is represented. People at this level identify more 
with such approaches as peace commissions, community dialogue or projects of trauma 
healing. This group can also be involved in mid-level activities such as problem-solving 
workshops or peace-commissions with the help of prominent local individuals. By 
contrast, level 1 involves high-level negotiations with prominent politicians, military 
and/or religious officials, led by a highly visible negotiator such as Nelson Mandela who 
led the final cease-fire negotiations in Burundi. 
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Generally, the broad range of members of civil society involved in peacebuilding work 
encompasses actors at the local, national and international level. Key actors included in 
the notion of civil society are19:  
 
o Human rights organizations or advocacy groups and peace networks;  
o NGOs that directly support peace processes or capacity building;  
o  Interest groups such as women‘s, religious, youth and professional associations;  
o  Community-based organizations (CBOs), women and youth groups, self-help 
groups; 
o Traditional leaders, informal networks and associations; 
o  Informational and educational CSOs (independent media, journalist 
associations, research and academic institutions and think tanks).  
 
Civil society can make unique contributions to peacebuilding with or without 
external support. The rich diversity of civil society and CSOs requires a practical and 
empirical approach that considers these organizations‘ objectives, functions, capacities, 
constraints and relationships to other actors. Donors interact predominantly with 
intermediate organizations at the national or international level, and rely on them to 
channel support to a broader range of CSOs or to coordinate interventions involving 
multiple CSOs. Donor funding is also often limited to a small group of CSOs (in 
particular, development-oriented NGOs), while social movements, mass organizations 
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and trade unions are often neglected as potential partners20. Donor preferences for 
financing CSOs on a project-by-project basis give CSOs limited opportunities to develop 
capacity, specialization, strategic planning, and long-term investments in beneficiary 
communities.  
2.4.4 Problems associated with strategies for civil society capacity building 
As part of the democratization agenda in countries affected by war, it is  
assumed that strengthening local civil society organizations can help prevent the 
outbreak of violence while promoting democracy. As seen in the literature on civil 
society, most scholars also agree that civil society organizations should always be at 
the center of any development endeavors. This applies both to conventional 
development or post-conflict scenarios. The international development community‘s 
approach to resolving conflicts in Burundi has followed this trend.  Donors have 
encouraged the promotion of grassroots organizations and have supported indigenous 
organizations mainly in the human rights fields and in the media.  
 
However, the promotion of grassroots organizations in Burundi and Rwanda has 
proved a more difficult undertaking than anticipated due to increased distrust and social 
divisions. The sense of community that existed before 1994 was greatly undermined, if 
not extinguished, by the war. Moreover, the work involved is politically sensitive and 
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difficult to carry out. Peter Uvin21, one of the few scholars who looked closely at the 
cases of Burundi and Rwanda, observes that the experience of development partners in 
these two countries in supporting civil society as democratization tools has been 
generally unsatisfactory. Uvin points out some of the major downfalls associated with 
these strategies for civil society that he characterizes as ―institutional destruction‖:  
 
o Although development partners have engaged civil society groups in conflict-
specific sectors such as justice, reconciliation, trauma and governance in 
development work, it is foreign NGOs that dominate those areas. As the 
emergency phase of post-conflict diminishes, so does the importance of NGOs 
since post-conflict governments begin to find their feet and assert their role as 
the responsible actors for sectors such as education, health or justice. 
 
o Despite neutral and apolitical rhetoric, the goals of most development projects 
are political in nature. Most of the donor-supported projects are often the target of 
government resistance as many of the groups supported have a politicized or 
anti-state agenda. 
 
o Ninety-five percent of the foreign aid development community resides in the 
capital city where most of the projects are directed from. Many of the grassroots 
organizations structures are merely token structures created to manage project 
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benefits which continue to exist as long as the projects do. When the day-to-day 
project evaporates, so, too, do the grassroots structures. 
 
o Projects are usually small, short-term and inflexible. Design criteria are not 
transparent; there are no clear criteria for how the local partners are selected for 
engagement. 
 
o Development partners often misunderstand the domestic dynamics of civil 
society development. Local organizations understand the long-term dynamics 
much better than aid partners do and as such, the development community often 
works from a position of weakness. Consequently, external aid unintentionally 
weakens civil society and contributes to institutional destruction (Uvin, 1999). 
 
Although social organizations are viewed as crucial partners in peacebuilding, in 
conflict mitigation, post-conflict reconstruction and in other development projects, 
associational life is often weak in post-war contexts. This means that the ―strengthening‖ 
work is both vital but also potentially divisive and damaging. Uvin (1999) notes that the 
building of civil society requires the creation of processes that allow all people at all 
levels of society to engage in collective action, learn to build their own capacities and 
ultimately act as citizens. He argues that in examining the dynamics of many conflicts, 
citizenship is an important concept of civil society organization. 
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Despite the dissatisfaction experienced by aid donors in the context of political 
instability and ethnic tensions, researchers and development workers agree that foreign 
aid opens up possibilities for change. Most major external actors in conflict situations 
are committed to strengthening local capacity and have good intentions. However, the 
wrong capacities may be enhanced, or the capacities of the wrong people may be 
strengthened (Smillie, 2001). Often, local people are not engaged as partners but are 
rather expected to fit into the hegemonic mainstream designed from the top: i.e., the 
situation confers representatives of the international community a higher degree of 
leverage in the implementation of reconstruction projects than the local people 
themselves in the initial development phase (Bush, 1998). In such situations, 
development is reinvented and come to acquire a new role; it can be viewed as having 
a capacity for conflict resolution. That is, it is able to alter the balance of power between 
social groups in the interests of harmony where resource allocation can be perceived as 
threatening by one social group or another22. Whether this is accurate or not, the 
question of humanitarian intervention has always divided critics of the global peace-
keeping agenda. 
 
This chapter has outlined the main theories that have influenced the practices of 
capacity development. The institutional school, together with the more recent 
perspectives of civil society and local participation, has provided a framework of 
analysis that are more appropriate to the realities of developing countries. The 
emphasis on local institutions gives the development workers opportunities to discover 
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local knowledge in order to design solutions for poverty reduction and peacebuilding 
which better suit local conditions. The more recent humanitarian and armed conflict 
emergencies have impacted greatly the priorities of donors in developing countries, just 
as new approaches in the role, functions and validity of civil society actors have to be 
re-evaluated. The support to civil society actors in peacebuilding is commanded but it 
does not necessarily lead to the expected progress. The following chapters look at the 
specific case of Burundi to assess the impact that donors have had on local 
organizations in the last decade.  
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
This research is an exploratory, focused comparison study. It is intended to 
contribute to the analysis of civil society roles in post-conflict development in general, 
and in the case of Burundi in particular. The research is designed to explain the patterns 
of behaviors and relationships existing between aid donors present in Burundi and civil 
society organizations, in order to assess how donors contribute to the effectiveness of 
local actors in the peacebuilding process. 
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, ownership and local participation in 
policy decision-making mechanisms are key elements in today‘s development 
discourse. The analytical framework of this study is therefore based on the belief, widely 
held among development organizations, that the contribution of CSOs to democratic 
governance and peacebuilding is central to development, although many challenges 
and doubt exist as to their sustainability and impact.  Drawing on the findings of 
Hadenius and Uggla (1996), the contribution of CSOs can be evaluated on the basis of 
three criteria: their autonomy (leading to effectiveness in influencing state actors), their 
multiplicity (increased number of popular organizations), and their organizational 
diversity (the range and variety of groups and interests that form networks).  
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 This study tests the hypothesis that in emergency situations, donor policies 
encourage the criteria of multiplicity and organizational diversity, while the criterion of 
autonomy remains the greatest challenge. This failure to encourage autonomy results 
from both political and programmatic factors: the political needs on the ground require 
the donors to emphasize public institutions, with minimum support to CSOs which they 
encourage to flourish. Furthermore, the typical short-term project approach to CSOs‘ 
programs neither leads to the sustainable results sought by donors, nor to the autonomy 
of civil society organizations that is necessary to fulfill their expected role towards state 
actors.  
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To explore this hypothesis, three questions were designed to examine the 
relationship between international organizations and CSOs in Burundi: 
 
Question #1:  What types of strategies are used by major donors in Burundi to 
engage actively in capacity development of local NGOs and how is the delivery of 
assistance structured?  
 
Not all international organizations present in Burundi necessarily work with local 
NGOs. To answer this question, the donors who have a clear objective of local NGOs‘ 
capacity building in their mandate are studied. Strategies indicated in donors‘ missions 
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and objectives will show whether or not they address civil society strengthening and 
what domain of activities they promote to achieve this goal. 
 
The second part of the question asks how the type of assistance for capacity 
development is delivered. This involves an analysis of service delivery, whether 
services are directly given to a counterpart local CSO or indirectly through another 
development organization or a government entity. Sub questions to question #1 imply: 
 
a. The sampling of the donors engaged in capacity development: e.g., bilateral, 
multilateral or international non-governmental organization (INGO), or national 
NGOs; 
b. The type of capacity development involved: individual, group or organizational; 
c. The group (for example: women, youth, traditional leaders, political leaders) or 
sector the donor supports (media, health, human rights, etc.), and the criteria 
used in choosing the indigenous NGOs to work with; 
d. Whether there is a partnership or linkage with other donors involved in service 
delivery or not. 
 
Question#2:  To what extent has the political conflict in Burundi influenced the 
donor‟s engagement or choice of strategies in local civil society strengthening? 
 
The answers to this question presented in Chapter Five will show how the 
political conflicts in Burundi influenced or motivated the type of activities that the donors 
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chose to conduct, such as training in conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance or 
post-emergency reconstruction; or the length of the intervention. The focus is to 
discover if the activities or project are designed with a short- or long-term goal; and to 
what extent the activities promoted have a significant impact on the targeted CSOs to 
sustain themselves in the peacebuilding initiatives.   
 
Question # 2 is closely related to Question #1. The political conflict could justify 
the presence of the donors in Burundi, the local groups that they donors work with, or 
the partnerships involved in service delivery. Indicators of the type of capacity 
development interventions to look for are: 
 
a. The amount of money allocated to an activity; 
b. Types of activities related to emergency and post-emergency situations; 
c. Direct or indirect linkages in service delivery; 
d. Duration of a CD intervention (short-term or long-term); 
e. The dynamics of the political situation which dictate the necessary interventions; 
at the national level (certain dates or years correspond to decisive events that 
mark a change on the political scene or a new dynamic of the conflicts).  
 
Question #3: What are the methods used by donors to evaluate capacity 
development activities at the local level? 
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The third question attempts to determine if the donor‘s strategies to strengthen 
CSOs are an on-going process, and if there are tools in place used to monitor and 
evaluate their efforts. Monitoring and evaluating tools in capacity development prove to 
be crucial to ensure that capacity development initiatives actually lead to improved 
performance and effectiveness. The working methods used by donors to monitor their 
CD activities are compared to the good practices and CD principles identified in the 
literature review. 
 
Findings of the research are organized according to the research questions. 
First, an understanding of local organizations in Burundi is necessary to grasp the 
notion of the role of civil society in the context of Burundi‘s political system since its 
independence. Second, changes in donor policies as a response to the political crisis of 
1994 are explained. Third, details of the interaction between donors and CSOs, 
expressed in prioritized activities, as well as the tools used to build local capacities are 
presented. In addressing the relationship between donors and CSOs in Burundi, two 
important issues pertaining to this research arise from the analytical framework: 
 
Issue 1:  The policies and assistance from the donor community in Burundi have 
influenced the development and actions of CSOs, but the dependency on foreign aid 
challenges their accountability and effectiveness. 
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Issue 2:  The extent to which ethnic divisions have affected the fabric of the 
political and social life leads to the belief that the efficacy of CSOs in Burundi is 
challenged. 
 
To support and verify these statements, the study examines the nature and 
characteristics of local organizations in Burundi and the different approaches adopted 
by the donor community to strengthen their capacities.  Findings presented from 
Chapters Four to Chapter Six are expected to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of 
Burundian NGOs today and shed light on the contribution of donors to address those 
weaknesses. The concluding remarks of the research in Chapter Seven discuss further 
the relationship characterizing donors and civil actors in Burundi. Major observations 
arising from the study are presented and questions for further research are pointed out. 
3.2 SITE SELECTION 
Burundi, once known as Urundi, is a small country (27,834 sq km) located on the 
northeastern shoreline of Lake Tanganyika in east-central Africa. It was controlled by 
Germany (1896–1912) and Belgium (1912–1962) until gaining its independence in 
1962. Its population consists of four groups that are usually qualified as ethnic groups 
(ubwoko): the Bahutu, the Batutsi, the Baganwa and the Batwa. These ethnic groups 
speak the same language and share the same culture. Before it was colonized, Burundi 
was ruled as a kingdom by the Baganwa for over two hundred years, and has been 
governed as a republic under military rule from 1962. With a large population of 7 million 
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and very limited natural resources, most of the citizens remain economically poor, 
resorting to subsistence agricultural farming.  
 
Ethnic tensions have been noticed after independence with short waves of violence 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi in 1969, 1972, 1988 and the civil war of more than a 
decade from 1993 to 2005. The violence of 1972 was characterized as a Hutu 
repression by the Tutsi military power. The civil war of 1993 was triggered by the 
assassination of a democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, and 
resulted in the mass killings of the Tutsi population in the countryside. 
 
After the war erupted in 1994, the international community followed the political 
development in Burundi with great concern. The self-criticism among major powers after 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 led to a number of initiatives which all aimed at 
preventing the escalation of the conflict in Burundi where similar historical and political 
backgrounds exist. Fifteen years later, Burundi is emerging from war and is prime for a 
study on local level capacity building. Many donors and international NGOs are running 
different types of programs for both poverty reduction and post-war emergency 
reconstruction. Reports on those activities can be found, but analytic and research 
oriented accounts of what is happening on the ground are scarce. 
 
An additional motivation to conduct research in Burundi is related to this 
researcher‘s previous work experience in that country and her familiarity with the official 
languages used there (French and Kirundi). This has facilitated the contacts needed for 
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data collection. Given the short time to conduct the survey and interviews (two months), 
the scheduling of meetings and planned field trips to the different offices could not have 
been achieved without the use of personal contacts. Some of the individuals the 
researcher knew eight years ago still work for INGOs and UN organizations. Those 
contacts helped the researcher to identify the key informants needed and to schedule 
meetings for interviews to take place within the short timeframe. Personal contacts also 
provided key documents which would be otherwise difficult to obtain in a timely fashion. 
 
Familiarity with the city, although there are many new geographic sites after five 
years since this researcher visited Burundi, allowed the researcher to travel easily in 
locating donors and INGOs offices. Surprisingly, many of the senior staff needed for 
contact within INGOs were local individuals, and this made it possible to have a 
perspective from people who understand both local realities and donors‘ practices. The 
researcher‘s knowledge of the local culture also facilitated the approach and 
communication in interviews and in acquiring the necessary information.  
3.3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The donors in this research include multilateral and bilateral organizations that 
have been most visible and who have contributed to peacebuilding by funding or 
sponsoring programs and projects for local civil society strengthening between 1994 
and 2005. After the war erupted in 1993, international actors became increasingly active 
in finding political solutions to the conflict in Burundi. Parallel to political negotiations, an 
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impressive number of international organizations came to Burundi to support 
humanitarian and political responses from 1994 onwards. The first significant peace 
treaties occurred in 2002 and 2003 followed by a favorable shift in development policies 
from donors who wanted to move from humanitarian assistance to a more post-conflict 
reconstruction development  model. The peace accords of 2002 and 2003 led to 
democratic elections of 2005. This study‘s goal is to analyze the trends of assistance, 
particularly the share given to local organizations from the period when international 
organizations came to Burundi in great numbers (1993), to the time when a democratic 
government was in place (2005). The researcher continued integrating and 
complementing data that might reflect the changes in donors‘ policies in peacebuilding 
support after the elections, from 2005 to 2008 when the researcher administered the 
survey and conducted interviews.  
 
In this research, INGOs are considered among the group of donors since they 
are the vehicle of donors‘ assistance and most visible to the population. The perception 
among many individuals in small local organizations is that donors are those 
organizations that interact with them and provide the assistance needed.  
 
 In addition to bilateral and multi-lateral donors that show involvement in 
strengthening local organizations, this researcher obtained an official list of 94 
registered INGOs in 2005 from the Burundi Ministry of External Affairs and Cooperation 
where all the international organizations register and report their mission and activities. 
Theoretical sampling was used to identify the donors and NGOs to study. The method 
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meets the criteria of the grounded theory mode of analysis (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). It is based on the practical ground that the researcher knows in advance 
what data to collect and where to find it.  
 
Organizations were selected following three criteria: 
1. To be listed as an external donor or an INGO in Burundi and to be 
registered as such with the ministry of external relations and international 
cooperation. 
2. To have a stated mandate to support local NGOs or have one or more 
objectives to do so in their programs and projects 
3. To have operated in Burundi for at least two years  
 
The criteria were applied to maximize the input and validity of information 
received. For the first criterion, given the multitude of new INGOs in Burundi after 1993, 
the researcher felt the need to rely on official records to increase the validity of the data 
to collect. In doing so, the first step was to consult official records within the governing 
authority of international organizations. The second criteria was to narrow the number of 
organizations to those that are related directly to the subject of the study. Third, the 
time-frame of two years of operation was judged to indicate a considerable level of 
implementation and progress of a project. If an organization wants to establish itself in 
the country, it would take at least a year to open an office, hire the staff, identify 
potential partners, conduct the necessary consultations for the project before its 
implementation, and address other operational concerns.  
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3.3.1 Selection of multilateral and bilateral donors 
To obtain official documents and information on donors‘ assistance to Burundi, 
the researcher visited the Office of the National Committee on Aid Coordination (CNCA-
le Comité National de Coordination des Aides) in March 2008.  This Office was created 
by the Government of Burundi in 2005 with a mandate to coordinate external aid and 
commitments made by the international community in Burundi.  The CNCA is chaired by 
the second vice-president of Burundi and is represented by the Ministry of External 
Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and Communal development, Vice-Ministry of Planning, 
the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finances, Cooperation and Development. 
The CNCA‘s purpose is to improve the coordination of external partners‘ assistance at 
the level of the government itself or between the government and development 
assistance agencies. From this office, the researcher was able to compare the list of 
INGOs obtained previously through the Ministry of External Affairs in December 2006 
and gather documentation on national strategic planning tools and data.  The first list of 
94 organizations was reduced to 57. The researcher assumed that the difference for the 
other 37 organizations was that they did not provide an official account of their activities 
to the office CNCA. They were therefore were not considered in this research.  
 
Lists of both of donors and INGOs in Burundi as of 2005 that are considered in 
this research are provided in Appendix C. A sample of international organizations 
surveyed for the purpose of this study is represented as follows: 
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Table 2: Representation of surveyed international organizations in Burundi
23
 
Type of 
organization 
Presence 
in-Country 
Organizations 
Surveyed 
No 
response 
Direct 
involvement 
with CSOs 
strengthening 
% of Valid 
Respondents 
Bilateral/embassies 13   6  1  5 38.4% 
UN organizations & 
Multi-lateral 
18 10  3  7 38.8% 
INGOs 57 33 20 13 22.8% 
TOTAL  88 49 24 25 28.4% 
 
Foreign governments who may support civil society organizations directly with 
small grants through their embassies were not directly contacted for the research. The 
grants are competitive in nature and they are not prescribed within the general mandate 
of strengthening local organizations. Efforts were made to follow the assistance 
channeled through development agencies and through grants to INGOs or other 
international organizations. Among the 13 bilateral donors, 5 were identified through the 
survey to have a program to support civil society organizations (US, Belgium, France, 
UK and Italy). The focus on multi-lateral donors was limited to the European Union and 
the World Bank due to the large share of assistance in most socio-economic 
development and peace -building sectors.  Five United Nations organizations (UNICEF, 
UNDP, UNHCHR, UNIFEM, and OCHA) were selected to receive the survey 
questionnaire and be interviewed according to sector-based activities in peacebuilding. 
The bilateral and multi-lateral organizations contacted by the researcher are shaded in 
the table below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 A complete list of donors and International organizations in Burundi is attached in appendix C. 
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    Table 3: Selection of Donors
24
 
  Multilateral
  
 Bilateral  Development 
agency/Organization 
UN System  (5 
organizations) 
 Germany  GTZ 
The World Bank  Belgium  BTC 
FMI  France  AFVP 
BAD  Netherlands   
FIDA  England  DFID 
GAVI  United States  USAID 
IMF  Japan   
European Union  Norway   
  Sweden   
  Finland   
  Canada              
  Italy   
3.3.2 Selection of International NGOS 
After thirteen years of civil war, Burundi is slowly gaining peace. Many INGOs have 
certainly contributed to the seemingly ―normal‖ existing atmosphere, although much has 
still to be done to recover from the war. What is striking is the number of national and 
international NGOs that operate in Burundi. In 1998, there were a handful of 
international development agencies and organizations in the capital city; today their 
presence is overwhelming25. However, not all INGOs working in Burundi have a goal to 
strengthen local organizations.  Among the 57 INGOs identified on the CNCA list26, an 
examination of project documents and discussions between the researcher and senior 
project staff of INGOs in the capital city of Bujumbura led to the identification of 13 out 
                                                 
24
 Donors highlighted are those contacted directly. The development agencies listed are those represented in 
Burundi. 
25
 This situation is not unique to Burundi.  Rwanda experienced the same situation shortly after the genocide in 
1994.   
26
 The full list of registered INGOs in Burundi at the end of 2005 is attached in appendices 
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of 57 INGOs (22.8%) believed to have capacity-building components in their projects 
and programs. Eight groups of actors out of the 13 INGOs identified (61.5%) were 
contacted directly for interviews. Those actors are:  
 
a. AFRICARE 
b. AFVP (Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès) –French Association 
of Volunteers of Progress  
c. SFCG (Search for Common Ground) 
d. ACORD (Association pour la Coopération et la Recherche pour le 
Développement) -Association for Cooperative Operations Research and 
Development 
e. AAI (Action Aid International) 
f. CARE International 
g. ARCANE (Appui et Renforcement des Capacités des Acteurs Non-Étatiques) -
Support and Capacity Building Project for Non-State Actors 
h. GLOBAL RIGHTS 
 
Representatives from CARE International, Action Aid International and GLOBAL 
RIGHTS were not available for interviews. However, sufficient information on their 
activities related to civil society strengthening were obtained from the organizations‘ 
web sites and from the INGO AFRICARE which works closely with these organizations 
for certain projects or activities. 
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3.3.3 Identification of civil society organizations 
An existing study by Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) identified more than 1,400 
civil society organizations as of 2001. Most of these organizations were established 
after 1980, with the movement towards democratization and after the first democratic 
elections in 1993, which led to the civil war and the need for civil society organizations 
to respond to the humanitarian crisis. A classification of these organizations and a 
closer look at their operations will be analyzed in Chapter Four of this study. The 
selection of CSOs to visit or research was guided by the 10% of the local organizations 
that are known to be operational and that work directly with the international 
community27. Interviews with four key national scholars who have researched local 
organizations and who have worked with different donors were conducted and visits to 
selected CSOs were made to collect data. The selection of CSOs to visit was based on 
their visibility and their sector-based representation. The four umbrella organizations 
selected were: 
 
o FORSC, the International Forum of national NGO platforms 
o OAG, The Observatory for Government Action (referred to as Observatoire) 
o RESO, a federation of international NGOs working in Burundi 
o LIGUE ITEKA, a national human-right based NGO 
o CAFOB, (Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi) – A coalition 
of women‘s  associations of Burundi 
                                                 
27
 The estimation is drawn from the same study. 
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The coalition CAFOB was contacted for a field visit and interview but the meeting 
did not occur due to conflicting schedules. Because the number of CSOs is 
overwhelming and since the goal of the study is focused on donors‘ strategies to 
strengthen local organizations, the researcher focused primarily on international 
organizations. However, field visits and discussions were targeted towards coalitions or 
umbrella organizations of CSOs. Coalitions are an important new trend for coordination 
and lobbying purposes and are found within many sectors, themes of activity or groups 
of interest. Examples include coalitions of women lawyers, coalitions of media 
organizations, civil society activist organizations, and others). Chapter Four elaborates 
on the types of CSOs found in Burundi and the nature of activities conducted by these 
organizations. 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
This study uses qualitative and quantitative research methods for data collection, 
document analysis, survey design, and data analysis.  The methods borrow from 
different resources in social research for case studies and exploratory research 
(Coontz, 1999; Denzin, & Robin, 2005; Rubin, H. 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 2008). Two 
field visits were made in Burundi where the researcher collected most of the data, 
administered the survey questionnaires to local NGO staff and representatives of 
donors, and conducted face- to-face interviews with key participants.  
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3.4.1 Data collection and methods of analysis 
The field visits were made in Burundi for a period of two months, in December 
2006 and April 2008. Primary data was collected; and the survey and interviews were 
administered during this time. However, gathering secondary data on capacity 
development, civil society and peacebuilding was carried out during post-graduate 
studies and combines both the knowledge gained from peace studies and international 
development from 1998 to 2002. Although there are a limited number of similar studies 
pertinent to the relationship between international organizations and civil society in 
Burundi, efforts were made to explore any relevant resource that was available on local 
capacity building, the scholarly literature on peacebuilding and reconstruction, and  field 
reports or professional papers from aid practitioners.  
 
Data collection methods  
 To answer the research questions, the data was collected through three sources: 
expert interviews, survey questionnaires, and professional reports from international 
organizations.  The questions asked on the survey and in interviews were designed to 
find answers to the research questions stated in the research design.  
 
 Survey questionnaire 
 A survey questionnaire found in Appendix A was the appropriate tool to use in 
order to reach the different organizations that operate across the country. The 
questionnaire was used to clarify the mission of the different organizations, the 
prioritized projects and activities, and financial data related to programs. The questions 
   59 
were developed by the researcher, reviewed and approved by a committee of academic 
advisors at the Graduate School of Public of International Affairs at the University of 
Pittsburgh. The committee members include: 
 
Dr. Phyllis Coontz, associate professor, coordinator of doctoral studies;  Dr. Louis A. 
Picard, professor, academic advisor; and  Dr. Paul J. Nelson, associate professor, 
academic advisor. Dr. Nelson is the committee chair of this work. A forth committee 
member, Joanna Quinn is associate professor at the University of Western Ontario in 
London, Ontario. Professor Quinn has done extensive work in the country of Uganda 
and is familiar with the African Great-lakes region. 
 
Closed-ended questions with multi-choice responses were used in the survey to 
indicate the type and mission of the organization, the group and sector of activities in 
peacebuilding, and indicators in identifying certain methods and tools in capacity 
building. Open-ended questions were limited on the questionnaire, except for the last 
question where the respondent was asked to express the challenges of civil society 
organizations and their personal opinion on the subject of the research. The time to 
complete the survey was approximately 30 to 45 minutes per respondent. 
 
o Part I consists of 5 questions to identify the nature of the donor (bilateral, multi-
lateral, or INGO), the length of their presence in Burundi, the mission or the 
mandate of each organization in Burundi, the local organization counterpart if 
one exists, and whether  the donor provides direct or indirect assistance to the 
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organization. 
 
o Part II includes seven questions to collect information on the types of programs 
that involve local organizations, the types of CD activities that are carried out and 
how the conflict in Burundi influenced these activities. Part II also addresses the 
length of projects or programs, the partnerships involved in service delivery and 
the amount of money allocated to the projects. 
 
o Part III comprises six questions that address the methods used by donors in 
assessing the progress or the success of CD activities and programs. 
 
Professional reports  
 Various reports were used to gather historical data and to complete the data 
collected from the survey as well as the other secondary information from international 
organizations. Humanitarian organizations and other INGOs working in Burundi produce 
reports that detail their priorities and activities. The selection of field reports was based 
on their content whether or not they contained relevant data to the research. 
Approximately 60% of those reports were obtained during visits to donors, INGOs and 
CSOs. A number of other resources also comprised of web-based documents from 
organizations that have available web sites. During the stage of data analysis, the 
reports were organized and grouped according to the relevance to the research 
questions. Similar case studies in the region concerning other emergency or post-
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emergency countries such as Rwanda, Uganda or DRC were also reviewed to compare 
and discover similar trends or differences where appropriate.   
 
Particular attention was put on discovering the links between policies in conflict-
affected countries and civil society capacity strengthening. The existing development 
literature on governance, peacebuilding efforts and policies, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction policy documents and programs reports were also a major source of 
information.  Resources such as the World Bank‘s (WB) Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) were also consulted. Such 
resources may only provide general guidelines for the development priorities in any 
given country or region. They are, however, tailored to the needs and circumstances of 
each country and can reveal a framework of assistance given to Burundi.  Chapter Five 
of this research indicates that a systematic application of the PRSP continues to be a 
major tool for donors, even in countries emerging from war where special 
considerations particular to a country need to be addressed. The interest in analyzing 
such documents was to verify any existing or prescribed strategies for strengthening 
local NGOs in order to link them to the current practices on the ground. 
 
The information collected from the survey questionnaire and the professional 
reports led to the identification of donors and INGOs who address specifically civil 
society capacity building as referenced in table 8 and 9 in Chapter Five. 
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 Interviews 
 Semi-structured interviews were judged to be the appropriate method to gather 
the perspectives of experts from identified organizations who know the different 
development actors in Burundi and who can give a professional and more informed 
opinion on the strategies and actions of both donors and civil society organizations. 
Interviews also provided an opportunity for the researcher to gain an explanation as to 
missing data from professional reports and the survey. The same questions were asked 
to each expert interviewed to assure comparability when analyzing the answers.  
 
Experts interviewed were identified with consideration given to their positions 
within the organization of interest, and to some extent, to their reputation in terms of the 
role played in the international development community. In total, 21 interviews were 
conducted: 12 donors‘ representatives (UN, bilateral and multi-lateral), 5 
representatives of INGOS and 4 key national scholars who are regular consultants of 
international organizations in matters of institution building. Donors and INGO 
representatives were senior staff members or program managers, knowledgeable about 
the general framework of operations within their organizations and the programs 
conducted in Burundi. The positions of people interviewed are given in Appendix A. 
 
Two scheduled interviews with representatives of local human rights NGO and a 
women organizations‘ network could not take place due to unexpected schedule-
conflicts from the respondents. A representative of CARE International received the 
researcher‘s letter of introduction but did not respond to the request for interview; and a 
   63 
scheduled appointment with the INGO Action Aid International (AAI) was cancelled by 
their office due to the unavailability of staff mandated to provide information about the 
organization‘s operations. Table 5 captures the response rate of interviews conducted: 
 
Table 4:  Response rate of interviews conducted 
Organizations Targeted sample Survey Interviews 
Bilateral 6 5 83% 
Multi-Lateral and UN  10 7 70% 
INGOs 13 5 38.4% 
CSOs 6 4 66.6% 
TOTAL 35 21 60% 
 
All interviews took place in the capital city of Bujumbura during the months of March and 
April 2008.The telephone was used to request interviews and a letter from the 
researcher‘s academic committee members was used as a way of introduction. 
  
All 21 interviews were conducted one-on-one and by note-taking. A statement of 
confidentiality was provided and permission for taking notes was sought by the 
researcher before the interview took place. The decision was made not to use a tape 
recorder based on the researcher‘s knowledge of the culture:  using such an instrument 
in Burundi is not favourable in gaining confidential information or when seeking a 
personal perspective from an expert. Interview sessions lasted 60 to 70 minutes and 
were structured according to the survey questionnaire described above. After each 
interview, the researcher summarized the main findings of the discussion for the 
interviewee upon conclusion of the meeting. 
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3.4.2 Data analysis  
The analysis of data collected was done in several steps. The first task was to 
identify all the major donors present in Burundi and how they channel their funds. 
Second, there was a need to establish and group the domains and types of activities of 
intervention per each organization contacted. Third, the core of the research 
concentrated on identifying the links that exist between: a) donors with international 
NGOs; and b) donors/international NGOs with civil society organizations.  
 
a. A review of documents and data from the sample of organizations contacted 
revealed that 95% of all donors support local organizations through grants to 
INGOs. In 5% of the cases, donors provide small grants directly to CSOs. 
Exceptions to the small grants are special projects supported by multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank and European Union where funds are 
allocated directly for the creation and development of local organizations to 
conduct certain activities. Such projects seem to be among the few successful 
CSOs (see the example of Twitezimbere). 
 
b. The most popular and visible CSOs, according to the data collected from 
interviews and document analysis, indicates that they operate in four sectors: 
economic sustainability, health, human rights and the media. The four sectors 
correspond to the priorities identified in the national planning tools, coordinated 
and used by the Burundi government and donors in general. The sectors take 
into consideration the needs of the aftermath of war and democratic governance 
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in particular. A close examination of emerging CSOs shows that a great number 
of local organizations are found in those four sectors. In selecting international 
organizations that support local capacity building, the researcher made efforts to 
interview at least one expert in each of the four sectors of activity. 
     
c. Identification of the relationship between donors/INGOs and CSOs was 
examined through the priorities set by the donors within the context of the 
political instability which characterizes Burundi at present. Efforts were made to 
compare the policies prescribed by donors in post-conflict situations in other 
nations to the specific case of Burundi. Peacebuilding theories and donors‘ 
practices applying to capacity building guided this study with an aim to explore 
their application and draw conclusions for the case of Burundi. 
 
The last stage of the research consisted of organizing and integrating the 
collected data. As explained in the research design section, some data related to 
subsequent years to the period of study were incorporated into the analysis to gain 
more insight on a specific subject.  
3.5  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study of capacity development best practices is an evolving process. The 
findings of this research contribute positively to the existing literature in the African 
Great-Lakes region by increasing the exposure of the many challenges faced by local 
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organizations.  Burundi NGOs are emerging and could also benefit from this research. 
Scholarly reports that focus on their particular environment, their struggles and 
successes are scarce and it is hoped that this study contributes to this knowledge. 
3.6 THREATS TO VALIDITY 
There are two threats to the validity of this research. The first threat relates to the 
un-randomized selection of international organizations which leads to a seemingly low 
statistical power of independent variables. The problem may be caused by a bias from 
the researcher that creates a type 2 error or ―omitted variable bias‖ in the selection of 
variables (King et al, 1994). However, care was taken to select and cover all major 
players involved in the activities of interest. In a small country like Burundi where people 
know ―who is doing what‖ in the international development community, chances to 
overlook organizations involved with CSOs capacity building were limited. The 
researcher is aware that more meetings with experts could have occurred if not for time 
constraints; but is confident that, given the few organizations involved with CSOs 
capacity building, the total response rate to survey interviews of 60% is sufficient to 
correct this perception. 
 
The second threat relates to the political nature of this study. Donors may not 
always want to disclose their strategies or intentions and the information collected may 
have omitted some variables due to the confidentiality involved. Omitted information 
could be related to the sensitivity of financial data, to political strategies that are behind 
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decisions to support a program, or simply to the bias that donors attribute to the 
performance of a country or the local political actors with whom they negotiate the 
assistance needed. This is very relevant to Burundi where all parties engaged in 
peacebuilding, whether international actors or their national counterparts, are affected 
by the ethnic polarization prevalent in Burundian society between the Hutu and the Tutsi 
groups. Donors may be inclined to help one group over another to reach a certain 
balance of local participation in political decision-making mechanisms; or individuals in 
the civil society arena represented by the ethnic group who are in power may find it 
easier to court international organizations for the support needed.  Understanding the 
role played by donors in empowering civil society actors in Burundi required the 
researcher to take into account this political sensibility and by so doing I may have 
omitted asking certain questions related to donors‘ perceptions of the power-play 
between Hutus and Tutsis and how it affects their support strategies. Although exploring 
this political aspect of relationships could have enhanced this study, the researcher 
opted to report on what is most observable in order to maintain neutrality of the 
information collected. In this study, the researcher also tried to keep a minimum account 
of political debates on the conflict in Burundi for the same reason. 
 
The threats described may have undermined certain aspects of this research; 
however, it was still possible to advance the knowledge of local organizations in Burundi 
and their relationship to donors. The analysis of this relationship will be done in three 
ways: Chapter Four analyses the associative movement in Burundi; the following 
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chapter looks at the different external players who work with local organizations and the 
last chapter analyses the specifics of the relationships between the two.   
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4.0  ANALYSIS OF BURUNDI CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
In the literature review, we have seen the importance and the increasing 
involvement of local actors in development initiatives as well as in peacebuilding. The 
examples of South Africa or Rwanda show the emphasis put on traditional instruments 
in more recent approaches to resolve African conflicts.  However, in researching donors‘ 
programs and projects that support indigenous organizations in Burundi, findings 
indicate that there have been only modest attempts to support traditional systems. In 
the early years of the conflict, the international actors involved in peace negotiations 
called upon traditional leaders to play a role in on-going talks. However, opinions 
expressed by local participants interviewed reveal that failure to provide for continued 
support of traditional leaders from elected officials or a weak collaboration between 
traditional and modern systems attests to the deep ethnic divide existing in the 
Burundian society.  The need to understand the fabric of civil society organizations 
existing in Burundi and their interactions with donors leads to an analysis of the 
development of the concept of civil society and the image that civil organizations 
present today. The analysis is based on findings collected by the researcher in 1999 
while consulting with AFRICARE, an INGO working with Burundi CSOs, and in 2008 
when more interviews with local researchers interested in the subject were conducted. 
The present chapter summarizes the findings and emphasizes the strengths and 
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weaknesses of Burundi CSOs. An analysis of ways in which international actors have 
addressed CSOs‘ capacities will follow in Chapters Five and Six. 
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON TRADITIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN BURUNDI  
In pre-colonial Burundi, non-government organizations as known and described 
in the literature were non-existent; the core of civil society consisted of the family and 
extended family clan.28 It is however important to mention the traditional institution of 
Bashingantahe whose power in the Burundian society denotes not only historical 
political influence but also an instrument for social cohesion.  As seen in the literature 
on peacebuilding, the role that this institution plays or could play should be understood 
within the more recent cross-cultural perspectives of transitional justice in post-conflict 
peace processes such as Burundi. The functions of the Bashingantahe/counselors in 
Burundi history were diverse; their traditional roles are described here due to the place 
of the institution in the Burundian society and the influence it had on the political level.  
4.1.1  The institution of Bashingantahe 
The Mushingantahe (noun: Umushingantahe; plural: Bashingantahe) is 
commonly described as a notable, an honest and respected person whose 
responsibility is to resolve conflicts in the community he lives in at all levels of societal 
                                                 
28
 
Ntabona, 2002
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structure. Traditionally, Umushingantahe is an example of morality, a symbol of justice 
and equilibrium, truth and peace wherever he lives. These qualities are derived not from 
a power attributed by an administrative authority but rather by his social conduct, a 
sense of citizenship that dictates his lifestyle.  Any candidate who wishes to be invested 
as Umushingantahe must be observed over several years and be guided by senior 
Bashingantahe before he can be sworn in as a peacemaker and guarantor of harmony 
in his community (Ntabona, 1991). 
 
The body of Bashingantahe characterized as an institution was governed by strict 
rules and procedures. Zénon Manirakiza29 pointed out that the institution was 
discriminatory by its nature, a closed circle in which one could not enter easily. The 
membership was restricted to men over 25 only, and from both Hutu and Tutsi tribes. 
Members of the Twa, a minority ethnic group could not qualify because they supposedly 
display a certain insensibility to human sufferings (Ntabona, 1991, 1995). Although 
wealth was not a criterion, the very poor were excluded from being a candidate. The 
idea was to limit corruption in conflict settlements and also to encourage a spirit of hard 
work and a certain level of material independency. 
                                                 
29
 A discussion with Zénon Manirakiza, professor at the University of Burundi. He is an invested Mushingantahe 
himself and has written many articles on the institution of Bashingantahe. 
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 A multi-functional role 
 The functions of Bashingantahe in traditional Burundi were diverse and their 
power was unlimited in the sense that their authority was never contested. They 
intervened in disputes from the lowest levels of society to the royal palace. 
 
Social functions: The institution was a structure through which society managed 
and resolved conflicts. Once a Mushingantahe was invested he was called upon to 
mediate conflicts in the private and public life of individuals and families. The body of 
Bashingantahe in each administrative unit served as guarantors of customs and cultural 
values. 
 
Political functions: The network of Bashingantahe represented a counter-power 
system and provided counsel to the political representatives from the hill to the king‘s 
palace. The Bashingantahe also played an important role in the initiation, investiture or 
deposition of the king. In a traditional monarchical system where the king was sacred 
and a supreme being, authority was pyramidal with a distribution of power from the top 
to the bottom. The closer to the king, the more sacred (see figure 2 below). The role of 
Bashingantahe was to serve as a buffer against this sacred power through a constant 
and institutionalized dialogue. They were not political appointees; their moral authority 
came from the population who invested them at the low level of the pyramid, but 
assisted directly by a sacred source, that of Imana (God).30  
                                                 
30
 There is a saying in Kirundi translating into “voice of people, voice of God” which applies to this concept. 
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Figure 2: Schematic social organization of traditional Burundi 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Ntabona (1991) 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Ntabona (1991) 
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Judicial functions: In the public eye, the judicial function was the primary role of 
the Bashingantahe. They had the authority to determine the rights of victims according 
to custom and to decide whether a public trial should take place or not. The types of 
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social and political life relied upon mediation, conciliation and arbitration. In public trials, 
the Bashingantahe consulted and operated as a group and used an open audience to 
render decisions on public issues, leaving little room for bribery. 
 
The institution of Bashingantahe‟s influence and power was gradually reduced by 
colonialism and the different republican regimes from 1963 to 1996 but it has managed 
to survive to this date. In the course of its historical evolution it has both changed its 
form and lost some of its prerogatives without losing credibility from the people in the 
hills who continue to resort to their wisdom.  
4.1.2 The role of the Bashingantahe during the ethnic conflicts  
During the political crisis of 1993 onwards, the killings of more than 250,000 people 
degraded moral and social values within the Burundian society (Ntabona, 1995). 
Reports from a study by the University of Burundi, complemented with  interviews and 
surveys conducted by Le Centre de Recherche pour l‟Inculturation et le Développement 
(CRID) and UNESCO in 1994 and 1996 respectively, indicate the existence of 30,000 
invested Bashingantahe. Many of these Bashingantahe risked their own lives trying to 
rescue persecuted Tutsis.31In several regions, the Bashingantahe also organized 
themselves to stop killers and looters. The Bashingantahe were widely sought after to 
                                                 
31
 The study by the University of Burundi was based on a national field study covering 114 communes and the 
capital Bujumbura. A sample of two elderly men per commune, were interviewed from structured questionnaires on 
cultural, historical, political, judicial and educational aspects. Additionally, public conferences were organized under 
the theme of `human rights‟. Other conferences and colloquium gathering public and civil society organizations 
were organized to discuss the institution of Bashingantahe, its past and its reinstitution; and gather practical 
suggestions on how to revive it.    
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resolve and assist in the settlement of land and property disputes within the context of a 
large- scale repatriation effort of refugees from Tanzania and internally displaced 
peoples who came back to their villages after 10 years of exile. Today in some 
communities, the Bashingantahe still enjoy the trust of local people who find it more 
convenient to resort to the traditional system in resolving their conflicts as opposed to 
pursuing formal administrative channels. The National Council of Bashingantahe has 
lobbied for inclusion and involvement in the post-war policies of the government but the 
traditional council has no place in the law for the proposed national truth and 
reconciliation commission (Commission Nationale Vérité Réconciliation). It was also 
absent in the negotiations between the government and the UN regarding the mandate 
and composition of the Burundian commission as well (Huyse &   Salter, 2008).  
 
During the early years of the conflict, various initiatives were developed by 
donors to strengthen this customary institution. The UN and UNESCO sponsored 
studies and explored initiatives to reinstate it. However, both politicians and the 
population showed some resistance to revive the institution. The Bashingantahe have 
largely lost trust from their communities who would otherwise give them power to 
function the way they used to. On one hand, the Hutu-controlled government saw the 
council of Bashingantahe as still controlled by the Tutsi group; and on the other hand, 
traditional leaders at the local level clashed with administrative representatives who 
received their authority through elections. The international community in its role as a 
facilitator in the peace negotiations usually relies on formal structures and may not see 
the need to counter these sources of resistance. Unlike in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra 
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Leone and in most other countries  that combine traditional justice and reconciliation 
instruments with other strategies to deal with the aftermath of  civil war and genocide, 
the institution of  Bashingantahe in Burundi is neither formally nor informally involved in 
the actual programming of transitional justice. However, many Burundians as well as 
local and international organizations consider the revitalization of the Bashingantahe as 
very important. The institution is still widely resorted to and trusted in rural communities. 
It serves as an alternative to the costly procedures and corruption of the official courts, 
while it is considered as a force that may stabilize society and stimulate pluralism. The 
Arusha agreement of 2000 explicitly refers to the importance of solidifying the 
Bashingantahe, and emphasizes their role in reconciliation at the level of the 
community32. 
4.2 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS TODAY 
 
The political decentralization, liberalization, and accommodating laws promoting 
associations of individuals such as the landmark public law of April 1992 saw an 
outgrowth of local associations. Another important juncture of civil society organizations 
was the signing of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 which resulted in an impressive 
growth of different types of associations with different identities, ideas and opinions. At 
the level of their internal dynamics, urban civil society associations organized 
themselves around numerous and scattered groups and social spheres. This in itself 
                                                 
32
 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Arusha: 28 August 2000, Protocol 2, Ch. 1 
article 9,paragraph 8 
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limits the scope of their actions and their impact at the national level. In 2003, an 
account of 1,405 not-for-profit associations was registered by the Ministry of Interior;        
by 2006, the number was doubled33. In 2008, more associations continue to grow but 
only 10 percent can provide an account on the objectives they assigned themselves to 
accomplish34. 
 
The consequences of the socio-economic crisis of 1993 motivated the creation of 
many CSOs. These were formed to resolve peacefully the ethnic and political conflict to 
accommodate the growing awareness of the role of women and youth in resolving the 
conflict, and address the new social challenges resulting from war such as caring for 
orphans and the dispersed/displaced population, the problem of child soldiers, and to 
address issues of poverty and other challenges. All these issues called for not only the 
government response but also civil society initiatives that prompted them to create 
spaces for action.  The spread of AIDS is another factor that encouraged and increased 
the dynamic of the associative movement. The study of Sebundandi (2002) indicates 
that between 1993 and 1999, sixteen associations were created exclusively dealing with 
AIDS.  
 
 Many Burundi CSOs have become effective instruments through which certain 
segments of civil society can be reached; others have dissolved or changed their 
activities over time. A closer look at these CSOs is given in the following section. The 
                                                 
33
 Palmans. E., “L’Evolution de la Société Civile au Burundi” L‟Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2005-2006, p.3   
34
 Stijn De Reu classification of Burundi operational CSOs in a thesis report conducted in Burundi in 2005. 
Sebudandi‟s findings on are also similar and the 10% of CSOs fall within the few local organizations that attract 
external funds.  
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study by Sebudandi and Nduwayo sponsored by UNDP (2002) classified Burundi CSOs 
in fifteen groups according to the sector of intervention and activities. The findings in 
this section draw from this study in addition to other collected data on Burundi civil 
society organizations. Efforts of this research concentrated on bringing out the domains 
of activities from local organizations that attract more donor support. 
4.2.1 Classification of Burundi CSOs 
The civil society organizations in the table below are categorized to distinguish 
which group(s) collaborated more with donors or have contributed significantly to the 
peacebuilding efforts.  
Table 5:  A Typology of Burundi civil society organizations 
# Category by Activity Number of  
associations/  
organizations 
I. Socio-economic 
1 Socio-economic and self-help 153 
2 Mutual aid and solidarity 76 
3 Humanitarian and philanthropic 
 
39 
II. Think tank, Spiritual and Cultural expression 
 
4 Education and research 106 
5 Religious denominations 77 
6 Environment and ecology 17 
7 Art, culture and sports 
 
38 
III. Protection of human rights, advocacy, civic action 
 
8 Human rights 24 
9 Special interests 32 
10 Promotion of freedom of  the press and the 
media 
4 
11 Youth organizations 9 
12 Women organizations 7 
13 Civic Education 43 
14 Advocacy for vulnerable groups 
 
61 
15 IV. Non-classified groups 11 
 Total 697 
Data from Sebudandi & Nduwayo (2002). Categories by the author. 
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A summary of the analysis for each group is given in the following section. 
Activities of these groups with a significant impact on peacebuilding efforts will be 
further discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
 Findings on the associative movement in Burundi can be divided into two main 
categories: (1) community associations, and (2) local non-government organizations. 
Community associations are prevalent in the first and fifth groups, while local NGOS are 
mostly found in the second and third groups. The latter category is the most active and 
visible in the area of political reconciliation and peace process and is more pertinent to 
the questions addressed in this research. A brief discussion of each group follows. 
 
 Community associations 
 From the sample of surveyed community associations per commune in the 
provinces of Burundi, members of these associations represent 3 to 5 percent of the 
population. The number of community associations is estimated at approximately 300 
per province, or an approximate number of 5,000 groupings in the whole country 
(Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002).  
  
Most of these community associations were created after 1993 and are 
dominated by female participants (up to 60%). Approximately 70% of the associations 
have fewer than 30 members, the average for each group being 15 to 20 members. 
80% have agriculture and breeding as their main activity, and some among them were 
created for common interests and with a long-term perspective. Self-help, solidarity and 
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economic survival are the main characteristics of the rural associative movement. The 
themes reoccurring in their names and objectives pertain to development, peace and 
motivation to work.  
 
 There is also a tendency to network among different groups in order to have a 
stronger voice and more influence in negotiating, for instance, to obtain better selling 
prices for their agricultural products, fertilizers, etc. External (foreign) development 
NGOs also encourage partnerships among small community organizations to better 
provide institutional support and coordination. Development agencies generally require 
them to have a certain organizational structure and impose conditions for their support. 
To that end, some of the groupings flow from that type of initiative, either as a 
requirement from a supporting donor or to attract external funding.  
 
Community groupings play a significant role in poverty alleviation and other 
social functions such as consultations with other social entities or administrative 
structures. In their communities, we also see them more and more involved and 
associated in local administrative decisions which increase citizen participation. 
However, apart from a few associations that received considerable technical support 
from development agencies most of the community associations are still in their 
embryonic stages. The community groups in this category correspond to what Richard 
Holloway (2001) describes as mutual benefit-organizations. They are characterized by 
individuals who join together to form an organization in which they are members, where 
they have a governance function to elect officers and from which, as members, they 
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derive benefits. Such organizations may be very small community organizations in a 
particular geographical area –or large and national in scope.  Group 1 on Table 5 above 
exemplifies the definition of this type of organizations.    
 
 Local NGOs 
 The research focused more on this category since their activities attract attention 
from donors trying to find solutions to the socio-political conflict. Burundi NGOs are 
mostly the product of an internal movement that responded to the needs of the moment 
after the war in 1993, but are also the result of initiatives and encouragement from the 
donor community. In fact, support for NGOs in countries affected by war has been a 
main focus among major donors for many years. Besides contracting international 
NGOs as distributors of humanitarian aid, donors have also looked to country-based 
civil society organizations to carry out an increasing number of roles in pursuit of 
development, democratization and conflict management. Among others, these tasks 
have included: 
 
o assisting the government in providing social and other services; 
o mobilizing social demands to put public pressure on government to be 
more responsive to public needs; 
o monitoring the state and playing watchdog with regard to human rights 
and corruption; 
o convening issue-specific dialogues between disputing leaders or groups; 
and 
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o working at the grassroots level in order to foster inter-group reconciliation 
through sectoral projects and mediated conflict resolution. 
 
All the programs supporting NGO activities and capacity-building are initiated as 
a way to foster the progressive emergence of a broad civil society, one that both 
supplements the state in providing for public needs and makes governments more 
responsive to their populations.  
  
Group 1: economic activity and self-help or mutual-benefit category represents roughly 
38% of all organizations. These groups have grown significantly in Burundi over the last 
few years to support community development at the level of each province. The two 
groups include people who come together for different reasons: they might share the 
same ethnic, educational or social backgrounds or originate from the same region. With 
the effects of war and after the 1992 law favoring the development of private 
associations, the need for individuals to reduce poverty and develop their native 
provinces was felt. Associations engaged in diverse sectors and activities related to 
water and sanitation, agriculture, infrastructure rehabilitation, etc. were developed. The 
growth of socio-economic associations can also be attributed to the introduction of 
participative development that encouraged professionals such as engineers, 
economists and sociologists to group into associations and provide a technical link 
between donors, the government and community organizations. 
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 Group 2: Think tank; spiritual and cultural expression.This is the second largest 
category as it represents 34% of all the organizations. Organizations in this category 
deal with the betterment of the quality of life, intellectual and physical fulfillment. In the 
education sector, many research, training and adult literacy centers opened around the 
country in the last ten years or so. Additionally, numerous private schools in the capital 
city and new post-secondary institutions in other provinces responded to a real need in 
the education sector, but also contributed in inciting local economic activities35.  
 
 Religious organizations and new congregations is another category of non-profit 
organizations that have flourished recently as a result of the development of evangelical 
and charismatic movements. Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and other religious 
congregations have created youth and women associations that pursue social, 
economic and cultural objectives. These associations attracted a large membership, 
and responded to the need for direction and the anguish that people felt during and after 
the war, as well as the many deaths caused by HIV/AIDS. 
 
Protection of the environment is another growing sector. The worldwide 
ecological movement has triggered very dynamic national and international programs to 
support the awareness and the preservation of the eco-system. Many associations were 
created to respond to this movement and also to attract funds from the international 
community. 
 
                                                 
35
 The opening of the private university of Ngozi triggered the construction of hotels and restaurants in the province, 
and other dynamic economic activities. 
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Group 3: a) Human rights, advocacy and civic action. 
 Among this group, human rights and media- related associations have grown 
remarkably and have played a significant role in the peace process.  Under the human 
rights theme, Ligue ITEKA, the GAPS (Groupe d‟Associaitons pour la Paix et le 
Secours) and CADH (Cadre d‟Association des Droits de l‟Homme) played a significant 
role since 1993 to defend a wide range of individual, civil and political rights. There are 
other organizations that promote and defend prisoners‘ rights, children and women‘s 
rights.  During the civil war, human rights organizations mobilized to denounce violence 
and tried to instill in the Burundian society the culture of neutrality and impartiality. Other 
religious and women‘s organizations intervened during the crisis to provide urgent care 
for the displaced population and participated also in the sensitization of tolerant 
behavior, peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and respect for human rights. 
 
Group 3: b) The non-profit media organizations 
Under this group of organizations, the promotion and protection of the freedom of 
expression has been flourishing a great deal and has equally attracted a lot of national 
attention and support from the international community.  Up until April 1992, the press 
was governed by the decree law numbers 1-136 of June 1976 issued under the first 
republic. Article 6 of the law stipulated that Burundian journalists had to abide by the 
ideology of the country‘s unique political party, Uprona.  Although the decree did not 
specifically impose a monopoly of the state over the radio or the press, it did ratify the 
control of the state‘s political party over the conduct of journalists. President Jean-
Baptiste Bagaza under the second republic made the law even more specific by 
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officially installing the control of radio and television by the state. The media at this 
stage were sponsored by the state and included the National Television of Burundi 
(RTNB), the daily French language newspaper Le Renouveau, the weekly newspaper in 
the national language Kirundi, Ubumwe and the Burundian Press Agency, l‟Agence 
Burundaise de Presse (ABP).  
 
The Constitution of Burundi today recognizes freedom of the press through an 
amendment passed on February 28, 2005 (article 30) and Law no. 1/025, passed on 
November 27, 2003. Article 3 regarding the press stipulates that in order to exercise the 
profession, a journalist has the right to access information sources, investigate, and 
comment freely on the facts of public life. However, although the law conforms to 
international standards, its enforcement is often problematic. In reality, journalists 
encounter numerous difficulties when they try to approach certain political leaders for 
interviews or reports. The issue is more visible in the provinces, where local authorities 
(political, military, police) frequently and deliberately violate the laws that establish 
freedom of speech.36 
 
In principle, public and private media are equal under the law. In practice, the 
public media has been given preferential treatment since independence up until the new 
liberalization of non-government organizations. During this time, private media was non-
existent and the National Radio-Television of Burundi (NRTB) and the Burundi Press 
Agency had a monopoly. Even with freedom of press, private media today are more and 
                                                 
36
 Media Sustainability index (Africa) 2006-2007, p. 48. International Research & Exchange Board (IREX)  
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more associated with the actions of the government and other public institutions. 
However, very often it is the state-run media that suffers from censorship enforced by 
the ministry of communication. No information published by the state-run media can be 
unfavourable to a member of the government as long as he/she is in office. The public 
media receives state subsidies, while the private media does not. 
 
Generally, the introduction of independent media influences the quality of public 
broadcasting in a positive way, as the latter no longer serves only the government‘s 
interests but is more and more concerned with the needs of the population.37 Unlike in 
neighbouring Rwanda where the radio was used to incite violence and promote ethnic 
division prior to and during the genocide of 1994, Burundi has learned positively from 
this experience recognizing the power of the media, particularly radio, and by 
channelling this power to build peaceful reconciliation. A good illustration is Studio 
Ijambo, sponsored by the INGO Search for Common Ground (SCG) in promoting many 
peace reconciliation programs broadcasted since 1994. USAID was one of the major 
donors who funded these programs through the SCG. Common issues usually 
addressed are related to peaceful reconciliation and discussion of current political 
problems.   
 
Despite the positive evolution in terms freedom of the press and the increasing number 
of independent stations, major obstacles complicate the existence of public 
                                                 
37
 Evan Palmans in her discussion the development of public and private media in her article “Médias et Élections 
au Burundi: l’expérience de 1993 et perspectives pour 2005”recounts how the media have played different roles 
during the crisis and throughout the elections. 
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broadcasting as well as private stations. Among other things, the political party affiliation 
of some media figures or the tendency of the government to control the materials 
broadcasted, compromises the freedom of the press. 
 
Group 3: c) Women‟s organizations 
Sustained conflict in Burundi for more than a decade has resulted in a disproportionate 
number of women being forced to play non-traditional roles as head of households and 
to assume other positions of responsibility for which many are ill-prepared and 
unsupported. An awareness of their roles and the need for their contribution to the 
peace process increasingly grew after 1993, and many women formed associations or 
coalitions to create a stronger advocacy voice. The association Dushirehamwe, for 
example, is a network that reaches several thousand women throughout the country 
and has more than 35 associations. One of its initiatives is the creation of Cadre de 
coordination des organisations féminines pour la consolidation de la paix et la mise en 
oeuvre de la resolution, or ―Cadre,‖ that addresses several issues related to human 
rights, youth, and conflict resolution training.  Another example of coalition initiatives is 
CAFOB, that groups together more than 40 associations.  Coalitions of associations 
work in areas of peaceful reconciliation, conflict resolution training, fight against 
HIV/AIDS and economic development. A closer look at the role of women in 
peacebuilding activities will be discussed in the chapter addressing CSOs‘ capacity 
building. 
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4.3 OBSERVATIONS ON BURUNDI CSOS 
4.3.1 Making a difference 
The considerable growth of Burundi CSOs, although still nascent, has brought 
positive contributions to both the democratization process and peacebuilding 
endeavours. From the researcher‘s observations and findings from experts‘ reports, 
many local organizations have intervened in numerous sectors of economic and political 
life, although the impact of their operations remains modest. More and more CSOs are 
providing a space for fulfilment, self-expression and ethnic tolerance. Internal and 
external observers agree on the many weaknesses that face Burundi‘s CSOs. However, 
many organizations have greatly invested themselves in certain areas such as the 
media, human rights, assistance/ protection of vulnerable and marginalized groups, and 
the fight against HIV-AIDS.  
 
Sebudandi‘s report (2002) stated that the proportion of operational and 
successful CSOs is estimated at 10%, representing around 70 organizations out of 700 
non-profits registered. There are several influential local organizations that have been at 
the forefront of bringing positive change that are worth mentioning: 
 
o The Burundian Human Rights organisation, Ligue Iteka and the Association des 
Femmes Juristes (Association of Women lawyers) have established network structures 
at the community level to assist in the resolution of conflicts, in response to the 
slowness, complexity and costs of judicial procedures in the formal systems. One of 
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their initiatives is cliniques juridiques; comprised of paralegals that provide advice, try to 
mediate in conflicts, or that orient people toward the proper institution. They work in 
collaboration with Commissions Justice & Paix (J&P) Commission Episcopal Justice & 
Paix, a national body established in 1999 by the Conference of Catholic Bishops of 
Burundi (CECAB) in all Dioceses as well as in 90 of the 132 parishes of Burundi. In the 
domain of human rights and peaceful reconciliation processes, we see organizations of 
women, professionals in matters of law, and religious organizations coming together to 
collaborate and contribute to peace and reconciliation in their local communities. Their 
interventions range from non-violent conflict resolution training to raising consciousness 
about peaceful coexistence and human rights, to making alerts on human rights 
violations and to implementing  the different peace agreements.  
 
o The Women's Peace Programme (WPP) started in 1996 as a direct response to 
needs identified by women and women‘s organisations working for peace in Burundi, 
Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region. Since 1996, WPP has facilitated dialogues 
between women from different ethnic groups in both Burundi and Rwanda as well as in 
the Diaspora.  
 
o Media organizations including private radio stations Radio Publique Africaine 
(RPA), Isanganiro, and Bonesha have managed to produce objective and well-
researched reports in the last five years. RPA is very popular and broadcasts in all 
provinces. The radio played an important role in August 2006 and contributed to the 
freeing of eminent political prisoners who were accused of an attempted coup against 
Burundi institutions. Managers of these stations were also sent to prison after they 
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proved that while the government accused former president Domitien Ndayizeye of an 
attempted coup, the coup had been in fact plotted by the authorities in order to muzzle 
the opposition.  
 
o  CAP (Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix-Company for Peace Apostles), has 
been known for making a difference in the polarized political crisis. It is made up of 
Burundians from the two main ethnic groups holding positions of influence in political 
parties, the army, the parliament and the administration. Their objective is to develop 
dialogue and peacebuilding among themselves and their peers, and the group has 
played an influential role in the Arusha peace negotiation. For several years, this group 
was the only forum where grievances from both ethnic groups could be discussed. 
Political events in 1999 put a great strain on the trust between group members, but CAP 
came out strengthened by the crisis and has since been very active in organizing 
meetings and conferences between parliamentarians and army officers. During political 
negotiations, the group also extended meetings and dialogue abroad between internal 
groups and groups of Burundians in exile. Other organizations made visible impact 
within alliances. Such organizations are discussed in the section of strategic 
partnerships. 
4.3.2  Weak representation and financial dependency on external support 
A look at the number of Burundi CSOs can appear impressive considering the 
size of the country, but not all registered associations are operational.  In their research, 
Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) notes that 63% of the community associations and 
   91 
local NGOs surveyed have fewer than 100 members and that the degree of 
engagement remains weak. Even when they are operational, they remain fragile due to 
the fact that they have neither the resources to independently finance their activities nor 
the appropriate strategies to raise money (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). Most visible 
and sustainable local NGOs operate in the capital Bujumbura and represent 48% of the 
associations/organizations of the survey. Only 15% of them have representation in other 
provinces.  The table below reflects the size as well as the operational budget of the 
organizations surveyed. 
 
Table 6: Size of CSOs’ membership and operational budget in 2002 
 
Membership 
# 
% of 
organizations 
Annual Budget (US$) % of organizations 
≤ 10 11 0-500 23 
20-50 22 500-1000 3 
50-100 30 1,000-2,000 6 
100-500 11 2,000-3,000 3 
500-1000 3 3,000-5,000 9 
1000-2000 11 5,000-10,000 6 
2000-3000 0 10,000-20,000 6 
4000-5000 6 20,000-50,000 21 
> 5000 3 50,000-100,000 9 
 _ 100,000-150,000 6 
 _ 150,000-200,000 6 
 _ 200,000-500,000 6 
Adapted from Sebudandi & Nduwayo (2002). 
 
 
The sample utilized above comprises operational CSOs, i.e., those organizations 
showing in their records an annual operating budget and activity reports. The sample 
represents about 25-30% of the 1400 organizations surveyed in Sebudandi and 
Nduwayo‘s research of 2002. One will notice however that, even among this category, 
12% of the CSOs operate with a budget less or equal to $500; and only one fifth of the 
CSOs have a budget in the range of $20,000 to $50,000. 
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Considering the existing relationship between those organizations and the donor 
community, some CSOs attract funding more than others with respect to their objectives 
and thematic issues pursued such as: human rights, HIV/AIDS, gender, humanitarian 
action or the environment.  
 
Community associations grew largely to attract external funding and do not even 
have minimum proper funds. Only 10% of community associations are financially viable 
and can be considered as success models according to research published in 2002 by 
Stijn De Reu. 38  
4.3.3 Missing link between community associations and NGOs 
A characteristic of Burundi association movement is that organizations and 
associations operate in isolation and therefore do not have representation in the 
countryside. They thus fail to create links with community groups. Provincial or regional 
economic development associations are initiated in the capital Bujumbura or provincial 
main towns but often do not involve the peasants or grassroots groups. Interviews 
conducted by Sebudandi and Nduwayo (2002) indicated that local people at the collines 
(hills) feel this void and believe that associations headed by educated natives of the 
provinces are more preoccupied with politics than community development. 
                                                 
38
 “The impact of international NGOs and civil society organizations on the peace process in Burundi”. Thesis report 
by Stijn De Reu, University of Ghent, Belgium in 2005.  
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Partnerships among CSOs and consultations with local groups could, however, 
enhance their functional capacity and their visibility.  
4.3.4  Friction between public administration and CSOs  
The relationship between public authorities and representatives of civil society 
organizations is limited and even where it exists, it reflects the difficulty of the 
administration to break away from the tradition of state authority and control over many 
aspects of Burundi social, economic and political life. The role of civil society as a 
counter-power to political actions is hindered by the administration‘s reactions which 
demonstrate hostility particularly when issues related to the abuse of human rights and 
other civic actions are raised. For instance, private journalists are jailed or intimidated 
for seeking information and reporting on the actions of a public official. The 
administration authorities at the communal, provincial or ministerial levels often ignore 
or misunderstand the role that civil society organizations should play, and do not 
hesitate to use their power to counter their actions when they feel opposed or criticized.  
Collaboration between the administration and local associations may exist when an 
activity or action concerns economic development. The fact that small community 
organizations do not necessarily collaborate with or receive support from larger NGOs 
leaves them even more isolated and with less power when it comes to negotiating with 
administrative entities. A tendency to restrain the growth of a strong and credible civil 
society by the administration is felt when, for instance, the government attempts to 
create structures that represent civil society but are governed by individuals who are 
close to power (Sebudandi & Nduwayo, 2002). There have also been instances where 
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CSOs functioned as a spring-board to state politics, blurring the distinction between civil 
society and formal politics. While many CSOs genuinely do represent the interests and 
needs of the local people, many are also connected with the ruling power or elite groups 
that promote their own vested interests. Furthermore, in cases such as Burundi or 
Rwanda where the political conflict is characterized by deep ethnic divides, civil society 
organizations directly experience the effects of conflict on the ground and position 
themselves within conflict politics and discourses. 
4.3.5 Strategic partnerships 
Although collaboration between organizations operating in the same sector is not 
extensive, efforts to create partnerships are emerging. Responses from the survey 
questionnaire and interviews conducted with representatives of OAG, FORSC, RESO 
and UNIFEM39 confirmed the tendency for organizations to act together and maximize 
collective actions. According to the representatives of CSOs interviewed the 
partnerships are made within or across sectors of activities, and the more regional and 
international partnerships or network they have, the more visible and effective the CSOs 
become. Data in Sebudandi‘s study (2002) and the classification of Burundi NGOs by 
Stijn (2002) indicate that the listed local NGOs below have dynamic projects, attract 
resources from donors, and have the reputation to be considered successful: 
 
                                                 
39
 See appendix A for people interviewed. 
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o The Observatoire (OAG) was created in 1999 and groups 18 CSOs with a 
partnership across three sectors–human rights activists, journalists and 
parliamentarians– to monitor government performance. Since its creation, OAG has 
produced many reports and studies ranging from laws and rights on land reform, the 
Burundi education system, the evaluation of policies and practices in refugee 
repatriation, critical analysis on the management of public funds in heath and economic 
sectors, challenges of governance with the new elected officials, the inclusion of women 
in decision making, and more. Their credibility is measured by the support and 
increasing number of grants received by donors as well as the size of completed 
projects.40 
 
o CAFOB (Collectif des Associations de Femmes), created in 1997 is a network 
grouping of 46 women‘s organizations who work for peace and development and has a 
wide range of activities from anti-poverty advocacy, promotion of women's rights and 
gender equality, advice on legal matters affecting women, to training in project 
management and reproductive health. In the area of peacebuilding, it has organized 
seminars, visited  displaced persons in camps, and has participated in regional and 
international conferences. CAFOB has been instrumental in gaining acceptance of 
women at the Arusha negotiations. As a result, there is now a delegation of six women 
with ‗permanent observer‘ status representing women in civil society, in addition to four 
women who are members of political parties‘ delegations and the National Assembly.41 
                                                 
40
 http://www.oag.bi/ 
41
 Africa Development, Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 & 2, 2005 
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Another women‘s organization, the Réseau des Femmes pour la Paix, has around 40 
member organizations operating in the peacebuilding sector. 
 
o PRAUTAO- representing peasant solidarity was created in 2000 with 380 
community organization members. The network is active and has coordination units 
operating in four provinces. 
 
o Other newly created network organizations such as FORSC, le Forum pour le 
Renforcement de la Société Civile and CPAJ, Collectif des Associations des Jeunes 
(with 24 member organizations) are very engaged and contribute toward an active and 
strong civil society. There are instances where initiatives to network within the same 
sector are made but are short lived such as the example of CADH- Collectif des 
Associations des Droits Humains (Network of human rights associations) or CASSOC- 
Collectif des Associations de la Société Civile (Network of Civil Society Associations).  
 
Thirty percent of the organizations summarized in Table 6 above, do not belong to any 
local, regional or international network.  Twenty-one percent have a certain level of 
collaboration with local partners, whereas 45% of the organizations are affiliated or 
collaborate with international actors/networks. Discussions with representatives of OAG 
and FORSC confirmed that strategic partnerships are crucial to the development of 
Burundi civil society in general, and to the success of individual organizations 
particularly in finding a common voice and managing advocacy efforts. Partnership is 
not only the key to survival of most CSOs; it is also encouraged by the international 
organizations that fund most of the activities.  
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This chapter has discussed the development of CSOs in Burundi and explored 
emerging groups that are contributing to or have the potential to make a difference in 
the peace process. Existing or new policies regarding international cooperation are 
focusing more and more on mechanisms that involve non-government organizations 
and CSOs in Burundi. Their influence continues to be vital to the development of a 
strong civil society that is still heavily dependent on external support. The next chapter 
addresses the place of CSOs in current aid policies.  
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5.0  FEATURES OF DONORS’ BEHAVIOR IN BURUNDI 
 AFTER THE WAR 
In Chapter Four, we examined the type of civil society organizations that exist in 
Burundi. The creation and development of most of these CSOs could not have 
happened without the support of external assistance to encourage democratization 
initially and as part of the peacebuilding initiatives of the last decade. This chapter 
examines Question two of the research and looks at the donors‘ provisions to support 
CSOs in the Burundi peace process and how these policies were influenced by the 
development of the crisis. In the literature review, we have seen that the strengthening 
of local CSOs is part of the donors‘ new approach to promote the country-driven 
ownership in peacebuilding. In reference to Lederach‘s peacebuilding model discussed 
in Chapter Two, this chapter investigates how donors reacted to the political crisis in 
Burundi by examining the programs and projects that were put in place to support local 
capacity building at the levels described in Lederach‘s model.  
 
First, the chapter gives an overview of donors‘ current trends in development 
policies observed in fragile states, and emphasizes their specific response to the 
Burundi conflict. Second, strategic tools to support the peace-process in Burundi are 
analyzed, highlighting what efforts were put in place to engage local community and 
CSOs involvement in peacebuilding initiatives. 
   99 
 Policies described in this chapter are central to the framework of assistance that 
is observed in fragile states as they provide guidelines on what priorities are put forward 
by donors in the distribution of aid. To the benefit of civil society organizations that are 
working to define their place in Burundi, the new policies emphasize an increased role 
of civil actors not only in post-war reconstruction efforts but also in decision-making 
mechanisms at the government level. 
 
The analysis of policies presented in this chapter summarizes findings of 
practices and guidelines of donors of assistance in Burundi following the crisis of 1993. 
The analysis is based on documents obtained from donors and INGOs in Burundi, 
together with the general literature on donors‘ engagement on civil society, 
humanitarian relief and peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes region.  
5.1 OVERVIEW OF POLICIES 
5.1.1 Principles of engagement in fragile states 
A review of donors‘ support strategies in Burundi during the crisis shows that 
their policies have not differed from other countries in conflict. In general, apart from 
some targeted policies such as conflict prevention and reconstruction in development 
programs, few donors have adopted a characteristic development approach applying to 
what they call ‗fragile states‘.  However, donors have recently attempted to address the 
particular situation of countries where institutional capacity is lacking by developing 
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agreed-upon principles that should guide international engagement42. The new 
principles involve both the coordination of donors and support for electoral, 
constitutional and governance activities in order to secure a legitimate and stable 
environment; to restore basic services including emergency relief; to increase 
institutional capacity building, and to nurture of an articulate civil society capable of 
participating in governance. A key feature of the new aid paradigm that explains the 
increasing attention to civil society building is that development policies have to be 
internally-driven, and not donor-driven and that ownership can be achieved through 
broad participation processes. Within this framework and discourse, civil society 
participation is thus expected to contribute to three interconnected results: ownership, 
effectiveness in serving the poor and accountability.43  
 
In addition to all the benefits that are expected to spring from participation, civil 
society participation is considered a high democratic value in itself. Low-Income-
Countries-Under-Stress (LICUS) such as Burundi are fully drawn into the new aid 
paradigm, although this poses a problem in that local organizations may need to 
subordinate their priorities to those of the state, blurring the distinction between their 
respective roles. 
                                                 
42
The OECD-DAC principles for  instance relates to twelve rules that should guide donors‟ response (1) Take 
context as the starting point; (2) move from reaction to prevention; (3) focus on state-building as the central 
objective; (4) align with local priorities and/or systems; (5) recognise the political-security-development nexus; (6) 
Promote coherence between donor government agencies; (7) agree on practical coordination mechanisms between 
international actors; (8) do no harm; (9) mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context; (10) Act fast; (11) but 
stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; (12) avoid pockets of exclusion Organization for Economic 
Development, 2007). Together with the Paris Declaration on aid alignment and harmonization , the principles 
support participation of civil society in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP), a central 
tool that is required by donor community the needs for assistance.    
43
 R. RENARD and N. MOLENAERS, Civil society participation in Rwanda‟s poverty reduction strategy, Antwerp, 
IDPM Discussion Paper, 2003.  
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We saw the difficult interrelationship between non-state actors and the 
government in Burundi in the previous chapter. It is not clear how this relationship could 
be improved under the new aid paradigm. This particular issue is discussed in the 
conclusion. 
5.1.2 Characteristic of donors’ responses to the Burundi crisis 
Politics of Stick and Carrot 
 An examination of the series of sanctions and pre-conditions imposed on Burundi 
by the donor community throughout the conflict to reach peaceful agreements indicates 
that foreign aid played a significant role in changing the dynamics of political 
negotiations during the different stages of the peace process in Burundi.   
 
In the early stage of the conflict, most of the donors froze their aid, as a 
consequence of the assassination of the elected president Melchior Ndadaye. The 
traditional donors, Belgium and France, retained their embassies in Bujumbura while 
Germany‘s embassy closed in December 1999. USAID, a major player in the INGOs 
community, suspended its assistance to Burundi. Structural adjustment credit from the 
World Bank was discontinued as well. Both the United States and The EU appointed 
special envoys for Burundi -- Howard Wolpe and Aldo Ajello respectively-- to be 
involved in political negotiations. While most European countries reduced or completely 
withdrew their direct assistance to Burundi, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway 
became more active.  A number of international organizations, bilateral donors and 
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NGOs sent delegations and observers to assess the situation and give suggestions as 
to what could be undertaken in order to ease the crisis. During an initial period of 
political confusion, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Burundi 
(SRSG), Mr. Ould Abdullah, assisted in the coordination of outside interventions and in 
the assignment of specific roles to the different actors on the scene.  
 
As the conflict evolved, bilateral and multilateral organizations in Burundi and 
regional countries increasingly used aid as a strategic bargaining tool. First, they 
imposed strict economic sanctions in the aftermath of Pierre Buyoya‘s coup in 1996. 
Subsequently, they promised financial aid when there was stalemate in the peace 
negotiations. The threat of discontinuing bilateral assistance or promises to increase it 
became a primary and unified strategy to make positive changes to the political 
environment. However, observers agree that the typical donor response to post-conflict 
situations—cutting back sharply on foreign assistance or freezing aid entirely until a 
comprehensive peace is achieved--must be rejected44. Burundi is one example that 
illustrates how this negative approach does not necessarily bring positive outcomes. 
After three years of regional economic embargo imposed by Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Zaire and Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999, corruption and embezzlement became 
the norm when the licit economy deteriorated badly, harming the poorest the most. The 
International Rescue committee reported in 2003 that the economic embargo, intended 
to remove political and economic power from the elite, and 
 
                                                 
44
 John Prendergast and David Smock: Post-Genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Institute of Peace resources, Special report # 53, 1999. 
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―...unfortunately, did not achieve its intended objectives, but resulted instead in 
the further consolidation of the economy in the hands of the oligarchy. The three-
year embargo (1996-1999) stimulated development of a strong illicit economy 
benefiting those with access to political power and military protection. The 
distinction between public and private resources was increasingly difficult to 
make‖45 
 
  After three years of economic embargo, a window of opportunity to resume 
foreign aid opened up in January 1999 with a donors‘ meeting intended to reward some 
progress in security and the move forward in internal and external peace talks. 
Humanitarian aid was extended and doors opened for community and development 
initiatives. Another payoff came with the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 that allowed 
the international community to help address some of the structural causes of the 
Burundian conflict. The Arusha Agreement, signed by nineteen political parties, 
provided comprehensive recommendations to stabilize for stabilizing and rehabilitate a 
highly polarised Burundian nation. The Agreement is composed of five protocols, each 
dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to 
peacebuilding. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; 
democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; 
and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement. Protocol IV is divided into 
three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of the internally 
                                                 
45
 International Rescue Committee (IRC) report No 57: “A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi”, p. 5 
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displaced population, physical and political reconstruction, and finally economic and 
social development.  
 
The Arusha accords provide a framework in which the government, donors, and 
other actors in the peace process can work. The development community was assigned 
a role in overseeing the implementation of the agreement through the UN-led 
Implementation Monitoring Committee and the Bujumbura-based donor coordination 
unit for the implementation of Protocol IV of the Peace Agreement.  
 
On the political front, the Arusha agreement provided a blueprint for power-
sharing and the reform of key institutions, and prescribed a 36-month transitional period 
commencing November 1, 2001.  Subsequent post- Arusha agreements were signed in 
November 2003, resulting in an expanded Transitional Government including the 
political party CNDD-FDD, the most significant rebel group who had  not previously 
signed the Arusha Peace agreement previously. The remaining active rebel group, FNL-
Palipehutu started to negotiate its inclusion in the comprehensive peace agreement in 
May 2008, and is expected to participate in future elections in 2010.   
 
5.1.3   Effects of the Arusha Peace Agreement on donors’ behavior 
In the eyes of the donors, the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement was a 
clear sign of progress by the warring parties to negotiate power. Donors encouraged it 
and pledged substantial amounts of development assistance. However, although 
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pledges were made to resume assistance, donors have been reluctant to disburse 
money for activities beyond humanitarian work46. This may have been attributed to their 
concerns about the inability of the transitional government to absorb the funds 
appropriately47, in part because of continuous, albeit diminishing, physical insecurity and 
political uncertainties after the first transitional government was in place. Moreover, 
even though most donors agree on the overall objectives of reconciliation and 
democracy, each uses different strategies and means, and decides independently on 
when to deliver the promised assistance48.  
 
The power of the donor community in general and each donor specifically has 
greatly dissipated because of the different messages given in terms of who is supported 
politically, the mechanisms for allocation of assistance and the conditions for renewed 
bilateral cooperation49. The reluctance to disburse funds can be illustrated by the 
decrease of aid by more than half in a span of ten years. International financial 
assistance fell from an annual average of nearly $300 million between 1992 and 2002, 
to an annual average of less than $100 million, and an overall decrease of international 
aid to 66 %. The spokesman of the World Bank, Raymond Toye, told reporters in 2002 
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 Table 13, a, b and c. 
47
 Mariam Bibi Jooma “We can‟t eat the constitution” in Transformation and the socio-economic reconstruction of 
Burundi. South Africa Institute for Security Studies paper # 106, May 2005.  
48
 International Crisis Group (ICG) 2003 report no 57: „A framework for responsible aid to Burundi’ 
49
Ibid. This underlines some of the reasons of the mixed messages due to different uncoordinated initiatives and 
activities: Donors may provide some budgetary assistance directly to the government, co-manage project specific 
assistance with the government in the areas of health and education, use UN agencies to implement community-
based programs, use international NGOs to implement humanitarian and expanded humanitarian programs and 
support civil society organisations. If uncoordinated or not based on a coherent strategy, this number of actors 
creates a chaotic and often ineffective situation. 
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how he felt about economic recovery in Burundi, announcing a $54 million economic 
rehabilitation loan: 
 
"Personally, I would venture that Burundi today is the most preoccupying country 
in the Great Lakes region in terms of insecurity...Therefore it is of the greatest 
concern to all parties to get the region back to civilian business and peaceful 
economic development".50 
 
From  the signature of the ceasefire agreement of 2000 until 2005, there were 
three donor roundtables and other appeals from the transitional government where 
donors promised to release the promised funds, but the deadlock had yet to be broken. 
During the meeting held in Brussels in 2004, donors pledged US $ 1.032 billion but 
there is little to suggest that even 25 % of this amount ever materialized51. If the donors 
decide to disburse the promised funds and fully support peacebuilding needs, the funds 
would go to the priorities outlined in the PRSP in 2007 since the PRSP is the closest 
strategy developed that echoes many of Protocol IV priorities of the Arusha Agreement. 
 
Data collected from INGOs and donors‘ reports on funding available for outlined 
priorities indicate that major donors in Burundi who contributed to emergency funding 
and the peace process are:  the United States, Belgium, and France. Their assistance is 
directed towards the rule of law, health and education. 
 
o Britain and France jointly fund HIV/AIDS activities together with USAID.  
                                                 
50 IRIN Great Lakes News, “Burundi: World Bank loan for economic rehabilitation”, September 4, 2002. 
51 Juana Brachet, Howard Wolpe: Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi. WB Social 
Development Papers No 27, June 2005 
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o Other important bilateral donors include: Austria (water, sanitation and human 
rights); Germany (debt relief, conflict mitigation and prevention, democracy, 
health); and Italy (emergency assistance, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation). 
o Key multilateral donors are the World Bank and the European Union. Partner 
sponsors are USAID/OFDA, UNHCR, UNICEF, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Capital Development 
Fund (UNCDF). Many of their key operations are implemented by international 
and national NGOs. 
o The UN organizations provide important assistance, especially UNDP and 
UNICEF. 
 
During the last decade of conflict in Burundi, each donor developed its own 
strategic framework of assistance, often through bilateral discussions with the 
government and not necessarily based on coordinated activities with other donors or 
with consideration to the existing situation in the country. Donors may refer to the 
Arusha Agreement as a guide for reconstruction but it is observed is that donors decide 
on what the best solutions to the conflict are based on their own mandates and 
priorities.  
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5.2 NEW TRENDS IN ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE AND PEACE BUILDING 
Three years after the elections of 2005, Burundi is recovering from war. The next 
elections are set for June 2010 and there are many programs now that are in place to 
mark the transition from war to peace. New trends in transitional development strategies 
are observed in donors‘ assistance, marking a shift in focus from conflict mitigation to 
conflict prevention and reconstruction. With this has come a stated emphasis on 
community development and an increased visibility of CSOs in activities of economic 
recovery as well as peacebuilding. The donors‘ transitional strategies will affect future 
activities and the growth of local organizations as the strategies are embedded into the 
national strategic framework agreed upon by both the donors and the government of 
Burundi.  
 
The new trends in donors‘ assistance can be summarized by four major aspects 
of development cooperation that emphasize civil society participation: 
 
o The coordination of strategic tools for funding (financial instruments are meant for 
effectiveness), 
o A focus on community development,  
o  the participation of civil society actors in the formulation of policies, 
o The creation of an integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi, a ―strategic 
framework” to be used by donors and the Government of Burundi. 
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The four aspects determine the framework of assistance currently given to Burundi. 
Each strategy of the framework is discussed below to understand how they affect 
the approach to the participation of CSOs.  
5.2.1  New Strategic tools for funding  
Donors may have different methods and priorities in the way they have assisted 
Burundi over the years, but, they have developed new partnerships between 
conventional diplomatic entities and non-governmental organizations to coordinate 
external assistance. They now utilize new financial instruments that are meant for 
effectiveness, e.g., grant programs for small, quick and high-impact projects such as the 
Multi-Donor Regional Trust Fund for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR). The DDR program and the security sector reform, together with the 
demobilization and reintegration programs, are examples of coordinated efforts 
supported by the UN office in Burundi in conjunction with other key international 
partners who fund activities for the integration of ex-combatants into Burundian society. 
  
As a result of the new collaborative strategies, donors are funneling aid resources to 
new kinds of Burundi civil society actors who are participating in peace building 
programs in their provinces of origin or other focus regions. These actors include, but 
are not limited to, religious and women organizations, community leaders and the 
traditional Bashingantahe who remain influential in rural communities. INGOs rely on 
those local actors to reach the population in remote places and also to carry on the work 
started when the INGOs projects come to an end.   
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In interviews, local NGOs personnel and other informants who work for 
international organizations indicated that local organizations who apply for funds now 
are very much aware of which priority programs are on the agenda of donors, and local 
organizations adjust their activities accordingly. What is changed now is that all donors 
decide on those programs together in most cases; and civil society actors, as well as 
INGOs and donors, know ―who is funding what‖. The increased collaboration among 
donors, the dialogue among the various actors, and the political consultations among all 
the stakeholders involved in the peacebuilding process have led to a Strategic 
Framework for an integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi, endorsed by the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission. This Strategic Framework was launched in February 2007 
by the Government of Burundi and its partners — both national and international — 
around a shared set of peacebuilding objectives. It provides a helpful guide toward 
reaching these objectives and toward mobilizing the necessary financial and political 
support. Input to the Strategic Framework was gathered from not only the Government 
of Burundi but also civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities 
and political parties to underline the importance of national ownership and of the 
primary responsibility of the Government and people of Burundi for the consolidation of 
peace and democratic development. 
  
Going forward, women‘s and civil society organizations, religious communities 
and the traditional institution of Bashingantahe have been called upon to integrate the 
priorities of the Strategic Framework into their missions and programs which include 
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among other things52: support of good governance; support of justice and the promotion 
of human rights; and the support of socio-economic recovery. The support given to 
good governance and promotion of human rights are supposed to nurture the 
population and lead to socio-economic development. Those areas are where local 
organizations have strived with the support of donors as shown in Chapter Six. 
 
Support of good governance includes among other things, engaging in dialogue with 
decision makers at all levels, and the integration of a gender perspective in government 
policies and programs. The gender perspective is an aspect that donors have 
emphasized strongly in political negotiations as well as in the programs and projects 
funded. All the CSOs capacity building activities reviewed for the purpose of this 
research show that gender is a cross-cutting theme in all peacebuilding and socio-
economic activities. Support to good governance is also reflected by an ongoing and 
effective dialogue within civil society itself and between civil society and other actors on 
issues related to peacebuilding.  
  
Donors have also stressed educational activities related to peace, a culture of 
democracy and cultural values promoting reconciliation under the rubric of good 
governance.  Educational activities are integral parts of all programs where CSOs 
intervene, whether the programs relate to good governance, human rights or socio-
economic development. Chapter Six provides the examples of educational activities and 
the involvement of non-government organizations. 
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 From the UN document „Strategic Framework for Peace building in Burundi‟ adopted in June 20, 2007  
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Support to justice, promotion of human rights and action to fight impunity 
Funding under this heading includes a wide range of programs geared toward  
strengthening the mechanisms of advocacy for issues such as: the prevention and the 
punishment of gender-based violence; equal access to justice for all citizens, including 
offering coordinated legal assistance and support to legal literacy. 
 
Support of socio-economic development initiatives addresses the general goal of 
combating poverty as well as fostering community reconciliation and peaceful 
coexistence. A particular focus is to encourage the socio-economic reintegration of 
various groups affected by the conflict: demobilized combatants, repatriated persons, 
displaced persons, child soldiers and those who remained in the hills, etc.  
 
A strategic planning tool used by donors in resource mobilization and setting those 
stated development priorities in Burundi is the annual Consolidated Appeal Process 
(CAP)53. The CAP represents an inclusive and coordinated programme amongst the 
intervening actors in a given country and leads to the Common Humanitarian Plan 
(CHAP). Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the CHAP is developed 
at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team. This 
team mirrors the IASC structure at headquarters and includes UN agencies and 
development actors, non-IASC members, such as national NGOs, host governments, 
donors, and other key stakeholders in humanitarian action. The CHAP is the foundation 
                                                 
53
 Information on this document can be found at the humanitarian relief community web site: www.reliefweb.int/ 
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for developing a consolidated appeal or, when crises break or natural disasters strike, a 
―Flash Appeal”. The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the annual preparation 
of the consolidated appeal document. The document is launched globally each 
November to enhance advocacy and resource mobilization. An update is known as the 
Mid-Year Review and is presented in July. Donors usually provide resources to 
appealing agencies directly in response to project proposals. The Financial Tracking 
Service (FTS), managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a database where donors‘ contributions can be found.  
 
Key assessment of the situation on the ground and information about donors‘ 
activities are provided in the CAP and CHAP, and address  an  analysis of the context in 
which humanitarian action takes place; an assessment of needs; a statement of longer-
term objectives and goals; prioritized response plans; coordinated program 
implementation; monitoring and evaluation expectations; and a framework for 
monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary. 
 
Another tool, the 2005 PRSP for Burundi, continues to be the donors‘ central reference 
framework of assistance. The recent innovation is that it identifies a number of 
peacebuilding-related conditions which would have to be fulfilled in order to ensure the 
successful implementation of the proposed poverty reduction strategies. New policies 
introduced in the 2005 PRS peacebuilding address the topics of unequal access and 
the ethnic dynamics of the Burundi society; the mobilization, coordination and sound 
management to resources; guaranteed security of person and property; institutional 
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stability and effective governmental action; reduced expenditures on security and the 
professionalization of the security forces. These initiatives are considered to be central 
to the economic rebound as well as to the peace process. Through the PRSP, the 
government of Burundi reaffirmed the central role of women in development. As stated 
above, gender is one of the new key priorities emphasized by donors.  No strategy will 
be decided on or implemented unless it clearly ensures the full participation of women in 
the decision-making process, in the choice of priority actions and more specifically, in 
their implementation. 
5.2.2 Focus on community development 
A new trend in donors‘ strategies is the emphasis on community development. 
Donors have put in place mechanisms for government decentralization, and request 
different degrees of participation by CSOs in the implementation of programs and 
projects. In those programs and projects, donors usually select the participation of 
CSOs following set criteria. The efforts on community development are generally 
undertaken by state actors, usually through the Ministry of Community Development 
and Reconstruction or the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction. The assistance 
provided under the heading of community development is referred to as ―strategic 
transitional interventions‖ and are supported by major donors such as the World Bank, 
the United States and UN organizations: 
 
o The World Bank has several emergency loans, and the IMF has an emergency 
post-conflict program. The World Bank‘s Program for Community Support is 
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supported by many bilateral donors who cannot give money directly to the 
government such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Germany, 
Sweden and Finland, among others. One successful project for community 
development sponsored by the World Bank is the local group Twitezimbere. This 
organization has long-standing experience in the field of participatory 
consultation.  It has prepared a methodology document, the Accelerated 
Methodology for Participatory Research (MARP) and on Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (PPA). During the preparation of the PRSP in 2004, the execution of 
the community consultative component was entrusted to Twitezimbere and this 
attests to the respect that development partners in Burundi have for the local 
NGO54.  
 
o The European Union has created its transitional support strategy in line with the 
latest ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. European Union‘s ECHO (European 
Commission Humanitarian Office) deals with emergency reconstruction and 
agricultural development. 
 
o The U.S. government has three development strategies: a) one for emergencies 
(OFDA); b) one for transitional support (OTI); and c) one for development 
(USAID). 
 
o Each UN agency has developed its strategic plan based on its mandate and 
works on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). It has 
                                                 
54
 IMF Country Report No. 05/325-Burundi, 2005 
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completed the 2003 Consolidated Interagency Appeal for humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
Other bilateral donors provide support on a smaller scale, through specific 
programs and projects. Those involved with CSOs do so by providing funds indirectly, in 
most cases through INGOs, or directly through  competitive grants. New themes in 
development assistance that target community activities include the integration of 
displaced persons and ex-combatants in addition to new training modalities designed to 
enhance the collaborative capacities of formerly belligerent parties. CSOs have a limited 
and prescribed participation in those community activities where they have a 
partnership with the local administration. The partnership can involve peacebuilding 
activities but also economic recovery.  
5.2.3 A regional approach  
Over recent years, there is a developing and growing discourse that the 
problems in the individual countries of the African Great Lakes region (GLR) are 
strongly interlinked and should be understood in the context of the region when planning 
for peace55. The countries in this region (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
DRC) face the same issues and problems such as the examples of politicization of 
ethnicity, the presence of refugees or militia from other countries, the spill-over of 
                                                 
55Pax Christi (2003) La Paix et la Réconciliation dans les Grands Lacs: historique, causes et pistes de solution‟, Au 
cœur de l'Afrique (3-4): Guérir les Populations et Reconstruire la Sous-région; le Rôle des Laïcs). 
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identity conflicts or the spread of uncontrolled arms in the region.56 Because of these 
common issues, it is argued that the efforts and approaches to solve these problems 
should transcend individual countries and should address regional dimensions of 
peacebuilding.  
 
The belief that problems in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) are linked and the 
concern to find regional solutions have witnessed an increase in the regional activities 
of international organizations, governments, and NGOs as well as CSOs from the GLR. 
The promotion of regional approaches takes into account the shared characteristics of 
the conflicts in the region and the lessons learned in addressing them. The regional 
perspective also goes along with an importance attributed to CSOs in realizing peace 
not only in the GLR but in individual countries as well. This attention for civil society in 
regional approaches should be seen in the light of the general popularity of the concept 
in peacebuilding discourse that considers CSOs as contributing to good governance 
and democracy.  
 
To that effect, in addition to diplomatic level negotiations (within the framework of 
Lederach‘s multi-track diplomacy model explained in Chapter Two), initiatives along the 
themes of women‘s empowerment and human rights were undertaken in Burundi by 
both INGOs and national CSOs at the regional level in peace process strategies. For 
instance, with facilitation by international agencies, several national CSOs were in 
                                                 
56
 Peter Uvin et al (2004) distinguishes actions at regional level and multi-national activities to 
address trans-border dynamics; and activities in several countries to address national problems that share 
common characteristics or that have an indirect regional impact. 
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regular contact with partners from neighbouring countries to exchange experiences or 
policy analyses. Some of these exchanges were formalized into regional platforms such 
as the human rights network Ligue des Droits de l‟Homme dans la Région des Grands 
Lacs (LDGL) or the regional association of Catholic Bishops (ACEAC). These two 
organizations were involved in activities initiated by civil society organizations together 
with the UN and the African Union to negotiate peace in the region and to promote the 
exchange of ideas between civil society groups across the countries of the Great Lakes 
Region: Rwanda, Burundi and Congo.   
 
Encouragement to have regional organizations or collaboration among 
organizations across the countries of the GLR involved in peace prevention and peace 
processes is based on the assumption that they can decrease the role of the 
international community in conflict-intervention, detect  conflicts earlier and resolve them 
more easily. The Organization of African Union (OAU) has  encouraged such initiatives 
and has referred to other similar initiatives such as the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in the East African region, and The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (Juma & Mengistu, 2002).  
 
Regional initiatives and strategies in the African Great Lakes Region contribute 
positively to the scope of activities of CSOs along with building their capacities. INGOs 
are involved in these initiatives and seek the collaboration of local and regional civil 
society groups. Initiatives where donors and INGOs collaborated with CSOs at a 
regional level include: 
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o Conferences and meetings on peace, democracy, good governance and 
development in the Great Lakes supported by the United Nations but 
initiated by representatives of transnational organizations 
o Exchange visits between the churches on peace and reconciliation 
initiatives 
o  Exchange visits between universities on food security and land issues, 
initiated by the Swiss Cooperation mission 
o Regional meeting on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution chaired 
by UNESCO, in conjunction with the University of Burundi and CSOs. 
o Lobby and advocacy between human rights groups  
o Consultation meetings between women‘s organizations from Burundi, 
Rwanda and DRC 
 
There are also regional programs whose aim is to strengthen a broader 
collaboration of regional African organizations in the African Great Lakes Region such 
as Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) sponsored by the 
World Bank; and the program ‗Femmes pour la Paix‟ sponsored by International Alert 
which, through a series of regional trainings, established a framework that enables 
women to have an influence over policy making. Other programs that have a regional 
impact are the ‗Global Partnership for Conflict Prevention in Central Africa‘ convened by 
the Netherlands-based European Centre for Conflict Prevention which aims to integrate 
civil society in diplomatic initiatives for conflict prevention at a regional level. On the 
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human rights front, the Burundi NGO Ligue Iteka chaired a research program on human 
rights violations in Eastern DRC and conducted training activities with local 
organizations in monitoring human rights in the region.  For the Media, the INGO 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) sponsored programs in which journalists from the 
region were trained collectively to produce radio programs on regional issues. 
 
To reinforce a regional perspective in peacebuilding initiatives, donors and INGOS have 
created regional offices to mainstream themes and programs with a regional 
significance. Some examples include the Office of the Special Representative of the 
European Union (EU); the regional approach from the Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish 
governments‘ support programs; the regional offices for the INGOs Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS) and Action Aid. In Burundi, the INGO Oxfam Quebec replicates its 
experiences with reconstruction work from Rwanda due to the similarities that exist in 
both countries.   
 
Although there is a clear desire from donors to fund regional initiatives and 
engage CSOs in developing regional strategies, Burundi CSOs involvement remains 
limited. With the exception of organizations specialized in lobbying and advocacy, CSOs 
often find it difficult to envision regional solutions that relate directly to their work. For 
many of these organizations, the focus is on reconciling the communities in their 
countries as they position themselves within the national discourse of conflict in their 
home countries. They therefore do not see an apparent need for a regional approach in 
their daily practices. While CSOs might agree that instability in one country has spill-
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over effects on the region, not all believe that regional solution to conflicts is 
appropriate. Rwandese organizations can, however, assume certain comparability in 
Burundi on the basis that best practices can be replicated, such as the demobilization 
and community reconciliation in the transitional phase from conflict.  Such comparison 
should be made carefully though. Reijntjens (1994) warned against drawing inferences 
from such apparent similarities, pointing out differences in the significance of ethnicity 
between the ‗false twins‘ Rwanda and Burundi. 
 
A clear advantage for CSOs is that such regional initiatives provide their 
members opportunities to network with each other, encounter sponsors, and shape 
ways of collaboration across borders: e.g., discussions of regionally-coordinated 
programs among organizations with similar goals, or the duplication of successful 
programs. Such interventions could target coordinated efforts between influential civil 
society groups such as regional media and trade networks, or focus on key issues of 
concern among groups to establish and promote regional programmatic co-operation. 
 
To INGOs involved in regional efforts, regional strategies may be more of an 
internal organizational effort: e.g., the integration of region-specific themes in diverse 
country programs or the regional exchange of best practices. Some consider that 
programmatic regional cooperation may increase operational efficiency, for example the 
sharing of emergency supplies among country offices. Both national CSOs and INGOs 
recognize the problem for civil society groups working in synergy at a national level, let 
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alone the regional level.57This remains a major challenge for CSOs to engage in 
activities beyond their individual borders, and may prompt the assumption that regional 
initiatives are an affair for international organizations. 
5.2.4 Local capacity building 
Within the scope of the new development strategies, building local capacities 
appears on every donor‘s priority list.  After the outbreak of violence in Burundi, it 
became vital for the regional and international community to support and rely on local 
actors, not only to foster positive change in the political environment but equally to deal 
with the social and economic consequences of the ethnic divide.  As observed in other 
countries in conflict, two main approaches were utilized by international actors seeking 
to strengthen local capacities: 
 
The first approach saw financial support channelled through the government down to 
the local administration. With this approach, capacity strengthening was provided to 
newly elected officials and investments for training were made in communal and 
community infrastructures. 
 
The second approach used by donors is to bypass public structures and support directly 
with the population through CSOs or development INGOs. This approach is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
                                                 
57
 Interviews with representatives of FORSC and ARCANE 
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State capacity building 
 Prior to the conflict, there were no clear prevention mechanisms put in place in 
Burundi by the local leadership to address the type of crisis such as the experience 
lived in 1993 and thereafter, even though ethnic violence was not new (similar mass 
killings between the ethnic groups occurred in 1972 and 1988). As in other conflict-
affected countries, aid projects prior to 1993 concentrated on state institutional building 
mostly undertaken by the UNDP, the European Commission (EC) and other bilateral 
and multilateral funders. The development of infrastructures58 and broad-based 
economic programs did not necessarily take into consideration targeted social projects 
that addressed conditions of injustice, improvement of ethnic relations or inclusive 
participative approaches that involve all levels of civil society. The late 1980s were 
marked by a democratization process and donors‘ policies aimed at pressuring political 
change by encouraging multi-party elections and creating incentives of aid increase. 
After 1993, policies to encourage democratization continued, combined with efforts to 
bring peaceful political solutions that continued throughout the past decade. 
 
Interviews and data collected from representatives of donors contacted in 
Burundi indicate that after 1993, the international donor community‘s investment to bring 
peace and stability concentrated on negotiating power-sharing between political leaders 
to stop the escalation of violence.  The international community became extensively 
involved in many diplomatic channels to prevent another genocide scenario such as the 
one in neighbouring Rwanda. The Office of United Nations Special Representative 
                                                 
58
 In the case of Burundi, southern provinces where most political leaders originated from were at a clear 
advantage. 
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coordinated many efforts and took the lead. In conjunction with the massive 
humanitarian efforts, many external initiatives were undertaken to reconcile the political 
antagonists and to negotiate the type of power-sharing necessary for political stability 
within both Burundi and the region. 
 
 State institutional building occurred at several levels: from training the elected 
authorities after the Arusha Agreement to specific administrative officials in key 
ministries involved in peacebuilding, rehabilitation, education and health. However, it 
should be noted that the capacity of government administrators had been weakened by 
corruption during the civil war, the absence of long-term investment in training, and the 
co-option of governmental responsibilities by international agencies and NGOs. 
Government officials openly admit to the discouragement of staff, a high number of 
whom have since been recruited by international NGOs and UN agencies59.  Details of 
state institutional building initiatives are not specifically addressed in this research, but 
rather on the second approach in order to address the questions of civil society 
strengthening.  
 
Subcontracting aid to NGOs 
 A general strategy by donors in countries in conflict is to rely on NGOs who can 
quickly reach the people in need. The trend was observed in Burundi where external 
NGOs contributed a great deal to the process both of humanitarian intervention and the 
establishment of dynamic projects that contribute to sustainable peace. Throughout the 
                                                 
59 ICG Africa Report N°57, 21 February 2003: A framework for Responsive aid to Burundi,  p.13 
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conflict, INGOs in Burundi have represented the sole direct and constant point of 
contact between the international community and the Burundian population. During the 
years of civil war, while government energy has been focused on fighting the rebels, 
international NGOs have taken increasing responsibility for providing social services 
and have become the primary implementers of bilateral donor and UN programs. 
 
Soon after the outbreak of violence, the inflow of development INGOs in the 
country went from 23 in early 1994 to more than 80 later that year60. In 2007, the 
number has increased to around 100. Table 7 below provides information on INGOs, 
the donors who fund their activities, and their local partners.  
                                                 
60 Ould-Abdullah, 2000:16  
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Table 7:  INGOs present in Burundi and source of funding as of 2005 
INGOs Start date of 
operation in 
Burundi 
Funder Local partnership 
AFRICARE* 1995 USAID, FIDA, UNDP Intermediary  CSOs, government, 
community development 
structures 
ACORD * 1993 NOVIB, DFID, EC, CIDA,UNICEF, 
UNHCR, Ireland AID, OXFAM Int‘l, 
COMIC RELEIF 
About  20 CSOs including Ligue 
Iteka, Twitezimbere, CADEKA,  
INGOs 
ADRA* 2000 USAID, UNHCR, ADRA- Danish  UNHCR, local church associations 
CARE* 1994 EC, Netherland government, USAID, 
WFP, Norway government,  Austrian 
government 
Human rights  and other CSOs, 
INGOs 
AFVP* 1969 French cooperation Youth groups, CSOs & INGOS, 
local administration 
ASF 1999 EC, Belgian cooperation Ministry of justice, judiciary actors 
AVSI* 2001 Italian cooperation SWAA-Burundi, UN system at 
local level 
ARP* 1996 Austrian cooperation, UNHCR, US 
embassy, FIDA 
Schools, health centers, economic 
development CSOs 
CRS 1961 OFDA, ECHO (caritas Germany), CMM, 
USAID, PCAC, CARE, proper funds 
Caritas network, ISABU, Nouvelle 
espérance, CEAL, BNEC 
Christian Aid 1995 Christian AID members, proper funds ACT, local church partnerships, 
Ligue Iteka  
CISV 1973 UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, ECHO, EC, 
Italian cooperation 
Twitezimbere, LVIA, CCM, AGP, 
MU-SHO.NYA. 
CNR 1996 SIDA (Swedish), NORAD, MFA (Norway) UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, JAAMA, 
FAJ, APL, KORICZA, ARS 
Global Rights*  2000 USAID AFJ, BIJ, CEJP, ABDP, 
APPRODH, ACAT, Ligue Iteka 
GVC 1995 ECHO, USAID, OFDA, UNICEF, Italian 
cooperation 
Burundi Ministry of Health 
IMC 1995 OFDA, USAID, DFID, UNICEF, WFP, 
FAO 
World Vision, CARE, OCHA, 
RESO, GVC 
IRC 1997 OFDA, ECHO, DFID, UNHCR, UNICEF Local actors in the Health and 
education sectors 
ISCOS* 2004 EC COSYBU, OCHA, ONUB; 
university of Burundi  
RCN*  2001 Belgian cooperation, Austrian 
government, Swedish government 
CSOs in the human rights sector, 
judiciary institutions 
SFCG* 1995 USAID, Belgian government, DFID, FIDA Radio Isanganiro, Ligue Iteka, 
APRODH, CAFOB, SPPDF, 
TUBIYAGE, DJDC 
TEAFUND* 1998 OFDA, ECHO, UNDP, DFID UNICEF, WFP, FAO 
VISPE* 1973 CARIPLO foundation, Lombardie region,  
LAMBIANA foundation, Conference of 
Bishops Italy  
RESO, artisan cooperatives 
(UNICO.MU), actors in health 
sector 
W. VISION 
Burundi 
1963 WV International, USAID, UNDP, WFP, 
Habitat for Humanity International, 
UNICEF, EC, UNHCR 
RESO, local administration, 
women & youth SCOs 
AAA 2001 BMZ, WFP and proper funds Actors in food security, 
reconciliation program  
Data analysis from the author, interview questionnaire and INGOs reports  
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The list of INGOs in Table 7 shows that five out of twenty INGOs were operating 
in Burundi prior to 1993, illustrating that most international organization came to Burundi 
after the war. The need to respond quickly to emergencies explains a large share of 
humanitarian influx of funds from the donors and an increased number of INGOs who 
came in the country with the expertise needed in such circumstances.  
 
Most of INGOs came to Burundi after they were forced to leave Rwanda and 
were contracted by the UN to carry out humanitarian services. These INGOs assisted in 
relief operations, including health-related services and the distribution of food and non-
food services items to displaced populations. According to the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), in 2003 it was noted that during ten years of violence in Burundi, 
 
While government energy has been focused on fighting a war, international NGOs 
have taken increasing responsibility for providing social services and have become 
the primary implementers of bilateral donor and UN programs. The majority of 
international NGOs operating in Burundi are humanitarian in mandate and approach, 
placing their emphasis on the delivery of immediate assistance to communities rather 
than building capacity of either the people or the government. Humanitarian 
assistance has undoubtedly been necessary but the absence of community 
development or capacity building has had the adverse effect of creating a population 
accustomed to handouts and steadily losing its ability to care for itself in deteriorating 
circumstances
 61. 
 
 
                                                 
61
 ICG Africa Report N°57, 21 February 2003: “A Framework For Responsible Aid To Burundi”, p.8 
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Gradually INGOs relied upon local partners in service delivery and local 
organizations started to learn from their international counterparts.  As seen in Chapter 
Four, the growth of local organizations stemmed from the wave of democratization of 
the 1980s and 1990s as the development of local human rights and media structures 
became essential to this process. In addition, the restoration of Burundi political 
institutions after the 1993 ethnic conflict required even more local voices to advocate for 
human rights in general and for marginalized and vulnerable local groups in particular. 
These needs explain the increased visibility of INGOs and local NGOs in three identified 
areas of activity: Human rights, women‘s empowerment and media. During the years of 
civil war up to the present time, the International community focused on the support of 
civil society in those areas of activity.  
 
Table 8 below gives a picture of the most visible international actors who work 
with CSOs and summarizes their activities during the crisis from 1993. Bilateral and UN 
organizations included in the table are those who provided primary data and who the 
researcher contacted for personal interviews. Interviews were also conducted with 
selected INGOS representatives: SFCG, AFVP, ACORD and AFRICARE due to specific 
activities they conduct with Burundi CSOs. Additional data was obtained from survey 
questionnaires, the National NGO Coordination Group (RESO), Burundian 
organizations FORSC (Forum for civil society strengthening), and OAG (observatory for 
governmental action) whose representatives agreed to be interviewed. 
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Table 8:  Involvement of donors and INGOs with CSOs: characteristic activities until 2005 
Organizations Conflict 
resolution 
Media Human 
rights 
Health Economic 
activities 
Education Cross-cutting 
themes: youth, 
women & 
marginalized 
groups 
Humanitarian 
assistance 
USAID* √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
DFID  √ √ √  √ √  
EC*     √ √  √ 
BC (Belgium) * √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BMZ 
(Germany) 
√   √ √   √ 
WB*     √    
OCHA        √ 
UNICEF*   √ √  √ √  
UNCHR* √ √ √   √ √  
UNIFEM* √ √ √  √ √ √  
AAA        √ 
AAI √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
ADRA* √   √  √  √ 
AFRICARE* √     √ √  
CARE* √  √  √ √   
ACORD     √ √ √ √ 
AFVP √    √  √  
ASF √  √   √ √  
AVSI*    √ √  √ √ 
ARP*        √ 
CORCAID    √    √ 
CRS √   √    √ 
Christian Aid       √ √ 
CISV     √   √ 
CNR      √  √ 
TDh       √  
GR*    √      
GVC    √    √ 
HI-B   √ √   √  
HI-F    √  √   
LVIA    √    √ 
TPO    √     
OXFAM-Q     √    
ISCOS*   √      
IMC √   √ √  √  
IRC √  √     √ 
RCN*    √      
JRS    √  √  √ 
SFCG* √ √    √ √  
SOLIDARITES     √   √ 
TEAFUND* √   √ √   √ 
TFF √        
VISPE     √  √ √ 
WORLD 
VISION 
√   √ √ √ √ √ 
 18 8 14 18 17 18 20 21 
Bilateral & multilateral   UN organizations   INGOs  
* Specific objective to strengthen local civil society        Data analysis by the author from interview questionnaire and INGOs reports 
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The organizations in Table 8 above represent about 30% of all INGOs present in 
Burundi in 200862. They are the most visible and dynamic organizations as they operate 
in all 16 provinces of Burundi. A large concentration of the 34 INGOs are in the capital 
city of Bujumbura (15); 13 are present in Gitega, the second largest city; 13 are also in 
Muyinga and Kirundo, the provinces bordering Tanzania where there are a large 
number of refugees. The other provinces count between 2 to 12 INGOs operating in 
different sectors. INGOs with a representation in every province are Action Aid 
International (AAI), Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), 
French Association of Volunteers of Progress (AFVP), Lawyers without Borders (ASF), 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Handicap International Belgium (HI-B), Handicap 
International France (HI-F), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Citizen‘s Network 
(RCN Justice & Democracy) and Search for Common Ground (SFCG).  
 
The activities conducted as indicated in table 9 reveal that besides contracting 
international NGOs as distributors of humanitarian assistance, donors have also looked 
to international and country-based NGOs to carry out a significant number of other roles 
in pursuit of economic development, democratization and conflict management. In the 
first years of peace negotiations, many local CSOs did not have the experience nor the 
organization required to deal with the tasks at hand. INGOs trained most local 
organizations that are operational today.  
                                                 
62
 Throughout lists of existing donors and INGOs in Burundi and acronyms are provided in Appendix C.  
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Humanitarian assistance has been continuous throughout the civil war, between 
1993 and 2005. Humanitarian assistance and activities related to women and 
vulnerable populations take a large share (20-21%) of activities as shown in Table 10, 
followed closely by projects in conflict resolution, heath, economic development and 
education (17-18%).  
 
Table 9: Distribution of activities by INGOs from 1993-2005 by percentage of expenditures 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Humanitarian assistance
Conflict resolution
youth, women and marginalized groups
Human rights
Media
Education
Economic activities
Health
 
Data analysis by the author 
 
 
All these activities are related to the needs of the aftermath of war, i.e. 
addressing deprivations of vulnerable populations in shelter, basic health care and food 
services, basic infrastructures for education, and short-and long-term activities to 
alleviate poverty in general.  
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Fewer INGOs engage in media and human rights work (8-14%), but these 
activities are nonetheless important and noticeable when discussing how CSOs have 
developed in Burundi. The issues of human rights and the media are related to the 
democratization process, and this is where Burundi CSOs have been at the forefront of 
advocacy and lobbying with the international community. Although the percentage of 
expenditure is low compared to other themes, capacity building of CSOs involved in 
human rights, media and women as a cross-cutting theme has been the most 
noticeable. 
  
From the data on CSOs activities in Chapter Four and the summary of INGOs‘ 
activities presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9, we can draw three important conclusions.  
 
First, external support specifically targeting capacity building for CSOs is limited. 
A mandate to strengthen local organizations in the peacebuilding process is identified 
by donors and is supported by many of the INGOs operating in Burundi. However, in 
conflict situations with pressing emergency needs, donors‘ support to civil society actors 
is overshadowed by political reforms emphasizing more on political actors. Although 
donors and INGOs‘ programs and work involve local partners in one way or the other, 
those who have a stated objective to strengthen Burundi CSOs represent only 10% of 
organizations listed on Table 7. These INGOs are: AFRICARE; Search for Common 
Ground (SFCG); Care International; International Alert; The Association of Volunteers in 
International Services (AVSI); Australian Relief Program (ARP); Global Rights Burundi 
(GR-B); Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation (ISCO); Adventist 
Development and Relief (ADRA); Citizen‘s Network (RCN Justice & Democracy); and 
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Tear Fund. Activities of CSOs capacity building in which these organizations are 
involved in will be discussed in details in chapter Six.  
 
Second, even with limited funds, the themes of human rights, media and 
women‘s empowerment are dominant in Burundi CSOs‘ growth, underlying the need to 
strengthen the democratization process recognized by both donors and civil society 
actors. Democratization remains the major concern of donors, and its success would 
mean power sharing and less violent conflicts. Peace building efforts undertaken by 
international actors are directed toward this goal of democratization. Programs and 
projects that support the identified themes of Human rights, media and the 
empowerment of women activities mentioned above are outlined in Chapter Six. In 
contrast with other important program activity in health or education, activities that relate 
to women empowerment, media and human rights themes provide opportunities for 
INGOs to accomplish related projects within a relatively short period of time of several 
months to a year or two. In situations like Burundi where the political stability is 
uncertain and security concerns are high, donors or INGOs do not want to plan for long 
term projects but rather target immediate results needed for the moment. Activities 
conducted by INGOs in Burundi detailed in Chapter Six illustrate the focus on the three 
identified themes which have short-term goals.  
 
Third, strategies undertaken by donors for peace negotiations have relied mostly 
on political, military and religious actors identified at the top leadership level on 
Lederach‘s pyramid in Figure 1, with minimal involvement of level three actors (local 
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leaders, indigenous NGOS) who constitute the ―grassroots leadership‖.  The recognized 
Bashingantahe who already operated either at level two (Middle-range leadership) were 
consulted but debates on their credibility and partiality with regards to ethnicity were 
questioned. Because Burundian themselves raised questions on their participation in 
peace talks; donors did not put too much emphasis on the role of Bashingantahe in 
peace negotiations. Donors did however encourage the revalorization of this institution 
and the traditional values they represent in building a culture of peace. 
5.2.5 War’s influence on donors’ policies  
Donors‘ strategies adopted in Burundi have been greatly influenced by war. 
Throughout the 10 years of conflict, a negotiated peace agreement between the 
dominant political parties was a constant condition to obtaining international assistance. 
Even today after fifteen years of civil war, the development assistance framework that 
exists follows the provisions of the Arusha Accords negotiated in 2002. It is evident that 
the international community has been instrumental to the Burundi peace process. 
However, the conditional assistance during the past years has hurt the majority of 
Burundians and development workers agree that it is no longer appropriate to use 
economic sanctions in a country affected by war. In its analysis of the role played by the 
international community, the International Rescue Committee agrees that the 
distribution of aid should have considered the impact of political and social stability by 
developing a more nuanced approach and not necessarily focusing on the economic 
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factor.63 External actors have dealt with and focused more on state actors and by doing 
so, they have reinforced state control over the economy and indirectly, supported the 
unbalanced distribution of resources and discriminatory policies that consolidated power 
in the hands of the elite, those few who control political and economic resources. With 
increased political power sharing, it became clear to international actors that the 
Burundian conflict was mainly between those who have access to state power, and 
those who do not, a distinction not solely based on ethnicity but also on other social 
connections. For instance, it is not a secret among Burundians that regional ties (one‘s 
native province) are crucial in getting access to resources and political power. Regional 
connections have been central to all political regimes after independence, and regional 
ties have often overlooked the question of ethnicity, believed by many non-Burundians 
to be at the heart of the conflict. 
 
On a positive note, donors‘ pressure on politicians to put in place democratic 
structures has encouraged the participation of local associations in democratic 
processes, and has produced dialogue between ethnic groups. Donors‘ policies that 
contributed to the growth of civil society organizations have been observed only recently 
within the context of democratization primarily, and later as indispensable partners in 
the management and delivery of basic services in the aftermath of war. Bringing 
together both political parties and civil society activists from both the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic groups in various national and international meetings on the peace process has 
helped reduce the tensions created by the ethnic divide and opened up discussions of 
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controversial topics on ethnic discrimination, political exclusion and other sensitive 
issues once discussed only privately for fear of persecution.    
 
On the other hand, the war has also influenced a minority of civilians in 
negotiating resources from donors in their favor through the creation of organizations 
that distribute assistance to the general population along the themes favored by donors 
such as seen in Chapter Four. Many local civil society organizations are not 
represented by individuals who are close to power or who know how the international 
community operates. This in itself does not discredit their work, but because the war 
has exacerbated poverty and corruption, the general population in the countryside 
perceives the well-off and the new political leaders as corrupt and untrustworthy. 
 
Donors‘ support can make a difference in local institutions only if individuals are 
ready to understand the need for better systems in governance and take the necessary 
actions themselves to make it work. However, corruption is still rampant and informal 
discussions with participants in the research have indicated that internal politics have 
impacted the behavior of donors in some of the following ways: 
 
o Donors may seem to ignore internal politics or turn a ―blind eye‖ to the misuse of 
aid .This can lead to manipulation by authorities or a network of few individuals 
who can bargain and control certain outcomes of foreign aid. Increased support 
of donors for humanitarian and basic services through INGOs and CSOs has led 
to more money being controlled by individuals outside of the local administrative 
entities who traditionally distribute aid to the population. The consequence is a 
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weakened administration and new ways to abuse resources by individuals who 
get a share in the new distribution chain. Generalized poverty in Burundi has 
caused the population to distrust the elite, including administrative authorities. 
Opinions expressed by civil society groups in the PRSP process often mentioned 
―bad governance‖ as the most import reason for violence in Burundi, ahead of 
reasons of war, land conflicts or sickness64. 
 
o  The international community has adopted the Western liberal-democratic system 
of formal institutions in their approach to change the ―bad governance‖. The 
impact of formal institutions may be limited if it does not consider the power 
relations and social dynamics existing in contexts like Burundi. 
 
o Public officials have seen their power reduced when INGOs and civil society 
organizations took a greater role in service delivery. In addition to the weakness 
created by a civil war, the ability of the state to meet the needs of its people has 
been reduced as well as their influence towards the population.  
 
There is certainly research gaps related to the consequences of the centrality of 
civil society in the new aid paradigm. Some of the gaps are discussed in the conclusion 
section of this research. So far, the present chapter has focused on the trends of donors 
in Burundi by reviewing the strategies used to prevent the escalation of the political 
conflict and the initiatives undertaken to address peaceful reconciliation. The 
engagement of CSOs, if considered in donors‘ strategies, was highlighted.  
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As indicated above, specific activities targeted by donors and INGOs to 
strengthen CSOs illustrate the link between the war and the development of local 
organizations.  The specific capacity building activities promoted by donors are 
discussed in the next chapter to answer question two of the research; namely, the 
influence of the war on the many local capacity building programs and projects. 
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6.0  CHARACTERISTIC ACTIVITIES OF BURUNDI CSOS CAPACITY 
BUILDING 
Chapter Four examined Burundi‘s civil society organizations, their characteristics, 
and how they have evolved over the years. Chapter Five discussed the donors‘ strategic 
assistance throughout the crisis in Burundi, as well as the general trends with regards to 
civil society capacity building. Chapter Six brings these two chapters together by 
focusing on the interaction between international organizations and CSOs in 
development programs and peacebuilding initiatives. Specific activities of civil society 
capacity building encouraged by donors are discussed based on the data gathered from 
the research survey and within the framework of peacebuilding. To assess how the 
conflict in Burundi influenced the choice of CSOs or the activities to support, surveyed 
international organizations were asked the same questions divided in three parts to 
indicate how they support CSOs. 
 
Part one of the survey identifies the type of respondent donor or international 
organizations (bilateral, multi-lateral, development agency, regional organization, or 
INGO). The questions in part one also give information on the goal of the organization, 
the domain of intervention and whether the organization works directly or indirectly with 
the CSO(s). Only data from international organizations involved with CSO capacity 
building are studied. As stated in Chapters Four and Five, international organizations 
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that have a clear goal to strengthen local organizations represent 10% of all INGOs in 
Burundi. The remaining series of the survey questionnaire in parts two and three are the 
subject of this chapter. 
 
Part two indicates the programs or projects that involve a local organization; the 
type of activities conducted under those programs or projects (institutional, 
organizational or individual capacity building); groups or populations targeted (women, 
youth, health-related, religious and others); and financial data for the programs or 
projects involved. 
 
Part three of the questionnaire relates to the methods used to assess the basic 
principles of local capacity building discussed in Chapter One such as a locally driven 
agenda, indicators of local participation and ownership or targets of sustainable results. 
 
Although some of the results from part two and three above were already 
addressed in Chapter Four and Five, specific data are found in this section. Reoccurring 
themes and relevant activities in local capacity building are discussed first, followed by 
an assessment of methods used. 
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6.1 CSO CAPACITY BUILDING 
The effectiveness of civil society organizations in achieving the roles ascribed to 
them (influencing policy, acting as agents of democratization or contributing to the 
peace process) is conditioned by several internal factors but is also shaped by 
international organizations and the availability of resources they contribute. While aid 
targeted specifically to civil society capacity building is limited, it is concentrated among 
a relatively small set of organizations perceived to have the potential for democratic 
development through engagement in public policy. Burundi‘s viable and active CSOs 
receive considerable international assistance.  The level of financial sustainability 
outside of this assistance is estimated at 1% for those CSOs that are believed to be 
solid and operational65. The source of this percentage is constituted by annual 
membership fees. 
 
The group of donors who provide significant funding to the programs or projects 
related to civil society strengthening outside of humanitarian assistance are the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID); the Belgian Technical 
Cooperation,  the UK Department for International Development (DFID); UN agencies 
such as UNICEF(children‘s rights and development); UNIFEM (to foster women‘s 
empowerment); the UN Commission for Human Rights (for the implementation of 
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human rights agreements locally) , and UNDP (to foster development programs and as 
a central agency for all UN initiatives). Individual grants related to civil society 
strengthening are provided through individual embassies but they are relatively small 
compared to comprehensive programs such as seen with development agencies, and 
they are meant for specific activities and in a given time. Other bilateral initiatives for 
indigenous support may exist, requiring a partnership between local organizations and 
local administrative entities in the implementation (such as sensitization activities on 
health issues) but those initiatives are not part of a comprehensive program to 
strengthen grassroots organization.  
 
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate major programs and projects in which donors reserve funds 
specific to CSOs capacity building. These programs relate mostly to peacebuilding 
efforts and democratic governance as general goals; but also to reconstruction 
development activities that are geared towards post-conflict economic sustainability as 
seen in the second figure. The major themes are used to measure areas in which 
capacity is developed and also reflect the influence of the political crisis on the donors‘ 
strategic support.  
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Figure 3: Percentage of program funds reserved for CSOs capacity building:  
Peace building theme 
 
 
Apart from partnership in service delivery for humanitarian relief and operations, 
considerable support and progress from INGOs in support of CSOs‘ capacity can be 
noted in three fields: human rights, media and the empowerment of women.  
 
As seen in Chapters Four and Five, themes related to peacebuilding are 
understood within the framework of the democratization movement of the 1980s and 
also as areas of development that are essential to the post-conflict reconstruction 
initiatives from 2000 onward.  Civil society strengthening depicted on the chart takes a 
large share (29%) since the subject represents the programs‘ goal as indicated by 
organizations surveyed. Together with youth projects (14%), concepts of gender 
diversity (10%) and conflict related activities (19%) civil society strengthening 
constitutes cross-cutting theme in various initiatives particularly after the implementation 
of the peace agreements of 2000.  Women and youth are emphasized for two main 
reasons: 1) the two groups suffer the most from war crimes and 2) they play a central 
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role in promoting reconciliation and in building a culture of peace. As such, 
peacebuilding training activities in conflict resolution targeting women and youth are 
found in health, education, media or socio-economic development programs and 
projects.   
 
Another area where international actors involve CSOs considerably has been in the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly during the first years of political unrest 
from 1993 to 2000. Those themes related to humanitarian relief and socio-economic 
recovery are illustrated in figure 4 below. Returned refugees after 2000 required many 
services including food security (17%), the settlement of land issues (8%), and the 
establishment of sustainable solutions to fight poverty (17%). Many CSOs have been 
trained or received technical assistance to carry out such activities.  
 
Figure 4: Percentage of program funds reserved for CSOs capacity building 
Other significant theme 
HIV and health related 
themes
33%
Fight against poverty
17%
Food seciity
25%
Assistance to returned 
refugees
17%
Land tenure
8%
Data analysis by the author
 
   145 
 
Health issues take a significant share of funds (33%). HIV has been a major concern, 
both as an underlying challenge in development initiatives and also as a result of war. 
Local organizations are deeply involved in the implementation of many health projects, 
particularly women organizations. This is reflected in INGOs‘ programs or project goals, 
the growth and size of women‘s organizations in the health sector, as well as their 
participation in all the major themes discussed above. 
6.1.1 Featured INGOs and selected activities in CSOs capacity building 
As we have seen in Chapter Four, not all of the donors focus on CSO capacity building in 
their objectives. Only 10% of donors provide CSO capacity building funds to the 12 
INGOs identified in Chapter Four.  
 
Selected activities in Table 10 below are those carried out under the heading of major 
themes of peacebuilding and democratic governance identified in the previous pages. 
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Table 10:  Featured INGOs from the survey questionnaire and selected CD activities 
INGO Activity with local NGOs Capacity type 
targeted 
Program Theme Local NGOs 
served
66
 
AFRICARE 
 
Organizational management training 
Organizational 
management 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
38 CSOs 
 
 Conflict resolution training: community 
leaders 
Individual 
Democracy & 
governance 
 
 
Training in advocacy techniques 
Organizational 
management 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 Financial management training 
 
Organizational 
management 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 Support in development of strategic 
plans  
Organizational 
management 
Civil Society 
strengthening  
 
 Training in decision making 
mechanisms 
 
Individual and group 
 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 Support in project planning, 
monitoring and evaluation 
Organizational 
management 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 Participatory project evaluation 
 
Community 
Development  
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 Promotion of CSOs networking 
 
Community 
development 
Civil Society 
strengthening 
 
 
Civic Education & advocacy training 
Democratic 
governance 
Democracy & 
Governance 
 
SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND (SFCG) 
 
Creation of “Studio Ijambo”: A radio 
production House 
Institutional 
 
Peacebuilding & 
media 
 
Networks+ 
Around 200 
individuals 
 
Responsible journalism training Individual 
Peacebuilding & 
media 
 
 Political dialogue project 
 
Individual 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
 
Creation of a women’s peace center 
 
Institutional 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
 
 Legal rights programme 
 
Individual and group 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
 
 Youth-recreational & communal 
activities 
Individual and group Peacebuilding 
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AGENCY FOR CO-OPERATION AND RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT (ACORD) 
 Training in communication and facilitation skills  
Individual and 
group  
 
Local governance 
88 CSOs + 
More than 1000 
individuals 
 
Training in project design, funding proposals 
and planning 
 
Organizational 
management 
 
Local governance 
 
 
 Training in social conflicts management 
Individual and 
group 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
Workshops in local governance 
 
Institutional 
 
Democracy & 
Governance 
 
 
 
Training in advocacy skills 
 
Individual and 
group 
 
Democracy & 
Governance 
 
 
 
Assistance in food security 
 
Community 
development 
 
Socio-economic 
recovery 
 
 Legal and psychological technical support 
Individual and 
group 
 
Individual rights 
 
 
 
Training on the integration of gender and HIV 
issues in projects and in work places 
Individual and 
group 
Education on gender 
and HIV AIDS 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (IFES) & GLOBAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM 
 
Discussion group activities / human rights 
Individual and 
group 
 
Peacebuilding 
Human rights CSOs and 
networks 
 
Training and technical support/ legal reform 
& judicial process  
Institutional  
 
Democracy & 
governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training in Human rights advocacy  
Institutional , 
group, 
individual  
Rule of law 
Peacebuilding 
 
Data Analysis by the author 
 
Featured INGOs are those acknowledged locally as developing the capacities of 
CSOs in major themes of peacebuilding; i.e. human rights, the media, conflict 
resolution, the empowerment of women and to some extent, the fight against HIV/AIDS 
when it is associated with individual rights and women‘s participation in sensitization 
and advocacy. A more in-depth review of the INGOs that are at the forefront of CSO 
capacity building is described in the following section.  
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AFRICARE was established in Burundi after 1995 with a specific goal to support the 
associative movement in the area of development. From 2003 to 2008, USAID funded 
the project‘s ―strengthening of the NGO Sector‖ with a strategic plan covering training 
and technical assistance to more than 30 CSOs. For the activities that address HIV/ 
AIDS, AFRICARE has a partnership with another active INGO, ACTION AID, for in-kind 
and in-cash support to the local organizations served. ACTION AID also intervenes for 
selected activities in project monitoring and evaluation. AFRICARE also works with the 
INGO Strategies for International Development (SID) for technical support in its 
activities to strengthen local NGOs in project planning, monitoring and evaluation. While 
USAID is the major donor for the AFRICARE program in Burundi to work with CSOs, 
other donors include United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for community 
development activities; United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 
assistance for training women leaders; United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) support to work with displaced groups and the World Bank (WB) for training 
the demobilized ex-combatants. 
 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) established its program in Burundi in 1995 after 
the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 to avoid similar tensions from developing in Burundi. 
Through its independent Studio Ijambo, SFCG was the first INGO to have initiated 
reconciliation of the two ethnic groups through the broadcasting of cultural-based 
entertainment programs and by establishing the independent radio station Radio 
Isanganiro. In 2005, SFCG was at the center of a media synergy that brought together 
11 media actors in a partnership to provide accurate and credible information on the 
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elections process. SFCG broadcasting programs have inspired the creation of other 
radio stations in recent years such as Radio RPA and others. 
 
In partnership with International Alert and UNIFEM, SFCG took the lead in helping local 
women‘s groups and leaders as well as youth organizations to come together in 
providing a space for dialogue and networking, and in providing training for specific 
educational activities. In 2006, SFCG‘s Women‘s Peace Centre and the Youth Project 
merged to become the Community Outreach Team (COT) to carry out community 
interventions and to support efforts by local individuals in the promotion of reconciliation, 
dialogue and collaboration. Recently, the INGO extended its programs in Burundi to 
include projects that address new concerns in the peacebuilding initiatives such as the 
reintegration and inclusion of demobilized combatants, returnees, displaced persons 
and ex-prisoners. SFCG is supported by many donors including USAID, the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA), the Belgian and Swiss cooperation and the 
European Union (EU). 
 
ACORD started its operations in Burundi in 1993 and has a focus on civil society 
strengthening in the area of peaceful reconciliation, research in socio-economic 
development projects and the empowerment women. ACORD also intervenes in HIV/ 
AIDs sensitization and has partnerships with other CSOs and INGOs to carry out its 
activities. ACORD plays a role of coordination and harmonization, research and 
methodology support in training programs carried out by CARE, AFRICARE, and the 
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local NGO Twitezimbere. The donors supporting ACORD activities are OXFAM 
International, OXFAM Novib (the Netherlands), UNICEF, DFID and others. 
 
IFES with Global Rights has been working with civil society organizations since 2000 to 
support the process of reconciliation and a return to the rule of law. Through the Great 
Lakes Justice Initiative: Promoting the Rule of Law in Burundi, IFES formed a 
consortium with the International Human Rights Law Group to merge their strengths in 
civil society capacity building and human rights advocacy. In Burundi, they work with 
local actors, particularly networks of organizations to develop communication, lobbying 
and advocacy skills on rights and issues related to the reconciliation and democratic 
process. They also address issues that include constitutional governance, human rights, 
children‘s rights, and inheritance and land law. In the capital city of Bujumbura and in 
other provinces, Global Rights provides training and technical assistance on the 
substantive and institutional capacity of human rights groups. They provide access to 
international human rights mechanisms and resources, and support key civil society 
legal initiatives, as well as public judicial processes and legal reforms. Since 2007, IFES 
has been providing financial support and targeted training to CSOs and key government 
anti-corruption institutions to address underlying corruption issues. The aim is to prevent 
the abuse of public funds, to develop the skills of key institutions in monitoring 
government spending, and in enhancing their reporting abilities. IFES supports the local 
organization Anti-corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory (OLUCOME), and 
the Burundi National Electoral commission (CENI). 
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6.1.2 Other significant organizations involved with CSOs capacity building 
Other INGOs are involved in building the capacities of CSOs, either in 
conjunction with the organizations featured above, or separately carrying out activities 
with similar themes of peacebuilding or related to socio-economic development and 
reconstruction. Those organizations include multi-lateral agencies and bilateral donors 
who carry out specific activities directly to benefit CSOs; and INGOs whose activities 
are related to civil society strengthening are noticed at a lower scale. Additional featured 
organizations include: 
 
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNOHCHR), present in Burundi since 1995 to conduct both human rights promotion 
and protection activities. Through its Promotion Unit, OHCHR helps to build civil society 
capacity to address human rights problems. It has conducted a wide range of human 
rights training seminars for members of the Government's human rights commission, 
civil society representatives, including women community leaders and members of the 
national human rights network, and for national human rights observers. In its activities, 
OHCHR Burundi coordinates closely with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Government and non-
government actors.  
 
The Belgian Development Cooperation has a program to support and involve 
local CSOs in the peace process, economic growth and gender equality. Unlike most 
other bilateral and multilateral donors in Burundi, the Belgian Cooperation provides both 
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direct and indirect institutional support to local organizations, including human rights 
CSOs, private radio and media organizations as well as heath and socio-economic self- 
help associations. Before war erupted in 1992, the Belgian cooperation worked closely 
with religious organizations. Since 2004, the focus in assistance has been more on 
human rights and media- related activities.   
 
Action Aid has been active in Burundi since 1976 and has contributed 
significantly to the peacebuilding process, working to reinstate the traditional institution 
of Bashingantahe discussed in Chapter Four. In order to revive grass-roots conflict 
resolution mechanisms across the country, Action Aid recruited more than 300 hundred 
men and women and trained them on how to deal with conflict issues in line with the 
current law. As a result, more than 250 Bashingantahe were trained on legal and penal 
procedures. Other Action Aid peacebuilding projects include support to the development 
of an orphanage Maison Shalom67, the rehabilitation and integration of ex-combatants 
and other returnees from refugee-camps. 
 
CARE started its activities in Burundi in 1994 and is active in activities related to civil 
society strengthening in partnership with other INGOs. This INGO was first involved with 
projects in the distribution of humanitarian assistance for internally displaced 
populations and returned refugees. Recent programs address social justice and 
democratization to encourage the participation of marginalized groups such as women 
and the Batwa ethnic group. The strengthening of the CSOs component in CARE 
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projects is executed with other local and international partners to provide technical 
assistance in organizational services, education in human rights, the integration of 
concepts of gender diversity and the delivery of psycho-social services to victims of 
sexual violence. 
 
 International Alert was one of the first INGOs to promote peacebuilding activities 
during the early years of political conflict.  ALERT‘s work consisted of promoting 
dialogue between the antagonistic ethnic groups and training women‘s organizations at 
the grassroots level to rebuild their communities and to promote their participation and 
the inclusion in the political peace negotiation debates. In 1995, ALERT brought 
together influential politicians from the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups and the Compagnie 
des Apôtres de la Paix in a forum for dialogue and debate which paved the way for a 
peaceful negotiated peace process.  Later, ALERT worked with the Commission for 
Peace and Justice of the Catholic Church in Burundi. In recent years, ALERT has been 
instrumental in providing advice, training and financial support in the establishment of 
the civil society organization The Observatoire de l‟Action Gouvernementale (OAG), a 
government watchdog group composed of journalists and parliamentarians who want to 
raise public awareness and increase government accountability.  
 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS Burundi) started its work in Burundi in 1963 but 
began implementing a justice and peacebuilding/reconciliation program in 1994. CRS 
intervenes primarily in the agricultural sector. As a Catholic organization, CRS works 
with churches in promoting peace and tolerance initiatives. It works within peace and 
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reconciliation committees within parishes and collaborates with other INGOs, CSOs and 
churches involved with reconciliation work such as Caritas Burundi, Diocesan 
Development Offices, the Bishops Conference various Episcopal Commissions, CARE 
and World Vision.  
6.2 REVIEW OF METHODS AND TOOLS USED BY 
INGOS 
The methods and tools discussed in this section are set out to evaluate research 
question number three, i.e. to assess practices in organizational capacity; and to 
measure indicators of project goal used by INGOs in CSOs‘ capacity building.  
 
INGOs are involved with local capacity building work within the individual 
frameworks prescribed in their scope of work. The methods and tools used to in 
conducting their activities may vary depending on the activity type and the results 
sought. When they differ, the level of education, or the location of the group or individual 
targeted is taken into account. In case the expertise to conduct a certain activity is not 
present within the organization, the INGOs sub-contract or partner with other actors with 
the required expertise in conducting the training or service desired. Table 11  a), b), c) 
and d) below represents characteristic activities conducted by INGOs, the methods 
used and indicators of achievements related to the major themes identified in CSOs‘ 
capacity building. 
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Table 11: Characteristic activities and measure of success in Institutional 
 organizational support 
 
a) Group of INGOs : Human rights 
Project type Methods/Tools Indicators  
Promotion & public 
awareness of Human 
rights  
  
Discussion groups 
Flyers 
Resource center  
 
# of individuals reached 
# Targeted groups (women, youth, 
CSOs, Traditional leaders) 
# visitors to the resource center 
Policy reform & building 
capacity for rural 
population to solve land 
disputes 
 
Mobile legal clinics  
Live radio broadcasts 
Discussion groups 
# elected officials trained 
Local ownership 
Accountability for war crimes 
Peaceful resolution of land disputes & 
inheritance issues 
Increased local awareness 
Increase local participation in legal 
reform 
Training-of- trainers & 
Institutional support 
Evaluation charts & reports 
Technical assistance workshops 
Mediation techniques 
Funds for books & computers 
Joint projects and activities with 
Human rights activists 
# of paralegals trained 
# human rights practitioners 
Increased capacity of Human rights 
CSOs and networks 
Increased coverage in the country 
 
Reconciliation and 
democratic rule   
 
Mobilization of women groups 
and network 
Training in communication, 
advocacy and lobbying skills  
Raise awareness of ethnic 
issues 
Inclusion of all ethnic groups  
Inclusion of women in decision-making 
mechanisms 
Promotion of the rule of law 
Social transformation & peaceful 
coexistence 
Support to the electoral 
system and promotion of 
good governance 
 
 
Discussion groups 
Discussion & implementation of 
the Arusha Peace Accord 
Research on the causes of 
conflict 
Refugee repatriation initiatives 
Radio broadcasts 
Wide inter-community dialogue 
Increased participation of women 
Peaceful political transition 
Decreased ethnic tensions 
Increased awareness of democratic 
governance 
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b) Group of INGOs : Peace & Media 
Project type Methods/Tools Indicators  
Support to National 
elections 
Radio broadcasts on civic and 
voter education 
Face-to-face interaction 
Multi-media campaigns 
Dramas, roundtables, and live 
call-in programmes 
Distribution of radios 
Interactive theatre 
Inclusive forums and accurate electoral  
information 
Increased women as voters and as 
candidates 
Increased transparency of elections 
 
Peace and reconciliation Creation of networks of CSOs 
Creation of partnerships 
between INGOs & CSOs 
Creation of private radio- 
production houses 
Social and cultural magazines 
Training of journalists 
Train-the-trainer programs in 
conflict resolution activities  
Increased encounter and dialogue 
between different stakeholders in the 
conflict including women & youth 
Increased national & regional coverage 
of peaceful programs  
Responsible reporting 
Foster the growth of skilled conflict 
resolution trainers and facilitators 
Increased leadership of journalists 
 
c) Group of INGOs: Peacebuilding 
Project type Methods/Tools Indicators  
Social justice and good 
governance 
 
Training in advocacy and 
communication skills 
Education in basic literacy skills 
Use of local and cultural and 
language elements 
Use of story-telling and drama  
Distribution of newsletters 
Seminars, discussion groups at 
the local & national levels 
On-air debates outside of 
government actors 
Women empowerment 
Increased decision-making capacity at 
the local level 
Increased mutual respect  
Ethnic social inclusiveness 
Increased awareness of social barriers 
and peaceful solutions 
Increased grassroots voices 
Dialogue across party lines 
Conflict resolution 
initiatives 
Training of Bashingantahe in 
human rights and modern 
techniques 
Training of women CSOs in 
conflict resolution techniques 
Creation of local and regional 
partnerships 
Sports & other activities to 
encourage dialogue 
Recourse to regional & 
international mediators and 
expertise 
 
Restructuring the traditional 
institution 
Promote community justice and 
leadership 
Inclusion & focus on women in 
decision-making mechanisms 
Increased mutual respect 
Increased solutions for land 
disputes 
Lasting solutions to national and  
political problems 
Involvement of key social groups in 
reconciliation initiatives: women, 
youth, religious actors, party 
leaders 
Peaceful repatriation of refugees 
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d) Group of INGO: Socio-economic development 
Project type Methods/Tools Indicators  
Technical assistance 
in project design, 
implementation & 
evaluation 
 
Proposal writing  
Training of trainers workshops 
Training modules for project design, 
implementation & evaluation 
Participatory methods at the 
community level 
Self-evaluation methods  
Periodic monitoring meetings 
Principals of NGO fundraising 
Steering committees for NGO 
networking 
Increased capacity of project & 
organizational management 
Increased visibility to donors 
Improve operations and quality of 
service delivery 
Increased funding level of CSOs 
Achieve sustainability 
Improve formal and informal structures 
in community 
 
HIV/AIDs & other 
health-related activities 
Surveys to collect data 
Training of AIDs educators 
Prevention & management of 
sexual violence 
Medical & psychological support to 
children traumatized by war  
Use of innovative practices in HIV 
care 
Control of malaria 
Maternal & child nutrition 
information  
Raise awareness in how to live with 
AIDS 
Increased women‘s role in decision-
making role in households & 
community 
Increased assistance to persons 
affected with AIDS, especially orphans 
Increased immunization coverage 
Nutritional improvement 
Malaria prevention 
Community 
Development 
Training of community leaders in 
micro-credits 
Rehabilitation of  community social 
infrastructures 
Livelihood & food security initiatives 
Emergency food assistance 
Increased participatory approaches  
Increased food security 
Integration of displaced people and 
returned refugees 
Increase agricultural security 
Data analysis by the author from the survey questionnaire and INGOs reports 
 
Broadly viewed, the initiatives, activities and methods outlined above are within 
the field of democracy and governance. The operations carried out reflect the objectives 
defined in the priorities of the Burundi Strategic Framework and the PRSP discussed in 
Chapter Five. These priorities put forward a culture of peace; the inclusion of a gender 
perspective in programs and projects; the engagement of civil society on issues related 
to peacebuilding; the support of legal literacy; community mediation or the socio-
economic reintegration of various groups affected by the conflict. The choice of projects 
and themes in the involvement with CSOs is therefore dictated and in line with the 
guidelines provided by donors, not only because the donors support those activities 
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financially, but because the support of CSOs in the areas described correspond to the 
needs of the moment and the general framework of peacebuilding and democratic 
governance.  
 
The INGOs whose work is devoted to strengthening the capacities of CSOs may 
differ in their missions but on the ground it is not always clear who does what. A close 
analysis of their activities shows that the projects are similar in their targeted objectives, 
the groups served or the services delivered. In many ways, the provisions of the Arusha 
Accord indicate the priorities of the peacebuilding initiatives and hence where donors‘ 
money is available. Both INGOs and CSOs who want to remain active in Burundi adapt 
to these priorities and usually are aware of the type of project that is likely to be funded 
by the donors. In other cases, as mentioned earlier, an INGO may not have the specific 
skills required to conduct the project or activity and will sub-contract with other INGOs 
locally. This may lead to overlapping themes in the INGOs‘ reports or confusion on the 
role and speciality of the different actors involved in a project. Generally, all INGOs 
maintain the original mission characterizing their organizations while watching closely 
the agenda set forth by the donors, and adjusting their mandate and programs when 
needed.  
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6.3 REVIEW OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT 
From 1993 to 2004, donors‘ funding priorities considerably influenced the 
agendas, activities and growth trajectories of local organizations. For instance, the 
availability of funds for issues of concern to women, human rights, HIV/AIDS education, 
or an increased role in policy making mechanisms stimulated the formation of new 
women‘s organizations. During the war, women were called upon to embrace other non-
traditional roles and became central to all activities related to the peace process. 
Donors largely supported their initiatives. This is illustrated not only in the policy 
directives of donors‘ programs but also by the fact that support to women is a cross-
cutting theme in all activities involving CSOs.  Together with youth- related activities, the 
gender theme represents 20 percent of all other activities (Chart 1 in Chapter Five). In 
addition, more than fifteen CSOs dealing with HIV/AIDS were created between 1992 
and 199968 alone and are classified among the most sustainable local organizations, 
this in part due to foreign aid. In this study, HIV/AIDS is an identified significant issue in 
CSO capacity building and represents 33 percent of selected donors‘ activities. 
 
 A similar pattern is found with human rights groups, the media and advocacy 
organizations that have also attracted the attention of donors in the past years. During 
the years of political instability, these civil society groups played a critical role in 
                                                 
68
 Sebudandi‟s report, p. 28 
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advancing issues related to democratization, participation in the on-going political 
debates and in responding to the increased need of voicing the concerns of 
marginalized groups. A dominant factor in budgetary allocations during the first years of 
conflict addressed emergency relief. Related emergency activities with the involvement 
of CSOs or not have been continuous from 1994 up until 2002 when a shift to 
peacebuilding and reconstruction development took place.  Overall, funds allocated to 
peacebuilding programs in CSOs strengthening projects as indicated by organizations 
surveyed range from $ 100,000 to more than $ 5 million. Access to these funds from 
donors is largely through INGOs except in cases where bilateral donors support the 
CSOs by small competitive grants ranging from $10,000 to $100,000. Budgetary 
information related to CSO capacity building in peacebuilding programs is summarized 
below. Small competitive grants given under $50,000 are not reported here as they are 
isolated and not integrated within the general scope of building the capacity of CSOs: 
 
Table 12:  Proportion of budget size allocated to NGOs according to  
capacity development themes 
NGO sector Strengthening 
Programs 
Budget range  
in US $ 
# of INGOs 
beneficiary 
Average duration of 
project(s) in years 
 
 Peace- building initiatives 
 
 Human rights 
 
 Media 
 
 Democracy & governance 
 
 
 
50,000  -    200,000 
 
200,000 -    500,000 
 
500,000 -  1,000,000 
 
1,000,000 - 5,000,000 
 
13 
 
05 
 
07 
 
05 
 
1 - 2 
 
2 - 3 
 
3 - 5 
 
3 – 5 
Data analysis by the author from the survey questionnaire and NGOs reports 
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The amounts in Table 12 indicate the value of contributed disbursements to the 
INGOs and not necessarily the official commitments from the donors69. Overall, the 
European Union and USAID provide a large share of funds in projects related to local 
capacity building and the sector of activities discussed previously.  As an illustration,  
 
o USAID‘s set of activities supports three strategic objectives, implemented by 
more than 18 different NGO and UN partners. Its Office of Transition Initiatives 
(USAID/OTI) has provided $5 million in Fiscal year 2005 to date and 
approximately $7.6 million in Fiscal year 2004 in support of peace process 
advances.  Programs supported include community based leadership and conflict 
mitigation training, vocational skills training, community conflict mitigation 
initiatives, and media programming. 
 
o The EU has disbursed up to $ 4 million in 2005 in support of 40 local 
organizations. Thematic budget lines include projects related to democratic 
governance, training for human rights actors and institutions, media, support to 
youth groups in elections, and others. 
 
o At a lower scale, due to delays in releasing funds and execution of approved 
projects, the UN peacekeeping funds is also a considerable supporter of local 
organizations. The Office‘s approved projects amounts to $26.9 million for the 
security sector ($12.48 m), governance ($11.50 m), justice and human rights 
                                                 
69
 Funding announced by donors in non-binding commitments (such as the allocations announced in the periodic 
donors‟ roundtable meetings or in documents where donors agree to contribute to the pledged funds) may be higher 
than the amounts shown. 
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actions ($2.20 m). The portion allocated to women‘s reconciliation processes in 
the community represents only one tenth of the 12 approved projects. As of 
2007, the rate of project‘s execution is at less than 10%.  
 
Local capacity building is considered in most programs as a cross-cutting theme in 
many social projects and programs of democracy and governance. Related thematic 
budgets are therefore included in the funding of social services and humanitarian 
assistance. They represent a very small percentage compared to other programs and 
projects for economic development and reconstruction. Table 13 a) and b) below show 
that local capacity building budgets may be included in the category of social services 
such as education, health or emergency assistance when applicable. It should be noted 
that some donors have specific funds for governance and civil society. They may be 
administered through the government or through the traditional ―Project Aid‖.  
 
Table 13:  a) Official donors’ assistance to Burundi ($ US m) from 2000 to 2004 
Country or Organization 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  
Germany 3.0  3.3  2.7  4.8  10.4  
Belgium  6.0  7.5  16.5  15.9  25.1  
United States 1.0  4.9  21.2  49.0  43.8  
France  4.8  4.7  7.1  4.4  34.8  
Holland  4.4  11.7  9.6  12.7  23.3  
Norway 5.3  5.7  10.2  12.2  11.9  
Great Britain 1.7  1.7  1.2  3.5  9.5  
Sweden 4.3  2.5  3.6  5.2  6.6  
Switzerland  3.4  3.9  2.4  3.3  4.9  
Total bilateral – OECD  40.9  54.7  84.7  121.2  184.3  
AID  27.6  2.2  25.0  27.6  43.3  
ABD -0.2  0.0  0.7  -0.9  -13.9  
EC 9.2  62.6  36.4  47.8  69.1  
IMF -5.1  -6.2  -2.8  -  39.1  
HRC 3.3  6.5  8.9  7.8  7.2  
WFP 2.1  7.9  5.4  6.8  3.8  
UNDP 6.4  4.5  5.4  6.0  8.9  
UNICEF  2.9  2.5  2.5  4.0  3.4  
Total multilateral  51.7  82.6  87.4  103.7  166.4  
 
 
 
   163 
Table 14:  b) Distribution of assistance 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  
Infrastructures & Social 
services  
21.4%  25.8%  30.1%  18.3%  19.3% 
Education  1.9%  2.1%  2.8%  3.2%  1.9%  
Health 5.2%  2.9%  5.1%  2.0%  1.2%  
Water & Sanitation  0.5%  0.1%  0.6%  4.2%  0.0%  
Infrastructures & economic 
services  
0.2%  0.1%  0.6%  0.1%  0.8%  
 Transports & 
communications  
0.2%  0.1%  0.6%  0.1%  0.0%  
 Energy -  -  -  -  -  
Productive sectors  2.8%  0.7%  0.9%  1.2%  0.8%  
Agriculture  2.3%  0.7%  0.7%  1.2%  0.8%  
Industry, mines, construction  0.3%  -  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  
Commerce & Tourism  -  -  -  -  -  
Multi-sectors  0.5%  0.3%  2.7%  6.1%  0.4%  
Assistance Programmes  2.3%  4.0%  7.4%  7.6%  6.4%  
Food Aid  2.3%  4.0%  1.8%  1.1%  1.8%  
Debt relief 8.9%  5.4%  3.2%  5.2%  22.9%  
Emergency assistance 63.1%  62.5%  35.8%  56.1%  48.8%  
Non specified 1.0%  1.1%  19.3%  5.4%  0.5%  
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
 
Table 15:  c) Summary of Official donors Assistance from 2005-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: OECD Statistics 
Top Ten of gross 
ODA 
(2006-07average) 
USD  
M 
1. IDA 
2. EC 
3. US 
4. Belgium 
5. UK 
6. Netherlands 
7. France 
8. Germany 
9. Norway 
10. IMF 
99 
84 
36 
31 
20 
20 
19 
19 
17 
16 
 2005 2006 2007 
Net ODA (USD) 
Bilateral share (gross ODA) 
Net ODA/GNI 
 
Net private flows ( US m) 
364 
50% 
47.0% 
 
7 
415 
54% 
47.8% 
 
-11 
466 
43% 
49.5% 
 
5 
Burundi references 
 
Population (million) 
GNI per capita (atlas USD) 
 
 
7.9 
90 
 
 
8.2 
100 
 
 
8.5 
110 
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In reviewing donors‘ funding policies in the area of humanitarian and post- 
conflict financing, inconsistencies may emerge both in nomenclature and practice. 
Different donors interpret ―humanitarian,‖ ―reconstruction,‖ ―recovery,‖ and 
―peacebuilding‖ in very different ways. Linking relief and development is broadly 
recognized as essential to building sustainable peace, but many donors have no 
mechanism for funding recovery and reconstruction work70.  While donors have clear 
authority to respond to emergencies, many have difficulty in funding reconstruction 
activities. As a result, some define ―emergencies‖ expansively.  Policy in this area is a 
source of particular frustration to INGOs, which often find themselves forced to apply for 
a series of short term grants, often for durations of only three or six months.  Those 
without on-going bilateral programs will leave a country as soon as the emergency is 
deemed to be ―over.‖ The resulting discontinuity is reflected in patchwork approaches 
on the ground and an absence of transparency in donor-partner relationships.  
 
Despite the small budgets allocated by major donors to local organizations, 
INGOs have invested significantly in projects that help Burundian organizations. In 2004 
alone, 33 INGOs used a budget of more than $ 51 million and $ 61million was projected 
for the following year. Attracting the necessary funding has not been easy either. 
Comparing Rwanda and Burundi due to the broad similarities in the political and social 
challenges of both countries, some experts have argued that Rwanda has been treated 
as a ―darling‖ by the international community, comparing it to the other ―orphans‖ of the 
Great Lakes Regions‖: Burundi and DRC.  While Rwanda benefited from substantial 
                                                 
70
 Ian Smillie. “The Quality of Money: Donor behavior in humanitarian financing” in Good Humanitarian 
Donorship. Relief Web Resources. 
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post-genocide aid allocations, Burundi was largely ignored for several years before 
2002 and was considered an international pariah71. Reasons for the preferential 
treatment could be tied to improved economic performance, good governance or other 
internal and endogenous factors favouring aid effectiveness. While the conditions in 
Rwanda improved after the genocide due to a more secure environment, the same 
criteria can be hardly explained in situations where continuous political instability and 
civil war was present in Burundi. The reality remains that donors‘ policies differ from 
country to country and decisions to support peacebuilding or post-conflict economic 
recovery remain highly strategic and political. 
6.4 KEY CHALLENGES TO CSOS’ CAPACITY 
The work and support by international actors to build a strong civil society in 
Burundi as elsewhere is viewed within the framework of the two concepts of post-
conflict peacebuilding and democratic governance.  The two concepts have been linked 
together in current development endeavor; ascribing an important role to civil society in 
both fields: solving deep rooted ethnic conflicts and promoting good governance. The 
different programs undertaken by donors discussed in this chapter have been oriented 
toward these two goals. In general, Burundi‘s CSOs are still very young; CSOs that are 
successful are few and these are financially dependent on external funding which has 
been largely limited to humanitarian and emergency type of aid.   
                                                 
71
  Analysis by Stephaan Marysee, An Ansoms and Danny Cassimon: “The Aid Darlings and Orphans of the Great 
Lakes Region in Africa” The Institute of Development and Management. Discussion Paper no 2006-10. 
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Many of Burundi CSOs are often run by members of the elite class: individuals 
who are well-educated, who held high positions in former administrations, and who have 
access and benefit from the funds provided by INGOs. The elite class has often been 
linked to their regional backgrounds shared with former administrations leaders. This 
does not mean that the contribution of the elite class to the growth and development of 
CSOs is not significant, or that they do not genuinely seek positive changes benefiting 
society. There are, however, organizations are not necessarily representative of the 
broader public interests but are, rather, business-oriented. Richard Holloway has 
termed this type of citizen organizations as ―the pretenders‖ within the categories of civil 
society organizations (2001). The pretenders represent individuals who are trying to 
earn money or power for themselves, their political party or their business. We have 
seen in Chapter Four that the socio-economic needs arising from the crisis is one of the 
major factors explaining the growth of Burundi local organizations. With the many 
changes on the political landscape due to democratization, the elite class has moved to 
the private sector more than it had before the war, either for alternative means of 
employment or simply to seek public benefits. In fact, one of the major contributions and 
achievements of INGOs has been to reduce unemployment among the well-educated 
Burundians, former government employees or small entrepreneurs who populate the 
offices of INGOs and on the field across the country. By 2005, more than 2,748 
positions were created due to the work of INGOs72. 
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Another challenge facing the growth of citizen organizations in Burundi is their 
relationship with state authorities. CSOs showing great leadership are often perceived 
as threatening by the administration since they are not under the government‘s control. 
They are therefore sabotaged, co-opted and resented73. Examples can be found with 
actors in the media and human rights. Local journalists working for private media were 
imprisoned in 2005 and 2006 for trying to expose the conspiracy behind the alleged 
coup against the current president. Alexis Sinduhije, the founder of the popular Radio 
Publique Africaine (RPA) who appeared on Time‟s 100 Most Influential People in 2008, 
was jailed for expressing his views in the same year. Other Burundians believe that 
because he is a presidential candidate for the 2010 elections, his candidacy poses a 
threat to the incumbent president. Another journalist, Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, a critic 
of corruption and human rights abuse by the new administration, has been targeted by 
the administration more than once. Threats and harassments against Radio Isanganiro 
journalists have also been common since 2005 when the current administration came to 
power. 
 
 
The challenge that most CSOs face is related to representation. Many INGOs 
and CSOs do their best to serve the general population but the representation in the 
major activities related to democracy promotion; justice/human rights remain limited 
outside the capital city. INGOs have tried to implement outreach programs by creating 
provincial offices but again, only few CSOs can compete and access that type of 
support. However, success in strengthening local capacity can be noticed by the 
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increased participation of women in many sectors in the capital and rural areas as well 
where civil society is engaged. In consequence, the rate of participation of women in 
official institutions has been increased.  Currently, the constitution calls for at least 30% 
of femele participation in official institutions including the senate and positions in the 
government. Their empowerment on a national level can be noticed in the diversity of 
women organisations and the rate of access to primary and secondary schools for girls.  
 
In this chapter, we have seen the activities and tools used to strengthen the 
capacities of CSOs. Those activities are under the themes encouraged and prescribed 
in the general framework of peacebuilding and democratization discussed in previous 
chapters. General conclusions of this research are drawn in the concluding section 
where we examine the central question of this research: Where do the CSOs in Burundi 
stand on taking up the challenges of building peace? 
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7.0   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Donors in Burundi have made substantial efforts to build the capacities of local 
organizations. The support they have provided has been and continues to be affected 
by many obstacles related to existing principles and policies prescribed in the aid 
systems, as well as the nature and national realities of non-government organizations in 
Burundi. From the programs sponsored by donors discussed in previous chapters, the 
findings confirm that donors‘ success in supporting local organizations has been limited 
to short term results, while the political emphasis on peace negotiations has had the 
greatest impact on political solutions. The program areas involving the media, human 
rights, gender and vulnerable groups have benefited mostly from donors‘ attention, 
triggering civil society organizational diversity and multiplicity around those themes. 
Multiplicity of civil society organizations is in itself commendable and is encouraged in 
donors‘ policies. However, the sustainability of promoted programs, as well as the 
autonomy of organizations that carry their implementation, remains questionable.  The 
implications of a limited autonomy and weak sustainability raise two issues for further 
research: (1) civil society participation in the Burundian context and (2) perceived 
negative effects of donors‘ incentives in the new aid paradigm. 
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7.1 CSOS PARTICIPATION IN THE BURUNDIAN 
CONTEXT 
Historical developments of the notion of civil society in Burundi indicate that its 
participation in policy-making is relatively new. Civil society functions, as perceived in 
Western societies, was a foreign concept up until the country‘s independence. The 
monarchical system that existed prior to the colonial era lasted for centuries, and 
created deep beliefs and varying perceptions of power relations in the different layers of 
the population. In the traditional system, different groups in the society had specific 
functions and political decision-making was ascribed to only a few, the Bashingantahe 
discussed in Chapter Three being among them. Democratic values introduced in the 
1960‘s brought the notion of elections and people started to identify themselves as 
belonging to ‗the majority‘ or ‗the minority‘ along ethnic lines.  
 
The transition in political systems from a monarchy to a republic run by military 
regimes for four decades may have been a small window of opportunity for the 
population to participate in political decision-making, but perceptions and practices do 
not change overnight. Traditionally, the state in the Burundian society has been 
perceived as the provider or source of all resources. In reality, individuals who hold 
public office and those connected to them by ethnicity, place of origin, family or party 
affiliation have tremendous power. It is very difficult to imagine the functions of civil 
society acting in the Western sense as a controller of the state in such a context where 
social, economic and political ties are to a large degree not distinct. Given the mistrust 
among different groups in Burundi, perhaps building social cohesion would require 
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immediacy over the political role. Edwards (2004) argues that that the mandate of many 
CSOs to build social cohesion at the community level places limits on their role as a 
political player. He suggests that ‗while trust may be the lubricant of civil society, 
hypocrisy is the Vaseline of political influence‘, Edwards proposes that, as part of their 
role in opposition to structures of power, CSOs are often also in opposition to politics. 
He argues that many CSOs choose not to engage with politics (or indeed policymaking) 
because this would compromise their independent status and ability to provide an 
alternative to state-led resources.  
 
To support the undertaking of genuine civil society organizations in Burundi 
would require efforts by the donors to understand the power relationships among the 
different actors on the political scene and in the civil society. A genuine civil society 
would imply that its organizations defend the interests of all the poor and marginalized 
groups. To name a few organizations viewed in Chapters Three and Four, there are 
groups that are fighting to apply this principle of representation to advance collective 
interests. These groups advocate for those in need and take risks to challenge the 
government: 
 
o The private radio broadcasting stations have been instrumental in informing the 
public on abuse of power by authorities, and have acted to speak for wrongfully 
convicted individuals, journalists or politicians from 2005 to the present. As 
mentioned in previous pages, the privately owned Radio Isanganiro and RPA 
have been constant targets of the ruling political party; their journalists are often 
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harassed, investigated and jailed but have continued their job of voicing the 
public‘s concerns. 
 
o Women have largely benefited from international support that paved the way for 
their increased political participation. Working in individual organizations or in 
networks, women are actively operating in the sectors of health (HIV/AIDS), 
peacebuilding, human rights and socio-economic development. Since 1993, 
women fought hard to be included in the Arusha Peace negotiations and their 
solidarity enabled their concerns regarding female inheritance and war crimes 
against women to have a much needed forum.  Facilitated by UNIFEM as well as 
other UN and regional agencies, fifty Burundian women gathered and met with 
Nelson Mandela, the appointed mediator in July of 2000 to put forward their 
recommendations for inclusion in the Burundi Peace Negotiations.  Over 50% of 
the recommendations were implemented in the Burundi Peace Accord.  Recent 
elections in 2005 have shown a dramatic increase in women elected to 
Parliament with 36 seats out of 118 being held by women. Today, women are 
largely represented in government: seven senators from the two ethnic groups, a 
vice-president, a foreign minister and the President of National Assembly are 
women. 
 
o Within the category of grassroots socio-economic organizations seen in Chapter 
Four, sustained projects are noticed among those that created partnerships or 
formed confederations. The organization PRAUTAO- solidarités paysannes is an 
example of such an organization, representing more than 350 community 
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organizations and operating in five provinces. The network of PRAUTAO 
member organizations work in socio-economic sectors across the country. 
 
The greatest criticism applied to Burundian local organizations is their 
disconnection from the rural population that they are supposed to represent. A large 
number of CSOs in Burundi operate only in the capital city and do not have enough 
representation at the grassroots level. However, there are success stories; the cases 
above are a testimony that participation and representation at the base does happen. 
7.1.1 On CSOs role Vis à Vis the Burundian state 
Local organizations in Burundi are emerging and face many structural and 
developmental challenges. Besides organizational and institutional problems, a more 
serious challenge relates to the role that civil society should play vis-à-vis government 
actions. CSOs are composed of individuals who are not immune to ethnic cleavage 
characterizing the political conflict of the last decade. It is difficult for CSOs to remain 
objective in checking the actions of the government when personal experiences from 
the civil war and a history of oppression are clouded by ethnic feelings, oppression, 
poverty and corruption.  The ability of CSOs to play a significant role in development 
and peacebuilding is dependent on several factors characterized by the social, 
economic and political situation of each country. Further research is needed to establish 
in what ways a civil society in Burundi can overcome ethnic perceptions in its functions. 
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This study was designed to assess whether or not CSOs in Burundi were up to 
the challenge to play a significant role in peacebuilding given the many obstacles that 
characterize the social and political landscape. Based on the findings of this study, it is 
clear that, while Burundi‘s CSOs have made remarkable progress in the last ten years, 
generally, their weaknesses outweigh their strengths. Weaknesses are indicated both 
by the lack of resources and by the social divide and political environment in which they 
operate. The lack of resources can be reduced to a mere technical issue to which 
donors can and do contribute, but more fundamental problems regarding the core of 
civil society are not dealt with. While success cases also exist and can be measured by 
the indicators identified in Chapter Six, Burundi‘s civil society is responsible for 
addressing   the fundamental issues. 
7.2 EFFECTS OF DONORS’ STRATEGIES ON CSOS 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
The international actors in Burundi have contributed significantly to the emerging 
civil society organizations even though evidence from funding mechanisms, the 
substance of projects or their presence nationwide may indicate minimum support. 
 
Donors‘ support in finding solutions to the political conflict concentrated heavily 
on high profile negotiations at level one of Lederach‘s pyramid, in addition to building 
the capacities of public institutions. Political parties were the most visible actors involved 
in peace negotiations while participation from civil society representatives was limited. 
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Understandably, donors cannot bypass public structures and institutional change at the 
political level is necessary. The problem is, as discussed in Chapter Five, a large 
population in Burundi that  trusts neither political leaders nor the state itself. The war 
has exacerbated poverty and has increased corruption at the top of the ethnic divisions 
that are at the root of the conflict. The support to public structures is consequently 
viewed as a waste, or in the eyes of many Burundians, destined to enrich the elite who 
are already well off.  The international community becomes, willing or not, part of the 
corruption machine. Donors need to understand and respond to the political dynamics 
of a country. Turning a ―blind eye‖ to corruption only increases the weakness of public 
institutions and their accountability to the population.   
 
Support to civil society organizations is a more recent approach. Donors have 
relegated this task to INGOs who invested heavily in humanitarian services, 
predominant from 1993 to 2002. As seen in Chapter Six, the efforts to encourage and 
promote pro-democracy, justice and human rights CSOs have met some success 
(private media, human rights and women advocacy) although representation outside of 
the capital is still limited. Some factors prevent INGOs from achieving even more fruitful 
results: 
 
o Their projects tend to be small, lack flexibility to adapt to local environments and 
do not have any long-term vision that can allow adequate follow-up. One 
informant I interviewed indicated that a UN project invested much money in 
sponsoring research on local civil society but that there had not been any 
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 follow-up on any of the recommendations suggested by members of the civil 
society. The expediency with which most projects operate does not leave room to 
understand the social and political dynamics discussed above, nor the culture 
and the people they work with. The general objective of peacebuilding activities 
involves creating an attitude conducive to sustainable peace. It is a long-term 
project and invariably requires major attitudinal and societal changes with a long 
vision. It becomes difficult and probably not that valuable to assess every small 
intervention in the light of this overall objective. 
 
o The availability of funds from donors and sub-contracting deals has led to a 
multitude of opportunistic INGOs that compete for donors‘ money. This promotes 
competition to the detriment of needed collaboration between INGOs. Among 
NGOs, a strong dynamic of self-preservation often guides their work, making 
them less than fully accountable to or representative of the communities with 
whom they work.   
7.2.1 Aid harmonisation vs. ownership 
Under the new aid paradigm, aid is increasingly being perceived as a collective 
effort. While the collective strategy may advantage donors and even governments, the 
drive to centralize development funds will not prioritize civil society development. Civil 
society will become reliant on governments for continued funding with the risk of 
subordinating their priorities to those of their state. 
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One important goal, and at the same time a challenge of aid harmonization, is 
the promotion of country ―ownership‖. The expectation is that national development 
strategies will provide a strategic policy framework oriented towards results that donors 
can support. The challenge lies in the fact that the Paris Declaration on the coordination 
of aid signed in 2005 does not show how this ownership can be achieved.74 Country 
ownership, as envisioned in the Paris Declaration involves having national development 
strategies that are not simply condensations of government priorities and objectives 
(e.g. PRSP) but that also incorporate the views and needs of other relevant national 
social sectors. The 2005 World Bank/IMF review of the PRS approach acknowledged 
that, while the process has expanded the space for dialogue over time, participation has 
remained broad rather than deep. The challenge of developing and implementing the 
PRS is even more daunting in post-conflict countries. The political and economic 
realities in these countries impose additional constraints on the capacity of their national 
leadership to lead the dialogue. The quality of government institutions and the capacity 
of the state are central to this vision; in cases where elites lack a political commitment to 
development, they will not truly own a national development strategy. What is at stake is 
thus the degree to which domestic political processes are capable of creating more 
legitimate, representative and inclusive, as well as more effective state institutions.75 We 
have seen that this in itself is a challenge in the case of Burundi. 
                                                 
74 Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal: Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda. In 
Development Policy Review, 2007, 25 (5): 543 
75 Ibid.
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several recommendations stem from this discussion and need more research. 
The most important aspect of civil society capacity building is the consideration of 
contextual differences. In the case of Burundi, the traditional values that held societal 
ties have been broken; it would be beneficial for Burundians to revisit traditional values 
and norms that promote citizenship and national unity in order to achieve peace. 
Reviving the institution of Bashingantahe is one option. Efforts to model the institution to 
modern standards were initiated timidly but it needs to be incorporated in the public 
structures. 
 
Another observation is that the understanding of the root cause of ethnic conflicts 
is complex. Donors need to create a long vision strategy in providing not only technical 
support but also engagement in understanding the power differentials existing in the 
country. Their support can emphasize more bottom-up approaches in practice, i.e., by 
engaging in policy planning that incorporates more local-level participation, and by 
developing direct approaches to work with civil society organizations rather than relying 
solely on the visible public institutions. Often, local participation in policies is reduced to 
involvement with the local governance entities. Local governance represents the 
administration at the local level but it is also part of the corrupted machine. There are 
other social networks that need to be discovered. 
 
There is very little research on Burundi civil society. Students who might be 
interested in development activities in post-conflict countries, in ethnic relations or in 
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peacebuilding would have substantial topics to research that can bring considerable 
contribution to the scholarly community. There is a tendency to compare Burundi to the 
case of Rwanda where much attention has been directed after the genocide. But 
substantial differences exist in their histories, political developments, and even their 
people‘s views on ethnic coexistence. The lack of substantial scholarly research is 
matched with a neglect noticed on the part of donors, whose financial support to 
Burundi is minimal compared to other countries in conflict, including Rwanda. Perhaps 
the neglect is justified by the lack of accountability of the recipient public institutions. 
The complex issues involved in this failure provide also a rich source of subjects to 
research. 
 
Donors‘ strategies to help Burundi have been driven by international standards 
but also by individual bilateral relations and policies. Building the capacities of civil 
society is an ambitious enterprise that involves Burundians first and an international 
community that needs to be patient and understanding.  
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8.0  APPENDICES 
8.1 APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Interviews conducted: 
o Country Director, USAID/Burundi 
o Information Officer at the European Commission 
o Program officer at DFID 
o Program Officer at the Belgian Embassy 
o Representative of AFVP (Association Française des Volontaires pour le Progrès) 
o Program Officer, UNICEF 
o Project Leader, Democracy & Governance unit, UNDP Bujumbura 
o Program Coordinator, OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 
o Program officer, OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
o Program Officer, The World Bank 
o National Coordinator, UNIFEM 
o Program officer, ARCANE (Projet d'Appui et de Renforcement des Capacités des 
Acteurs Non Étatiques) EU consulting Project 
o  Director, Search for Common Ground 
o Operations officer, AFRICARE 
o Country representative, ACORD 
o Director, FORSC 
o Director, OAG  
o Representative, RESO 
o Human rights activists, Ligue Iteka 
o Researcher, Burundi Civil Society 
o Researcher, CNCA (Government Office for the Coordination of foreign aid) 
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2. Survey questionnaire on Burundian NGO capacity building 
 
Part I.   
 
1. Select a description that fits your organization: 
 
 Financial institution   Multilateral organization 
 Bilateral organization  International NGO 
 Development agency   Regional organization 
 Private volunteer organization  National NGO 
 Other (Specify):    
 
2. Start date of operations in Burundi ______________________ (month & year) 
 
3. a. What is your organization’ role/mission in Burundi? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. b. Do you work with domestic/national organizations? Do you work with 
international organizations? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5. How do you deliver your services? Check all that applies:  
 
a: Direct assistance to the government of Burundi______ 
b. Directly to the local organization _______ 
c. Through another organization__________ 
d. Other (specify) _____________________   
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Part II.   
 
1. Name the program/project that involve a Burundian organization   
 
 Name of the Program/Project (P) 
 
Life of 
program/project 
From (year):      To: 
 
   
P1   
P2   
P3   
P4   
 
 
2. What type of activities do you have for the listed programs/projects above?  
 
Institutional (CD1) ________ Organizational (CD2) ___________ Individual (CD3)_________  
 
3. In your opinion, how has the ethnic conflict in Burundi influenced the choice of 
your program/project? P1-4 refers to the previous table: 
Program/Project  No 
influence 
Some 
influence 
Considerable 
influence 
A great deal of 
influence   
P1     
P2     
P3     
P4     
 
4. Indicate below what activity you conduct in Burundi. Check all that apply.   
 Conflict prevention (CD type1)  Youth related (CD type 7) 
 Conflict resolution education (CD 
type 2) 
 Economic activity (CD type 8) 
 Peacebuilding (CD type 3)  Health-related (CD type 9) 
 Humanitarian Assistance 
 (CD type 4) 
 Religious- related (CD type 10) 
 Human rights (CD type 5)  Education (CD type 11)     
 Media related (CD type 6)      Other (CD type 12)     
 
 
5. On average, what is the duration of the primary activities you are involved in? 
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Six months to 1 year ____1-2 years _____ 2-3 years_____ 3-5 years _____5 years and 
more   
 
 
6. Do you collaborate with other organizations or share partnerships with other 
organizations in the service delivery? Please list them: 
a. d. 
b. e. 
c. f. 
 
 
7. Financial assistance for the programs/projects on to Q.4:  
  
Allocated budget 
FBU____________________ 
$0-50,000                   
 
FBU____________________ 
$50-100,000               
 
FBU____________________ 
$100,000-150,000      
 
FBU____________________ 
$150,000-200,000      
 
FBU___________________ 
$200,000-250,000      
 
 FBU___________________ 
$250,000-500,000      
 
FBu____________________ 
$500,000-1,000,000   
 
FBU____________________ 
$1,000,000 and more 
 
Program/project/activity name 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
_______________________________ 
 
_______________________________ 
 
_______________________________ 
 
_______________________________ 
From(year):      To: 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
__________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
___________________ 
 
 
 
   184 
Part III. 
 
1. Who participates in setting the priorities of the local NGO/group? Check all 
that apply.  
 
Donors‘ executive staff _______ 
Burundian NGO representative ____ 
Other partner organization (s) _____ 
Other stakeholders in the same domain of intervention ____ 
A government representative _____ 
 
2. How often do you have consultation with Burundian NGO(s)/group(s) you 
work with? 
 
Daily ___Once a week ____Once a month ___ Every 2 months ____ 
 Other (indicate) ___  
 
3. How do you determine whether your program/project is meeting its 
objectives/goals?  
 
4. a. Do you have a formal evaluation built into your programs/projects? 
Yes ____ No_____ 
 
If so, what methods or tools do you use to determine the success of your 
program/project initiatives and the progress of your activity? 
_________________ 
_________________ 
_________________ 
_________________ 
 
 
5. Does your program/project respond to policy changes and/or internal or 
external mandates? 
 
 Such as:  Flexibility to change the program/project design or activities (internal); 
Adaptation to other similar programs/project within the community (external) 
 
Example (1) _________________________________________________ 
Example (2) _________________________________________________ 
Example (3) _______________________________________________ 
Example (4) _________________________________________________   
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6. What type of challenges do you have or foresee concerning your activity 
or intervention? Explain: 
 
___________________________________________________________________  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Comments:  
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time 
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8.2 APPENDIX B: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO 
INFORMANTS 
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8.3 APPENDIX C: LIST OF DONORS AND 
REGISTERED INGOS IN BURUNDI  
1. Donors 
UN Agencies & 
Multi-Lateral 
Bilateral /  Cooperation 
  FAO 
 OCHA 
 OHCHR 
 BINUB 
 UNDP 
 UNESCO 
 UNFPA 
 UNHCR 
 UNICEF 
 WB 
 IMF 
 WFP 
 WHO 
 
Belgian Cooperation 
Chinese Cooperation 
DFID 
ECHO 
European Commission 
French Cooperation 
Germany Embassy 
Italian Cooperation 
JICA 
Netherlands 
Royal Norwegian 
Embassy 
Swiss Cooperation 
USAID 
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2. INGOS 
AAA    Agro Action Allemande 
AAB    ActionAid Burundi 
AC    AFRICARE 
ACF    Action Contre la Faim 
ACCORD    African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
ACORD    Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development 
ADRA    Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
ADG    Aide au Développement Gembloux 
AHA    Africa Humanitarian Action 
ARM    African Revival Ministries 
AFVP    Association Française de Volontaires pour le Progrès 
ARP    Austrian Relief Program 
AVSI    Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internationale 
ASF    Avocats Sans Frontières 
CA    Christian Aid 
CARE    CARE International 
CSI    Caritas Secours International 
CCM    Comitato Collaborazione Medica 
CECI    Centre Canadien d'Étude et de Coopération 
CISV    Communita Impregno Servizio Volontario 
CONCERN  CONCERN Worldwide 
CRS    Catholic Relief Services 
CORDAID  Catholic Organization for Relief and Development 
CORD  Christian Outreach - Relief and Development 
DaPaDu  Dalla Parte Degli Ultimi 
DCA  Danish Church Aid 
FSD  Fondation Suisse de Déminage 
GVC  Gruppo Voluntariato Civile 
HI-B  Handicap International - Belgique 
HI-F  Handicap International - France 
IBS  International Bible Society 
ICCO  Interchurch Organisation for Development Co-operation 
IMC  International Medical Corps 
I-Oxfam  Intermon Oxfam 
IRC  International Rescue Committee 
ISCOS  Institut Syndical pour la Coopération au Développement 
JRS  Jesuit Relief Services 
GR  Global Rights 
LVIA  Lay Volunteers International Association 
MSF-B  Médecins Sans Frontières - Belgique 
MSF-H  Médecins Sans Frontières - Hollande 
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council 
NCA  Norwegian Church Aid 
OAP/FPED   Opération d'Appui à l'Autopromotion / Fondation pour l'Étude du Développement 
Oxfam - Q  Oxfam Québec 
PREFED  Programme d'Étude et d'Échange de Formation pour le Développement 
PSI  Population Santé International 
RCN  Réseau des Citoyens 
SFCG  Search for Common Ground 
SOL  Solidarités 
TDH  Terre des Hommes 
TF  TearFund 
TPO-HN  Transcultural Psycho-social Organisation 
TSF  Terre Sans Frontière 
VESOS  Village d'Enfants SOS 
VISPE  Volontari Italiana par la Soliedarieta Emergente 
WR  World Relief 
WVI  World Vision International 
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8.4 APPENDIX D:  POLITICAL MAP OF BURUNDI 
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8.5 APPENDIX E:  AFRICA MAP 
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